*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2023 KCIS Conference volume that was published Nov. 2024

Introduction

China has undergone rapid development in the past decades as a result of reform and opening-up under former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to some extent stuck to the Deng Xiaoping’s policy of taoguang yanghui or “keeping a low profile,” with an emphasis on economic development. The three Chinese leaders—Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao—adopted the principle of acting with a low profile and tried from then on to gradually integrate into the global mainstream to create space for economic development of China. However, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is now taking efforts to increase and extend its influence in the worldwide political stage. Xi Jinping’s strategic direction significantly differs from Deng Xiaoping’s policy taoguang yanghui.[1] The most significant departure from previous policies is China’s adoption of increasingly assertive foreign strategies, such as the notorious “Wolf Warrior diplomacy.”[2] This diplomatic policy is perceived within China as a heroic offensive to defend national interests, underpinned by China’s growing national strength and rising nationalism that can be described as a shift from a passive and conservative stance to an active and confident approach.[3] China, namely, is confidence in the path, guiding theories, political system, and culture.[4]

The aforementioned stance indicates that China is ready and determined to reshape the rules as a major participant in the international community. As some observers have noted, the shift signified a return to revisionism in great power politics.[5] But now, dramatically, after decades of rapid growth, China’s economy is facing economic and developmental challenges. In the words of some scholars, this economic downturn is referred to as the “Peak China” theory.[6] Scholars supporting this view argue that China’s rise is nearing its end, and while it has emerged as a revisionist state with grand ambitions, it might now fail to achieve these objectives without drastic economic resuscitation. When the gap between the ambitions and capabilities of a revisionist state becomes uncontrollable, they tend to become most dangerous, such as resorting to warfare to achieve their political objectives.[7]

Other scholars hold a different perspective, believing that China has not yet reached its peak. In their view, the US is more likely to face a confident and capable China in the coming years rather than an insecure and reckless state.[8] A powerful and increasingly self-assured China, as evidenced by Xi Jinping’s proclamation to “dare to fight,” is interpreted by some as Xi’s call to his comrades to prepare for war against Taiwan.[9] Interestingly, both sides of the argument agree that China will act regarding Taiwan, albeit for different reasons.

However, what I would like to say is that they all may go in the wrong direction. As the speakers in Panel 4 in this year’s conference mentioned, NATO failed to recognize Russia’s willingness to bear high risks and related war costs because the West might have incorrectly estimated Russia’s primary objectives. Hence, a failure to accurately understand and analyze the deeper structural dynamics of China’s strategy could lead to miscalculations and tragic outcomes. This paper aims to highlight the commonly overlooked sources of China’s self-confidence and the shifts in its strategic core, thereby enabling a more thorough evaluation of the enduring themes of China’s strategy.

The Neglected Theorist and China’s Strategic Deployment

When discussing China’s and CCP policy’s increasing confidence, people often fail to provide coherent and logical evidence for the reasons behind this change. Typically, the rise in confidence is attributed to the growth of China’s economic power or Xi Jinping’s leadership style. However, Wang Huning, a party theorist who served three leaders—Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping—and is regarded as a “national master” by the Chinese, has not received the attention he deserves in these discussions.[10] Wang Huning published a book in 1991 entitled “America Against America” based on his observations and thoughts from an academic visit to the United States in 1988. In Chapter Eleven, Wang scrutinizes institutional issues in the United States, including racial tensions between African American and white communities in Section Seven, while also offering an intriguing analysis of US-Japan relations in Section Ten, predicting that in the twenty-first century, more nations will challenge the United States akin to Japan’s past attempts, albeit unsuccessful. Overall, Wang concludes that the United States faces significant problems in its political, economic, and cultural domains.

While Wang’s sections may not serve as direct evidence, they remind us of the four confidences proposed by China, namely, “confidence in our chosen path, confidence in our guiding theories, confidence in our political system, and confidence in our culture.” Integrating these factors, one might gain a clearer understanding of China’s strategic developmental trajectory.

In the late 1990s, Wang Huning entered the Chinese central government, influencing official ideology and gradually becoming the most important designer of modern Chinese theory and ideology. As he gained more power, the political division in the United States, the rise of Donald Trump’s populism, and the Black Lives Matter movement, among other events, might have reinforced Wang Huning’s and the Chinese government’s perception of an impending American collapse, aligning with his earlier observations, and a sense that China was becoming a real challenge to the US. It has been noted that, as early as the 1980s and 1990s, Wang Huning was conveying a message that true democracy was being practiced in China, that American democracy was a sham, and that American power was in decline.[11] Wang’s other works also reveal the trajectory of China’s reforms and the image it currently presents, such as the emphasis on traditional Chinese culture and historical narratives. Those in the West interested in China’s strategic development should endeavour to understand the thoughts of Wang, enabling a better comprehension of China’s actions and the evolution of its thoughts.

Beyond the theoretical aspect, the assertive stance of Xi Jinping in practical strategic matters was foreseeable. Xi Jinping had been assigned the responsibility of overseeing China’s activities in the South China Sea as early as the 2000s. During that period, China’s leadership began to assert sovereignty over the maritime territories of the East and South China Seas.[12] Considering the aforementioned factors, we can discern the context of China’s current strategic development. Thus, observing China’s revisionism and aggressive posture under Xi Jinping’s leadership today should not come as too much of a surprise. Taoguang yanghui implies a low-profile approach, but this Chinese adage is often forgotten in many contexts, resembling more a buildup of strength, waiting for the right moment to strike back. Evidently, the financial crisis of 2008, which subsequently led China to question its system due to capitalism, and China’s rapidly growing power led the Chinese leadership to believe that their strategic moment had arrived. Just as Wang Huning titled his work “America Against America,” around 2020, in the wake of witnessing the financial crisis and severe internal political divisions in the US, Chinese official media published articles with titles such as “America’s Main Opponent is Itself.” These articles posited that America’s current state is the inevitable result of flaws in the design and operation of its political and economic systems, driven by short-sighted pursuits.[13]

The Soviet Experience

China has pursued an expansionist strategy externally, but what’s intriguing is that shortly after coming to power, Xi Jinping started discussing the Soviet experience. The collapse of the Soviet Union has consistently served as a cautionary tale for him.[14] In Xi Jinping’s speeches, members of the Communist Party of China can see and hear their leader referencing the Soviet experience, reminding them of the ideological turmoil among the Soviet people, the near collapse of party organizations at all levels, and the military’s deviation from the party’s command. These factors contributed to the ultimate disintegration of the Soviet Union.[15] Xi’s analogies to the USSR emphasize the grand principle that everything must revolve around the stability of the CCP regime. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party has fundamentally reevaluated the relationship between economy and security. Whereas Chinese leaders once prioritized economic growth above all, they now place security above economic development.[16] No research or evidence conclusively explain why Xi Jinping suddenly placed such great emphasis on regime stability and security, but the shift has indeed occurred. Consequently, China is now exhibiting a contradictory state. Post-2000s, China has been attempting to gain more influence internationally, but its domestic politics are showing signs of contraction, becoming more autocratic and centralized, with a lack of confidence in the legitimacy of its own regime.

New Themes in China’s Strategy

In scholarly works discussing the enduring themes of China’s strategy, there are two classic examples, Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon and Rush Doshi’s The Long Game describe China’s current strategic planning as highly aggressive, aiming to supplant the United States and achieve global hegemony.[17] However, as discussed above, we can see that the primary objective of the Chinese Communist Party’s grand strategy may change to focus on the stability of its regime rather than the so-called pursuit of global dominance. The establishment of this priority can aid us in more accurately assessing China’s actions and objectives.

Therefore, I would like to use a strategic analysis framework for examining current Chinese strategies. Nina Shiloff divides grand strategy into three separate elements, which are grand plans, grand principles, and grand behaviour.[18] Each of these distinct categories presents a singular and beneficial approach for both research and the development of policies. The most significant representation of China’s current grand principles is Xi Jinping’s 2017 declaration, “Party, government, military, civilian, and academic, east, west, south, north, and center, the party leads everything.” He also mentioned that this principle provides a “fundamental political guarantee” for the party to conduct all its activities.[19] The metaphor here implies that the unshakeable core leadership of the party is the primary principle of China’s future strategy. Simultaneously, Xi Jinping’s emphasis on national security is, to an extent, a reiteration of regime security, as in the narrative of the Communist Party of China, there is no China, the state, without the Communist Party, the regime. Therefore, China’s future strategic actions will largely revolve around affirming the party’s absolute position, as well as the security and stability of the regime.

If we apply the reasoning to analyze China’s strategy towards Taiwan in the coming years, we may find that China launching an attack on Taiwan is unlikely. Firstly, the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford the consequences of a failed war against Taiwan. Although it remains unclear whether the United States would deploy its military to support Taiwan in the event of a Chinese assault, the primary adversaries in the minds of Chinese leaders in a Taiwan conflict would undoubtedly be the US and its allies. Russia provides a prominent example to China, illustrating the complexity and unpredictability of modern warfare. Moreover, years of nationalism centred on Taiwan would backfire in the event of a failure, significantly undermining the legitimacy of the CCP regime.

Secondly, economic considerations would be a major concern. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that widespread sanctions imposed by the international community on aggressors can severely affect an economy, as evidenced in Russia’s case. Compared to Russia, China is far more reliant on the global economy. Foreign trade and foreign investment are significant components of China’s economic structure. Waging war against Taiwan would inevitably lead to sanctions from the West. Given China’s current economic difficulties, comprehensive Western sanctions may lead to a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy, particularly in the context of the ongoing deceleration of China’s economic growth. This situation poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, which is certainly not a scenario the Party would desire.

Thirdly, the management issues that the CCP would face after occupying Taiwan would pose a significant challenge. It involves the governance of over 23 million people accustomed to democratic practices, a task that is undoubtedly challenging and a stark reality. In such a scenario, modern society offers no direct comparative guidance. Chinese leaders might look to historical examples, such as Germany’s actions during World War II, for strategies to manage large populations in conquered territories. However, violent measures are unlikely to restore peace among the local populace. Moreover, engaging in armed conflict while attempting to control a large population could distract China’s focus. Resorting to extreme measures like massacres or mass incarceration might exhaust the international community’s patience, potentially leading to more extensive conflicts. Such actions would fill China’s future with uncertainties.

The above factors demonstrate that under a strategic direction prioritizing regime security and stability, China’s likelihood of using military force for the unification of Taiwan is exceedingly small. However, as some observers have pointed out, former and current US officials should avoid making imprudent statements suggesting that the United States should formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation. Such declarations could lead China to believe that failing to launch an attack soon would mean permanently losing the opportunity for unification.[20]

Conclusion

Nationalism, aggressive foreign policy, and China’s rise under Xi Jinping’s leadership have significantly heightened international concerns about a deteriorating security environment. This article contributes an analysis of the significant shifts in China’s strategy and addresses blind spots in its internal logic, attempting to apply these findings to the nature of the conflict with Taiwan.

China’s strategic evolution did not abruptly change with Xi Jinping’s accession but has deeper historical roots. China’s chief strategist, Wang Huning, anticipated future confrontation between China and the United States and the possibility of internal political division in the US as early as the last century. Xi Jinping’s actions in the South China Sea in the late 2000s also indicated that with China’s growing national strength, conflicts with the West were seen as inevitable. Under these dual factors, China viewed the 2008 financial crisis and Trump’s populist politics in 2016 as signs of relative decline in US power, thereby bolstering China’s confidence. China presents itself with a paradoxical state of confidence that hides a fragile self-confidence underneath the facade of self-confidence. Most importantly, attention needs to be paid to Xi Jinping’s reflections on the Soviet experience and its impact on China’s grand strategy. Self-confidence and face-saving are one aspect, but regime stability is more important.

Therefore, in analyzing China’s strategic transformation, the West must consider China’s deep concerns about security and its own priorities, which is crucial for predicting China’s strategic direction and will significantly change China’s approach to foreign cooperation and problem-solving.

End Notes:

[1]. Son Daekwon, “Xi Jinping Thought vs. Deng Xiaoping Theory,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/.

[2]. For more about Wolf Warriors Diplomacy, see Yaoyao Dai and Luwei Rose Luqiu, “Wolf Warriors and Diplomacy in the New Era: An Empirical Analysis of China’s Diplomatic Language,” China Review 22, no. 2 (2022): 253–83, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48671506.

[3]. Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy’,” The Diplomat, May 15, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/.

[4]. Political implications of the “Four Confidences” see Hui Jin, “Research on the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics from the Perspective of Four Self-Confidence,” Open Journal of Political Science 10, no. 01 (2020): 41–49, https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=97191.

[5]. Thomas Wright, “China and Russia vs. America: Great-Power Revisionism Is Back,” Brookings, April 27, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-and-russia-vs-america-great-power-revisionism-is-back/.

[6]. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley discuss the concept of “Peak China” in detail in their book, see Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2022).

[7]. Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “The End of China’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs, November 10, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise.

[8]. Oriana Skylar Mastro and Derek Scissors, “China Hasn’t Reached the Peak of Its Power,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-hasnt-reached-peak-its-power.

[9]. John Pomfret and Matt Pottinger, “Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/xi-jinping-says-he-preparing-china-war.

[10]. To know more about Wang Huning’s career development, see Ryan Mitchell, “China’s Crown Theorist,” Foreign Affairs, December 4, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-12-04/chinas-crown-theorist.

[11]. The Economist, “Wang Huning’s Career Reveals Much about Political Change in China,” The Economist, February 12, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/02/12/wang-hunings-career-reveals-much-about-political-change-in-china.

[12]. Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 8.

[13]. Jude Blanchette, “Beijing’s Visions of American Decline,” Politico, March 11, 2021, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/03/11/beijings-visions-of-american-decline-492064.

[14]. The Economist, “The Fall of Empires Preys on Xi Jinping’s Mind,” The Economist, May 11, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/11/the-fall-of-empires-preys-on-xi-jinpings-mind.

[15]. Chun Han Wong, Party of One (Simon and Schuster, 2023), 1–12.

[16]. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Xi’s Security Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/xis-security-obsession.

[17]. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon (Henry Holt and Company, 2015); Rush Doshi, The LONG GAME: China’s Grand Strategy and the Displacement of American Power. (Oxford University Press, 2021).

[18]. Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (August 28, 2017): 3.

[19]. Charlotte Gao, “The CCP Vows to ‘Lead Everything’ Once Again,” The Diplomat, October 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-ccp-vows-to-lead-everything-once-again/.

[20]. Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen, “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterrence.