*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2023 KCIS Conference volume that was published Nov. 2024

In the Canada’s Future Army process that culminated in the three publications during 2015 to 2017, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1: Methodology, Perspectives and Approaches, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 2: Force Employment Implications, and Canada’s Future Army, Volume 3: Alternate Worlds and Implications, the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (CALWC) identified four future world scenarios. These future worlds were developed in a strategic foresight and alternative futures process that included environmental scanning,[1] a futures wheel,[2] hindsight,[3] and red teaming,[4] along with a seminar war game cycle that included a wide range of both military and civilian participants from a variety of fields.[5] A general assumption underlying the process, and therefore all the future worlds, is that, “Uncertainty is a predominant characteristic of the future security environment. For that reason, it is impossible to accurately predict what it will yield.”[6] Future world scenarios were not expected to be perfectly accurate predictions, but rather benchmarks which could be revisited at regular intervals to identify major trends and patterns in unfolding events.

Given geopolitical events between 2017 and 2023, one of the future worlds, Global Quagmire, drew our interest in the above context. A number of the characteristics of Global Quagmire resemble recent developments; it includes a failure to effectively implement solutions to deal with environmental issues, a zero-sum view of international affairs in many parts of the world, and pessimistic, short-term and reactive views of security and how it is achieved.[7] As the CALWC authors stated: “Cooperation is muted; conflict, both armed and otherwise, is widespread.”[8] However, the key driver for these problems in the Global Quagmire scenario was increasingly scarce and unsustainable energy supply.[9] By contrast, between 2017–2024 no true resource scarcities arose—although from the point of view of managing climate change the sustainability of ongoing fossil fuel production is questionable, and the potential for scarcities to arise in key resources such as lithium exists. Questions of sustainability may have a greater influence on events in coming years and decades, but the significant shift towards a geopolitical scenario with notable Global Quagmire-like elements in only seven years from 2017 to 2024 likely must have other key drivers that exacerbate resource scarcities. Our argument here is that the key driver has simply been a global mindset increasingly characterized by extremism and a lack of desire to negotiate, rather than resource constraints, that drives a pattern of development in the world’s security environment. Contrasting the pattern of events with the Global Quagmire future world scenario of 2017 is important as the lack of recent and near-term resource constraints underscores the importance that extremist and maximalist thinking is having geopolitically.

To support this argument, we consider seven developments of the past several years. First is the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016 and the associated further increase in polarization in American politics, an acceleration of a trend that had in some respects been underway since the 1990s. The second is the 2016 “Brexit” referendum in the United Kingdom which led to that country withdrawing from the European Union. Third is the ideologically charged reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic, including a variety of conspiracy theories and the so-called “Freedom Convoy” protest against vaccine mandates in Canada. Fourth is the decisions of both the Trump and Biden administrations in the U.S. that led to a poorly executed withdrawal from Afghanistan and a return of the Taliban to power in that country in 2021. Fifth is the outbreak of the current Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 (expanding on a conflict that started in 2014), and sixth is the Israel-Hamas conflict beginning on October 7, 2023. Seventh is the Yemen civil war ongoing since 2014, which has now become intertwined with the Israel-Hamas conflict with Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and U.S. and U.K. air strikes against targets in Yemen. Each of these developments can provide the basis for major research projects on its own, so the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of these events as relates to the pattern of increasingly extremist and maximalist thinking alongside a mindset that is increasingly biased against negotiation and positive-sum settlements.

Each of these seven developments is potentially a trend setter and transformative of the post-Cold War order. Each is also symptomatic of the increasing inability of both status quo and revisionist states to compromise and maintain the stability of the international system. In particular, the Trump phenomenon, though arising from domestic U.S. politics, has far reaching international implications. It dealt a blow to elements of consensus in Washington’s bipartisan politics that had remained largely unchallenged in the immediately preceding decades. At the international level this meant a new agenda including America First, protectionism, and a further increase in unilateralism. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan signalled the end of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror operations and with it the demise of the renewed emphasis on nation building missions of the 2001–2021 period, while Brexit questioned the late and post-Cold War economic liberal order in Europe. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine dealt a blow to European stability and challenged NATO influence even while driving alliance expansion to include neutral countries—Finland and prospectively Sweden—that had not previously been expected to join in the foreseeable future. Finally, the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel targeted the most important U.S. ally in the Middle East in a very dramatic way and created the geopolitical situation in which Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea began.

U.S. Presidential Elections 2016 and After

A very closely split electorate has been an aspect of U.S. politics at least since the 2000 presidential election, in which Republican candidate George W. Bush lost the popular vote by a thin margin to Democratic candidate Al Gore but nonetheless won in the electoral college.[10] Analysis of the U.S. 2016 presidential election in the Pew Research Center’s 2018 report underscores the continued increasing polarization of the American political landscape. Similarly to 2000, there was a discrepancy between the popular vote and the electoral college result. Pew notes that while Trump won in the electoral college, its examination of post-election surveys of verified U.S. voters showed 48 percent reporting voting for Hillary Clinton and 45 percent for Donald Trump, while the official national vote result was 48 percent of the vote for Clinton, and 46 percent for Trump.[11]

Noting other resources on the election such as U.S. National Election Pool exit polls, American National Election Studies, and the Current Population Survey’s Voting and Registration Supplement, Pew states that its report “reaffirms many of the key findings about how different groups voted.”[12] These include that “race was strongly correlated with voting preference” and that “wide educational divisions among white voters seen in other surveys are even more striking in these data.” The Pew analysis finds that among “whites with a four-year college degree or more education,” “far more (55%) said they voted for Clinton than for Trump (38%). Among the much larger group of white voters who had not completed college (44% of all voters), Trump won by more than two-to-one (64% to 28%).” It notes that there “were large differences in voter preferences by gender, age and marital status,” with “the gender gap” being “particularly large among validated voters younger than 50,” and that “voter choice and party affiliation were nearly synonymous” with voting being “strongly correlated with ideological consistency.” Additionally, the Pew report found that: “As in previous elections, voters in 2016 were sharply divided along religious lines,” and that there were “striking demographic differences” between those who voted and those who did not bother to vote, with non-voters “more likely to be younger, less educated, less affluent… non-white,” and more likely to favour the Democratic party were they to vote.

The immediate reaction to election of Donald Trump in many American media sources was reflective of ongoing polarization. For example, the New Yorker ran an article titled “An American Tragedy” which characterized the election of Trump as “a triumph for the forces, at home and abroad, of nativism, authoritarianism, misogyny, and racism.”[13] In the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, Trump was defeated by Joe Biden in an election in which, according to Pew, voter turnout rose by seven percentage points over 2016, but only by a four-point margin in the popular vote.[14] Over the several years from 2016 to 2024, several attempts were made in the U.S. Congress to impeach Trump, while Biden’s political opponents in the Congress have also launched “investigations” into impeaching him during his presidency. There has been widespread refusal to accept the 2020 election results amongst Trump supporters, with many accusations and conspiracy theories about electoral fraud. The January 6, 2021, insurrectionist riot in which Trump supporters broke into the U.S. Congress, and the subsequent attempts in some states to disqualify Trump from running in the 2024 election on the grounds that he supported an insurrection in January 2021, such as that by the Colorado Supreme Court, are indicative of an ongoing highly charged mindset in American politics.

Many academic analyses and think tank forecasts emphasize that the 2024 U.S. presidential elections will be an event of high importance to watch in terms of its impact on international stability generally and on Western alliance systems and regional partnerships in particular. Given the unfolding challenges in Eastern Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and the fate of globalization, increasing polarization in American society and the possible actions of Trump if he regains the presidency, such as threats to withdraw from NATO, the rest of 2024 and the election is likely to bring further uncertainty in an already polarized international environment.[15]

Brexit

The U.K.’s decision to withdraw from the European Union should read as symptomatic of general malaises within the European Union (E.U.) regarding the tensions between individual sovereignties and Brussels. Issues such as refugees, immigration, relations with China, perceptions of a Russian threat, the future of NATO and the rise of right-wing political parties to power already form inflection points between countries such as Hungary and Poland or Slovakia[16] on one side and other members such as France and Germany.

Trade disruption and economic uncertainty were two key economic impacts of the U.K. referendum decision to withdraw from the E.U. that came into force on January 31, 2020.[17] The exit of the U.K. from the E.U. single market and customs union led to increasing business costs with ripple effects on international trade and supply chains. Foreign investment and trade flows between the E.U. and the U.K. have also been seriously affected by uncertainty due to the multi-year ongoing negotiations between the two from the 2016 referendum to the ratification of the U.K. withdrawal by both the U.K. and the E.U. in 2020. Moreover, wider E.U. foreign policy and cooperation were strained by the prolonged negotiations over trade, fisheries and the Northern Ireland Protocol during this period, in addition to the impact of a core member nation voting to withdraw. This was followed by further challenges to E.U. cohesion and unity arising from subsequent debates over Italexit, Frexit and dissension from countries such as Hungary and Poland over Brussel’s policies. Unity arising from a reaction to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine may have delayed some of these internal divisions to a later time, but in other respects, especially by the end of 2023, disagreement over the extent of support for Ukraine threatened to reopen divisions both within the E.U. and NATO.[18] The U.K. had to turn towards strengthening ties with countries outside the E.U., including the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan, a process that has not been without difficulties, such as a failure to successfully conclude trade negotiations with Canada in January 2024.[19]

A rebalance of alliances, driven both by economic fallout of events such as Brexit, and changing military priorities, could have wider geopolitical implications. The AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. excluded the “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing partners Canada and New Zealand. The centerpiece of AUKUS, the development of Australian nuclear submarines based on U.S. and U.K. technology, exacerbated French frustrations from the cancellation of the Australian agreement to procure French-built submarines.[20] Coverage of the cancellation of the Austalia-France submarine detail, including coverage of comments from Australian politicians, generally links the two events. Because Australia, the U.S., and the U.K. developed the AUKUS agreement, Australia cancelled the French submarine procurement around the same time that AUKUS was announced. Perhaps a different version of this sentence, such as: The centerpiece of AUKUS, the development of Australian nuclear submarines based on U.S. and U.K. technology, caused the cancellation of the Australian agreement to procure French-built submarines, exacerbating French frustrations with this group of its allies.

Subsequently, France did not join the U.K. and U.S. air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen at the beginning of 2024 and opted to have the frigate Languedoc escort vessels with “French interests” through the Red Sea independently of the American-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. The partially independent nature of the French deployment is further suggested by French navy leadership making separate statements defending the use of expensive missiles by the Languedoc to shoot down Houthi drones, although British and American vessels have also used missiles. While the U.K. is still a member of NATO and remains committed to European security, geopolitical developments such as Brexit and AUKUS could have an impact on collective security efforts. British pivoting could also mean international trade regimes and agreements undergoing at least some amount of reshaping that are less stable and predictable than during the post-Cold War period. Such developments open the prospect of new uncertainties over the roles of both the U.K. and the E.U. as global actors in fields such as foreign policy, defence, and international development.[21]

Pandemic Tensions

The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated internal tensions within democracies, not only over issues such as protectionism and the effectiveness of public institutions, but also over trust towards the very legitimacy of the government and, more importantly, the perception of truth. Conspiracy theories arose alongside an increase in the extremist views that, as seen above, had already been gradually developing on both the left and right, creating significant opportunities for malicious cyber activities and information warfare from both state and non-state adversaries. The societal resiliency of democracies has been seriously tested by these events, and it is debatable whether governments and political elites showed sufficient inclusive leadership to address these challenges. Doubts about the effectiveness of leadership are illustrated by, for example, the ruling by a judge that the federal Liberal government was unjustified in using the Emergencies Act to bring an end to the “Freedom Convoy” protesting vaccine mandates in Ottawa and key Canada-U.S. border crossings during the winter of 2022,[22] even though various concerns arose at the time about right-wing extremism within the protest. The federal government stated that it disagrees with the ruling and plans to appeal, showing that differences in views over these pandemic-related events persist.

Beyond creating conditions for further growth of extremism within countries, the pandemic also accelerated pre-existing tensions related to international instability and geopolitical conflict and created new challenges. Disruption of global trade created an economic downtown that governments partially counteracted with increased spending, leading in turn to a period of elevated inflation and higher interest rates, as well as significant volatility in stock markets. These conditions led to business closures, job losses, and decreased growth, and fiscal strain due to reprioritization of resources for funding healthcare, economic relief, and vaccine distribution that all further increased rising national debts and budget deficits. In many cases “vaccine nationalism” occurred in which countries secured medical supplies and healthcare resources for their own citizens before providing aid to other regions due to lack of stockpiled personal protective equipment, production capacity, and supply chain deficiencies, adding to mistrust in interstate relations. Mistrust over the accuracy of pandemic data reporting by some states also contributed.

Criticism of pandemic management by international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations arose, leading to the threat of more serious disruptions when some countries started the process of ending their involvement with, and withdrawing funding from, these organizations.[23] Such weakening of trust and support combined with other criticisms of how international organizations have managed climate change, nuclear proliferation, and escalating military tensions. The negative effects on interstate trust, driven by factors such as data reporting, vaccine distribution, and the diversion of governmental resources towards pandemic management, have led to the emergence of geopolitical vacuums, presenting opportunities for destabilizing actors and states to exploit. As a result, societal vulnerabilities to non-conventional threats have increased. These include potential re-emergence of concerns regarding biological agents’ dangers and conspiracy theories surrounding the origins of new infectious diseases and their vaccines. Moreover, there is heightened vulnerability to cyber activities exploiting and amplifying such fears. Public discontent over lockdowns, travel restrictions, and social distancing measures spilled over into the domain of political instabilities and polarization, adding to a deficit of social capital. Authoritarian tendencies were reaffirmed as some governments exploited the pandemic as a pretext to consolidate power, restrict civil liberties, and repress dissent.[24]

Withdrawal of the U.S.-Led Coalition from Afghanistan

The resurgence of the Taliban was the immediate result of the U.S.-led coalition’s withdrawal. Afghanistan went back to square one: the situation in which the Taliban was the source of regional and international instability, including by its harbouring of Al-Qaeda. Once again ruled by an extremist Sunni regime, Afghanistan is potentially turning into a safe haven for extremist groups with global agendas such as ISIS in Khorasan, as well as other forms of transnational crime, such as drug and human trafficking. Neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and various central Asian states, have increased their interference to counter the spill-over of the Afghan crisis, especially in the forms of extremism, refugees, and criminality into their territories. Similarly, major world powers such as Russia and China are using the weakness of the Taliban government and the partial power vacuum centered on Afghanistan to expand their influence and promote their regional and global interests.

U.S. credibility and reliability as a global security partner has diminished due to the chaotic nature of the withdrawal and the collapse of U.S. strategic objectives in the region, and regional U.S. partners might shift towards Russia and China for security and trade cooperation.[25] As a result, the very ability of Western-led coalitions to counter terrorism via international missions has come under question, at least to an extent, as has the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism measures and strategies. Moreover, despite any statements to the contrary the commitment and ability of the Taliban to counter terrorism is uncertain. The humanitarian crisis that has developed since the return of the Taliban to power is reflected in the Afghan refugee crisis as part of a growing global refugee crisis. Additional violations of human rights, especially those of women, can be seen as a result of the lack of coordination and cooperation between international actors—states and non-governmental organizations alike—to address these challenges.[26]

Wars: Russo-Ukraine, Hamas-Israel, and Houthi Raids

The final three of the seven significant geopolitical developments that we consider in this paper are the ongoing conflicts including the Russo-Ukraine war, the Hamas-Israel war, and the Houthi raids on shipping in the Red Sea, including U.S.-U.K. air strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. These events came as a surprise to many Western analysts and commentators, despite some warning signs, but the manner in which events unfolded may also have been unexpected to those who initiated events, suggesting a slide into an increasingly unpredictable quagmire world for a variety of actors including nuclear states.

In the case of Ukraine, warning signs included the Russian military operation into Georgia in 2008, allegedly in support of the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, during which Georgian resistance was ineffective and NATO and Western support to Georgia was weak, and the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and support for an insurgency by Donbas separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. As with the Georgian case in 2008, Western support for Ukraine in 2014 was indecisive and sanctions imposed on Russia were weak. Ukrainian civil society and the Ukrainian military appeared to be not strong enough to resist Russian incursions and maintain the unity of the country.

In February 2022, many observers believed that the Russian military buildup near the borders of Ukraine was a bluff to put pressure on NATO as well as the Ukrainian government, given that it seemed Russia could achieve its objectives of keeping Ukraine out of the E.U. and NATO by maintaining a “frozen conflict” in Luhansk and Donetsk similar to the situations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. However, there was also a widespread view that if the Russians did invade, Ukrainian resistance would again be ineffective. The vigorous resistance, epitomized by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement “I need ammunition, not a ride”[27] when the U.S. offered to evacuate him from Kyiv in the opening days of the Russian invasion, was unexpected both to many Western observers and to the Russian government. For example, a RadioFreeEurope article on this subject was entitled: “How Did Everybody Get The Ukraine Invasion Predictions So Wrong?”[28] Amongst the examples that it cites is the comment by Clint Reach, a defence researcher at the RAND Corporation and a former Russian linguist in the U.S. Navy and Defense Department, that he was, “was surprised with how well the Ukrainians performed and how poorly the Russians executed.”[29] Analyzing this political and military surprise, Michael Clarke, Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at King’s College London in the U.K. and Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) from 2007 to 2015, has commented that Putin didn’t intend for a “forever war” to develop, but he “is now riding the tiger” with no choice but to keep on, even if he “doesn’t exactly know what he wants to happen next.”[30] The combination of the maximalism of the foreign policy and military objectives of the Putin government in Russia with unexpected Ukrainian military effectiveness and political will to resist led to a protracted, and ongoing conflict which has continued into early 2024.

The continuation of this conflict has had ongoing ramifications for both the international system and the internal politics of trade blocks, alliances, and other countries. In the case of NATO, the full-scale Russian invasion prompted Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, thereby contributing to eastwards NATO expansion by which the Putin government had claimed to be threatened. At the same time, it also contributed to internal tensions within the alliance, with Turkey and Hungary delaying ratification of Swedish membership in particular due to their own perceived concerns.[31] Within the E.U., as of early 2024, the Hungarian government was also blocking a significant aid deal to Ukraine as a result of its tensions with the rest of the bloc. In the U.S., the decision of the Biden administration to send cluster munitions to Ukraine in summer 2023 caused internal debate. Military aid to Ukraine subsequently became linked by U.S. Congressional politics to immigration policy and security along the U.S.-Mexico border, with much of the Republican Party blocking further military aid to Ukraine unless Democrats agree to far more stringent—some have said draconian—measures on immigration.[32] Maximalist war aims in a conflict in one part of the world have thereby become directly linked to increasing extremism in other regions.

Similar to Ukraine, the open conflict that erupted between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2024, came as a surprise to many observers, even though Hamas is a militant group that has been hostile towards Israel throughout its existence, including a series of smaller-scale conflicts. The extent to which the Israeli government and defence forces and the U.S. intelligence community had prior warning of the Hamas incursions into southern Israel is debated, with some evidence suggesting that certain detailed knowledge may have become available but was dismissed due to the belief that Israeli defences and military effectiveness provided a sufficient deterrent.[33] Nonetheless, Hamas carried out what was in some respects the most significant attack on Israel since 1973, and what the Center for Strategic and International Studies has evaluated as one of the worst terrorist attacks in history and the third deadliest terrorist attack since 1970.[34] International organizations operating in the Middle East may have been penetrated by Hamas-linked extremism, as illustrated by the investigation into several employees of the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) opened on Friday, January 26, 2024, by the U.N.[35] The employees are accused of participating in the October 7 attack, and the investigation has led Canada and other countries to pause funding to UNRWA.[36] Nonetheless, Hamas extremism has also driven further extremism within Israel and elsewhere. The Israeli military operation in the Gaza strip in response to the Hamas attack has by most estimates caused heavy civilian casualties and led to accusations of genocide, with some analyses claiming that “Israel’s image has collapsed”[37] globally even while “the Israeli public imagines itself to be a besieged people facing death, with no option but resistance even to the point of suicide.” Furthermore, the Israel-Hamas conflict has contributed to the expansion of conflict in Yemen to include Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.

The American-led response to Houthi raids on shipping, Operation Prosperity Guardian, has already been partially discussed above in our section on Brexit. The Houthi attacks on international shipping arose, in part, due to the unresolved Yemeni Civil War, a larger regional proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran—although Saudi forces, in Operation Decisive Storm, were also directly involved in the civil war between 2015 and 2022. This situation left Houthi militants in control of large parts of Yemen bordering the Red Sea, although the international community has not recognized them as a legitimate government. The Houthis’ declared reason for attacks on international shipping is support of Hamas, the deaths of civilians in the fighting in the Gaza strip, and resistance to Israel. On this issue, BBC International editor Jeremy Bowen said: “It is time to stop talking about the risk that the war in Gaza will spread elsewhere in the Middle East. It has already happened. Hopes for containing what is happening rest on the fact that it is still relatively low-level, compared to the worst-case scenarios of regional war.”[38] The U.S.-U.K. air strikes have not immediately eliminated the Houthi threat; on Friday January 26, 2024, a “British linked”[39] tanker operating under the flag of the Marshall Islands was hit by a Houthi anti-ship missile causing a fire that damaged the vessel, and Houthis also fired a missile at an American destroyer which the U.S. ship shot down.[40] In addition to the military aspects of geopolitics, the expansion of conflict to include the Houthis and shipping on the Red Sea also has a significant economic effect. The Red Sea is the route through which shipping to and from the Indian Ocean must pass to access the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean; diverting shipping around the south of Africa adds considerable distance, both increasing the time that it takes to ship goods, and significantly driving up the cost.[41] This has a significant effect on supply chains, which as seen above, were also affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Increases in the cost of shipping contribute to higher levels of inflation that emerged in the aftermath of the pandemic, again demonstrating an interaction of negative trends in the current geopolitical environment.

Summarizing the effects of these ongoing wars, both the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the conflicts in Gaza and the Red Sea have had chain effects reverberating across the international order. The previous working agreements between Russia and the U.S. over international challenges such as strategic weapons treaties or nuclear proliferation are fading away. It is unclear whether Ukraine will be able to recover lost territories or even hold the Russians back if American and E.U. aid continues to be curtailed, and the country’s bids to become a member of the E.U. and of NATO are uncertain. The prospect of Russian victory in Ukraine, along with increasing Russian rapprochement with China and North Korea and other expanded BRICS members, pose significant challenges to the future of security not only in the region but also East Asia and the Middle East, and perhaps also in the South China Sea. In the case of Israel, the Hamas attack has not only posed challenges to the pillars of the Israeli doctrine of national security including projecting an image of invincibility but has also weakened the prospect of success for the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements between Israel and a number of Arab countries. U.S. intervention in current and possible future conflicts, such as a confrontation with China over Tiawan, needs to take into account threats to the strategic dominance that it has held in these regions over recent decades and possible military over-extension. If the position of the U.S. and its NATO allies gives the appearance of growing weaker or more disunified it is likely to increase Russian and Chinese opportunistic interventions and expansions in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the South China Sea.[42]

Conclusion

While many periods of history have been characterized by regional wars, civil wars, pandemics and plagues, great power manoeuvring, and economic problems, the analysis above of seven major geopolitical developments indicates that current trends are pointing towards a future security environment characterized by significant conflict and zero-sum thinking. Based on the futures and foresight approaches used in the Canada’s Future Army process approaching a decade ago these seven factors—U.S. elections, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic tensions, the chaotic withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition from Afghanistan, the Russo-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas war, and the conflict with the Houthis in the Red Sea—trend towards the future world scenario described as Global Quagmire.

Given that the time horizon for the future army process extended to 2040[43] there is still time for these trends to shift. Even so, in early 2024 this paper’s evaluation highlights events trending in a less geopolitically desirable direction. In this context, what is of note is that no significant fundamental resource constraints—the most likely drivers of a Global Quagmire scenario in the original futures analysis—are so far contributing to this direction. Rather, the key driver has simply been a global mindset increasingly characterized by extremism, maximalism and a lack of desire to negotiate. Should this driver continue to gain momentum the implications are troubling, especially if the type of resource constraints considered in the original Global Quagmire scenario emerge. Already, established extremist mindsets combined with additional severe resource challenges could act as multiplier effects on one another, creating a particularly severe form of Global Quagmire. However, it also appears that realization of the potential threats posed by global instability is growing, and, as the saying goes, forewarned is forearmed. Addressing destructive and zero-sum outlooks, attitudes and ideologies may be as important as managing more materialistic threats in climate change, technology, resource constraints, and other such areas.

The reasons for this growth in destructive and zero-sum mindsets are a complex topic in itself, but in a simplified sense may be the result of a confluence of two patterns. One of these may be interrelated fears of losing national, tribal or religious identities that arise within some countries or regions. Such fears may be provoked by a global technological civilization and international system in which forces of rapid change present both opportunities to preserve identity as well as to destroy or erode it, depending on how such forces are harnessed and by whom.

The other reason perhaps is described by Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs Hal Brand in January 2024 in Foreign Affairs magazine: “The parallels between [the Second World War] era and the present are striking… Once again, the fundamental commonalities linking the revisionist states are autocratic governance and geopolitical grievance; in this case, a desire to break a U.S.-led order that deprives them of the greatness they desire. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are the new ‘have not’ powers, struggling against the ‘haves’: Washington and its allies.”[44]

Revisionist states have an incentive to leverage and manipulate fears about identities, both to create unquestioning ideological loyalty within their own borders, and to create instability in contested regions and disruption in the body politics of the states that they perceive as their enemies. Reciprocally, those who fear loss of identity have reason to look to powerful revisionist states as potential allies—even if only allies of convenience. Such an analysis requires more depth and nuance to be substantiated, but our analysis here of the effects of extremism and maximalism on the geopolitical system suggests that this sort of intersection of motives, interests and attitudes is where further study may be worthwhile.

End Notes:

[1]. Defined by the Canadian Army as: “Environmental scanning is a process involving the acquisition and use of information about events, trends and relationships that may have a strategic bearing on how an organization does business… It also involves the use of four basic techniques (undirected viewing, conditioned viewing, and informal and formal search of primary and/or secondary sources of information).” Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1: Methodology, Perspectives and Approaches. Kingston, Ontario: Army Publishing Office, 2015, 20.

[2]. Described as: “…comparable to what is more commonly referred to as structured brainstorming and… aligned closely with mind mapping… allows for a representation of complex interrelationships between trends…” Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1, 20.

[3]. Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1 notes that: “…hindsight and learning from the past are essential components of the process of foresight, as past experience often filters and conditions the impact of evolving trends and drivers on states, societies and the organizations and individuals that make them up. To this end, historical analysis of trends, drivers and their potential impacts is also employed to help ensure that observations and conclusions advanced are adequately informed by an appreciation of past history and context.” Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1, 22.

[4]. The Red Teaming process that was used: “One core team member was selected to monitor and participate in group discussions with the aim of questioning the team’s fundamental assumptions, the lines of reasoning employed in advancing arguments and conclusions concerning the material under examination, and raising alternative possibilities which might be underplayed or overlooked during group discussion.” Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1, 22.

[5]. The authors were amongst the participants in some of the wargames, and observed participants from various branches within the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as other federal government departments, academia, and from other countries, primarily United States military and government personnel.

[6]. Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1, 17.

[7]. Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 3: Alternate Worlds and Implications. Kingston, Ontario: Army Publishing Office, 2017, 24.

[8]. Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 3, 24.

[9]. See: Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 3.

[10]. Details of the U.S. 2000 presidential election results are widely available, such as: Michael Levy, “United States presidential election of 2000,” Britannica, accessed January 13, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-2000. Other notable aspects of American political polarization leading up to 2016 include conspiracy theories about the birthplace of 2008–2016 U.S. President Barrack Obama, the Tea Party movement that appeared in 2009, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011.

[11]. Pew Research Center, “For Most Trump Voters, ‘Very Warm’ Feelings for him Endured: An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters.” Pew Research Center, August 9, 2018, accessed January 13, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/.

[12]. Pew Research Center, “For Most Trump Voters, ‘Very Warm’ Feelings for him Endured.”

[13]. David Remnick, “An American Tragedy,” New Yorker, November 9, 2016, accessed January 13, 2024, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-american-tragedy-remnick-trump-wins-presidency-2016.

[14]. Ruth Igielnik, Scott Keeter, Hannah Hartig, “Behind Biden’s 2020 Victory.” Pew Research Center, June 30, 2021, accessed January 13, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/.

[15]. See Graham Allison “Trump Is Already Reshaping Geopolitics How U.S. Allies and Adversaries Are Responding to the Chance of His Return” Foreign Affairs, 6 January 2024.

[16]. Since the Polish election in late 2023 in which Donald Tusk returned to the job of Polish Prime Minister as the leader of a coalition, Poland has become more aligned with mainstream European Union policy and support for Ukraine. However, also in late 2023, the Slovakian parliamentary election led to the formation of a nationalist coalition government with Robert Fico, who has made statements unsupportive of continuing aid to Ukraine, as Slovakian Prime Minister.

[17]. Following ratification of the withdrawal agreement in the U.K. on January 23, 2020, and in the E.U. on January 30, 2020.

[18]. Examples include the blockades of Polish agricultural workers along the Ukrainian border, the ongoing blocking of an E.U. aid package to Ukraine by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and statements made about Ukraine by Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico in January 2024. For example, in a conspiracy theory like statement, Fico said that: “Ukraine is not an independent and sovereign country” but is “under the total influence and control of the United States.” “Slovak PM: Ukraine must give up territory to end Russian invasion.” Politico.eu, accessed January 26, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-prime-minister-robert-fico-ukraine-cede-territory-russia-moscow-invasion-nato-entry/.

[19]. See, for example: Janyce McGregor, John Paul Tasker, “U.K. walks away from trade talks with Canada.” CBC, January 25, 2024, accessed January 26, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-uk-trade-cheese-1.7094817.

[20]. For example, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said of AUKUS that “It’s really a stab in the back.” “Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China.” BBC, September 16, 2021, accessed January 26, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837.

[21]. Look also Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

[22]. Jim Bronskill and Laura Osman, “Emergencies Act ruling reopens emotional debate two years after huge protests.” The Canadian Press via CTV News, January 24, 2024, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/emergencies-act-ruling-reopens-emotional-debate-two-years-after-huge-protests-1.6740473. See also: Christian Paas-Lang, “Former justice minister says he’s still ‘confident’ in decision to trigger Emergencies Act.” CBC, January 25, 2024, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/lametti-emergencies-act-leaving-politics-1.7093824.

[23]. These included the U.S. and Russia. See: Lawrence O Gostin, Harold Hongju Koh, Michelle Williams, Margaret A Hamburg, Georges Benjamin, William H Foege et al., “US withdrawal from WHO is unlawful and threatens global and US health and security.” The Lancet, Volume 396, Issue 10247 (August 1, 2020), 293–295, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31527-0/fulltext; and Sarah Anne Aarup and Ashleigh Furlong, “Russia takes first steps to withdraw from WTO, WHO.” Politico.eu, May 18, 2022, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-takes-first-steps-to-withdraw-from-wto-who/. In the Politico article Aarup and Furlong note that: “The Russian government is starting the process of unilaterally withdrawing from a series of international bodies, including the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization, the Russian Duma’s Deputy Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy said on Tuesday… Tolstoy singled out the international trade and health organizations, saying that ‘the next step is to withdraw from the WTO and the WHO, which have neglected all obligations towards our country.” The Biden administration in the U.S. reversed the withdrawal from the WHO; see, for example: Christina Morales, “Biden restores ties with the World Health Organization that were cut by Trump.” New York Times, January 20, 2021, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/biden-restores-who-ties.html. Nonetheless, even if reversed, the fact that the U.S. began to withdraw from the WHO likely undermines confidence in the stability of international organizations and the commitment of major power to them.

[24]. Look also “A Historian of Economic Crisis on the World After COVID-19” https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/08/adam-tooze-how-will-the-covid-19-pandemic-change-world-history.html accessed on 29 January 2024 and “Fuzzynomics and 12 other Attempts to Name our New Era” in Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/fuzzynomics-new-economic-era-name-economists-post-pandemic-government-monetary-fiscal-stimulus/ accessed on 29 January 2024.

[25]. See: Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “US State Department report details damning failings around chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal.” CNN, Friday June 30, 2023, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/30/politics/state-deparment-afghanistan-withdrawal-report/index.html, and: U.S. Department of State, After Action Review on Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 2022). Accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/State-AAR-AFG.pdf

[26]. See also the report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf accessed on 29 January 2024.

[27]. This statement has been attributed to Zelensky in various sources. See, for example: Sharon Braithwaite, “Zelensky refuses US offer to evacuate, saying ‘I need ammunition, not a ride.’” CNN, Saturday February 26, 2022, accessed January 27, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html.

[28]. Mike Eckel, “How Did Everybody Get The Ukraine Invasion Predictions So Wrong?” RadioFreeEurope, February 17, 2023, accessed December 27, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-invasion-predictions-wrong-intelligence/32275740.html. Eckel comments that: “Many believed Russia would not invade. Wrong. And many believed that if it did, Ukraine’s military would be routed, Kyiv would be captured in a matter of days, and the government would fall. Wrong again.”

[29]. Eckel, “How Did Everybody Get The Ukraine Invasion Predictions So Wrong?”

Michael Clarke, “‘Hopeless’ Russian offensive capability could put Putin himself under threat,” interview by Kate Gerbeau, Frontline for Times Radio, May 17, 2023, 31:08, video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUkpR9BoJnA.

[31]. “The US is disappointed Hungary’s ratification of Sweden joining Nato is taking so long, Washington’s ambassador has said, saying that Budapest is ‘really alone’ and that the Hungarian government is pursuing a ‘foreign fantasy’ instead of a foreign policy. After weeks of delays, Turkey’s parliament approved Sweden’s Nato membership…leaving Hungary as the only country in the 31-member western military alliance that has yet to ratify the Swedish bid… In an interview at the US embassy in Budapest… the US ambassador, David Pressmen, said: ‘An alliance is only as strong as the commitments that we make to each other and the commitments that we keep… Hungary is really alone—and it doesn’t need to be… The Hungarians have this idea that it’s a political communications device where they’re constantly talking about imperialists and colonialists and Brussels and George Soros—and all of these entities who are trying to ‘interfere’ in its domestic politics—and it’s really a fantasy… And it’s a fantasy that is serving some political purpose in this country, but is also distracting from some of the real challenges and opportunities that Hungary has.’” Lili Bayer, “US ‘disappointed’ Hungary taking so long to approve Sweden joining Nato.” The Guardian, Friday January 26, 2024, accessed Saturday January 27, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/26/us-disappointed-that-hungary-taking-so-long-to-approve-sweden-joining-nato.

[32]. “Top Biden administration officials labored… to try to reach a last-minute deal for wartime aid for Ukraine by agreeing to Senate Republican demands to bolster U.S.-Mexico border policies, with urgency setting in as Congress prepared to depart Washington with the impasse unresolved… As details of the plan emerged, advocates for immigrants and members of President Joe Biden’s own Democratic Party fretted about the policies under discussion. Some demonstrated at the Capitol, warning of a return to the hardline border and immigration policies of the Trump era… ‘I never would have imagined that in a moment where we have a Democratic Senate and a Democratic White House we are coming to the table and proposing some of the most draconian immigration policies that there have ever been,’ said Maribel Hernández Rivera, American Civil Liberties Union director of policy and government affairs.” Stephen Groves, Lisa Mascaro and Colleen Long, “Biden considers new border and asylum restriction as he tries to reach Senate deal for Ukraine aid.” Associated Press, December 13, 2023, accessed January 27, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/biden-ukraine-israel-funding-us-mexico-border-e1da808689aeef52308d19010a5e3cfa.

[33]. CNN notes a number of indications of prior warning of the attack: “Hamas’ surprise attack on October 7 left Israel flat-footed, sparking a backlash that is still rippling through the country… But a report from the New York Times claimed Israel obtained Hamas’ plan for the attack more than a year in advance. The report says Israeli officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, and deemed it too complex for the group to carry out. Other outlets, including Israeli newspaper Haaretz, have also reported the claim… The attack was widely seen as a major Israeli intelligence failure, with a number of top defense and security officials coming forward in October to take responsibility to some extent for missteps that led to the attacks. Later that month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received sharp public criticism after he accused security chiefs in a later-deleted social media post of failing to warn him about the impending attack. “On the contrary, all the defense officials … assessed that Hamas was deterred,” Netanyahu wrote at the time. In a CNN interview earlier this month Netanyahu refused to answer whether he would take responsibility for failing to prevent the attack… The US intelligence community produced at least two assessments, based in part on intelligence provided by Israel, warning the Biden administration of an increased risk for Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the weeks ahead of the seismic attack on southern Israel, sources familiar with the intelligence said in the days after October 7.” However, it also discusses how a “small cell of Hamas operatives” planned some aspects of the attack secretly. Rob Picheta and Simone McCarthy, “What did Israel know about Hamas’ October 7 attack?” CNN, Friday December 1, 2023, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/01/middleeast/israel-hamas-gaza-intelligence-intl/index.html.

[34]. Daniel Byman, Riley McCabe, Alexander Palmer, Catrina Doxsee, Mackenzie Holtz, and Delaney Duff, “Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data.” Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 19, 2023, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.

[35]. “Canada pauses funding to UN relief agency over workers’ possible role in Oct. 7 attack on Israael.” CBC/Thomson Reuters, January 26, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/unrwa-israel-raids-investigations-1.7095676.

[36]. Haley Ott and CBS staff, “Australia, Italy and others halt funding to U.N. agency over claim staff involved in Hamas attack on Israel.” January 27, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/countries-halt-funding-to-unrwa-over-claim-staff-involved-in-hamas-attack/.

[37]. Simon Frankel Pratt, “Unsourced Allegations Feed Israel’s ‘Masada Complex.’” Foreign Policy Magazine, January 26, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/26/unsourced-allegations-israel-masada-complex-palestine-hamas-gaza-war/, and Anna Gordon, “New Polling Shows How Much Global Support Israel Has Lost.” Time, January 17, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://time.com/6559293/morning-consult-israel-global-opinion/. The article by Gordon notes that as of mid-January 2024: “Net favorability—the percentage of people viewing Israel positively after subtracting the percentage viewing it negatively—dropped globally by an average of 18.5 percentage points between September and December, decreasing in 42 out of the 43 countries polled.”

[38]. Jeremy Bowen, “Strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen show war in Gaza has already spread.” BBC, January 12, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67955729.

[39]. James Gregory, “Houthis attack British-linked tanker Marlin Luanda in Gulf of Aden.” BBC, January 27, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68110358.

[40]. “Houthis target U.S. destroyer in latest round of missile attacks; strike British merchant ship.” CBS/AP, January 27, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houthis-target-u-s-destroyer-carney-british-merchant-ship-missile-attacks-red-sea-gulf-of-aden/.

[41]. See, for example: Paul Wiseman and Mae Anderson, “Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are idling car factories and delaying new fashion. Will it get worse?” ABC News/AP, January 28, 2024, accessed January 28, 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/houthi-attacks-red-sea-idling-car-factories-delaying-106742092.

[42]. See also: “The Next Global War How Today’s Regional Conflicts Resemble the Ones that Produced World War II” by Hal Brand, Foreign Affairs, 26 January 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/next-global-war accessed on 29 January 2024.

[43]. Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Canada’s Future Army, Volume 1, 14.

[44]. See Hal Brands, “The Next Global War: How Today’s Regional Conflicts Resemble the Ones That Produced World War II.” Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2024, accessed January 30, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/next-global-war.