
Insight 5-4 | February 13, 2025
A Different Look at the Un-Changing Nature of Intelligence
James Cox is the Chair, Board of Directors, of the Canadian Intelligence Network (CIN). During his 38-year military career, Cox served principally in operational command and staff appointments in Canada, and on UN and NATO missions in Europe and Africa. After leaving the CAF, he served for six years as lead analyst supporting House of Commons and Senate committees dealing with national security and defence issues. Cox holds an MA and PhD in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. His principal interest is the promotion of intelligence research and education in Canada.
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*This article also appears as a chapter in the 2023 KCIS Conference volume that was published Nov. 2024
Introduction
Truly disciplined discussion of conflict remains clear on the difference between the terms war and warfare. They are not synonymous, but both have an unchanging essential character.[1] Where Clausewitz saw war as the violent clash over the great interests of nations and states, modern war continues to reflect such confrontations over the great interests of nations, states, and significant non-state actors. The current Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the traditional nature of war, generally indistinguishable from the Russo-German war of 1941–1945. The current conflict between Israel and Hamas also illustrates the extended notion. It too, reflects the nature of past Israeli wars against neighbouring Arab states. Every war erupts within a context of unique circumstances, but all wars essentially serve the same purpose. While the form of war might not be constant, its function is.
That this is so has been expertly illustrated by Dr. Howard Coombs’ 3-D Matrix of Competition at Figure 6.1. This figure shows a shotgun array of various forms of conflict scattered about three axes.[2] No matter where a particular type of conflict landed in Coombs’s model, its function remained constant—to prevail in a more or less violent clash of wills over more or less great issues of state or non-state actors.
What appears to have changed in all cases, some more than others, is the means by which war is conducted today, but some appearances can be deceiving. Warfare is the means of war. From longbows at Agincourt to precision-guided hypersonic glide vehicles in the Arctic; from marauding hordes of Mongols to clandestine insertion of special operations forces; and from rampaging Hun cavalry to networked tank regiments in the Iraqi desert—modern warfare has evolved, largely in the extensive array of tools, weapons, and methods employed, but all still driven by the fundamental desire to defeat an adversary’s will to fight by either killing them or creating effects that make it impossible for them to carry on.
A medieval arrow in the heart at Agincourt is little different in consequence than a bullet (from any number of sizes of guns) on the outskirts of Bakhmut. An ICBM is just a bigger arrow, shot from further away. No matter the sophistication of available means and effects today, modern warfare, conducted in Ukraine Army front-line trenches and Israeli street fighting in Gaza, seems, at least on the surface, to be a rerun of the Goth sacking of Rome, or the siege of Stalingrad.
Within all this structured mayhem, there is a another fundamental, but largely under-appreciated enterprise—the intelligence function. Like war and warfare, the intelligence function wears different suits but retains an essentially consistent, under-appreciated nature.
The study of intelligence is an essential element, or should be, in all research related to war and warfare. Consider that when classified material dealing with the Ultra traffic in the Second World War, revealed by Frederick Winterbotham in 1974, in The Ultra Secret, many wartime histories in the West required significant revision.[3] In 1977, Dr. Harold Deutsch of the U.S. Army War College wrote, “Whatever the verdict on the hotly debated question of whether the ULTRA revelations require a ‘complete’ re-write of World War II history, there can be no argument that they will demand the re-examination of a vast complex of historical problems.”[4] Winterbotham was perhaps more blunt. “No history of World War II is complete which does not take into account our knowledge of our enemy’s intentions, disclosed by our ‘most secret source[AH1] ’.”[5] And so it is today. Intelligence studies in Canada lag far behind such programs in our closest allies.
Most historical study is incomplete if it misses the intelligence dimension, ignoring its important causal and enabling role. Why any specific battle took place, or why commanders did what they did cannot be fully answered without examining the intelligence enterprise that enabled those activities. Traditional thinking considers the intelligence function as offering different products for different wars, to enable different forms of warfare. New thinking will see intelligence as unchanging. The essential unchanging nature of intelligence is captured in a conceptualization of the intelligence function having its roots in human nature, not as a simple written product provided to a client. Deeper thinking also reveals the much more substantial and essential nature of intelligence than commonly exists within the profession of arms today.
To demonstrate the enduring nature of intelligence, this paper argues that human cognitive activity is the premier, unchanging activity of the intelligence process. It argues that bio-psychological human intelligence is the one enduring fundamental form of intelligence and that, as such, is essentially humankind’s attempt to replicate the bio-psychological human intelligence process in purposeful social groups. It is further suggested that the pursuit of advantage is the central, unchanging focus of a true intelligence enterprise. This is the nature of intelligence. It always has been and will continue to be.
The next section begins by discussing the importance of definitions. It is followed by an outline of today’s definitional difficulty in Canada, illustrated by the results of an informal survey of definitions of intelligence from various government entities at federal, provincial, and municipal levels in Canada. The paper proceeds to explore the essential idea of intelligence, whose roots are found in the human biological intelligence process, leading to a conclusion that intelligence is not merely a tangible thing, but a capacity that enables an effect in the service of policy, strategy, and mission objectives. It explores the bio-psychological and etymology-semantic roots of intelligence, leading to a proposed new universal definition of intelligence as the capacity for reasoned foresight that enables advantageous action. In the end, intelligence is portrayed as encompassing the generalized and unchanging endeavour from conceived intent to successful adaptation in a contested environment, no matter what the conditions of that contested environment.
Some of the ideas found herein have been drawn from observation and study of the Canadian intelligence function as a cross-government, pan-domain enterprise. They draw benefit from valuable comments offered by several current and former Canadian government intelligence practitioners, all of whom spoke on background. They were quite frank in their views, which were entirely personal and not reflective of any government policy or position. Many agreed with various ideas presented here. Others strongly disagreed. All were helpful. In the end though, observations, opinions, and conclusions found in this paper, for better or worse, are the author’s alone.
The Importance of a Definition
An adequate definition of intelligence is important for at least two general reasons. First, it provides an essential foundation for understanding the unchanging nature of the intelligence function. In turn, a credible definition will assist in reaching more complete understanding of the intelligence function contribution to war and warfare.
One measure of how seriously an organization thinks about its work is the degree of enthusiasm with which it pursues a useful definition of that work. However, even if once settled, the evolving features of any field may require definitional adjustments. Furthermore, the degree to which an organization is open to considering amendments might indicate the quality of thought devoted to the subject. A stagnant definition might be a sign of institutional apathy, or that an organization has simply run out of ideas—or both. A live and valid definition should consistently represent the current state of maturing knowledge. Done properly, the disciplined pursuit of relevant definitions can be a profitable path for the acquisition of true and justified knowledge, and full understanding. Crafting a definition is fundamental to the development of theory and doctrine, which in turn are foundational to the establishment of professional status.
Today’s Definitional Difficulty
Simply being able to define something does not necessarily indicate understanding. Moreover, a well-crafted definition should not be considered the end of thinking but rather seen as a gateway to more fulsome comprehension. Many people can define “fire” as the product of combustion, but that only tells us how fire comes about. What is fire itself, actually? What is the difference between “fire” and “flame”? Intelligence is another term that seems easily described but not adequately defined or deeply understood. Like fire, there are various views about how intelligence comes about, but too little on what it is. What makes intelligence, intelligence?
Canadian intelligence studies have not come to grips with the need for deeper thinking about intelligence and the value of intelligence education as the vehicle for doing so.[6] Consider this example from the only organization in government that has a formal intelligence doctrine. The 2003 version of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Joint Intelligence Doctrine defines intelligence as:
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which gives rise to intelligence and as a generic title, to those who carry out the process, which leads to its production.[7]
In 2011, after nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan, The CAF doctrinal definition of intelligence is essentially the same. Today, the most recent update, provides a definitional tweak:
Intelligence is … the product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the operating environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. The term “Intelligence” is also applied to the activities that result in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activities.[8]
It seems stuck in the same old, outdated paradigm linking intelligence to the notion of a tangible product. This limited view does not imply the idea that intelligence is an unchanging activity.
Canadian law also seems to ignore serious thinking about intelligence. Across the entire range of Canadian legislation there is but one lone entry that attempts a definition of intelligence. The Communications Security Act says, “foreign intelligence means information or intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.”[9] As will be discussed later, this circular definition is ultimately inadequate.
An informal survey of intelligence practitioners in the fields of national security, defence, and law enforcement, at the federal, provincial, and municipal level, asked for a formal definition of intelligence as it was used in the subject’s organization.[10] For comparison purposes, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency liaison office in Ottawa was also invited to respond. The quickest and best structured response came from the Americans. They noted that their formal definition of intelligence, provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), guided all their work. The US definition was nested in, and consistent throughout with the coherent strategic framework provided by the United States National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense National Defense Strategy, the U.S. Military Strategy, and the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy. Regrettably, the formal US definition of intelligence begins with, “Intelligence is information ….” This is also an inadequate definition, as well be explained later.
Canadian results were less cohesive. Generally, Canadian law enforcement organizations had specific definitions for tactical or strategic intelligence, usually related to crime or criminal intelligence. Each police service, at all levels, in different jurisdictions, had its own definition. All were based on the idea of intelligence as a product. On the other hand, some organizations have no definition, despite having a legislated mandate to, for example, conduct reviews of security and intelligence activities.[11] Perhaps a return to first principles will help in the search for a more useful understanding of intelligence.
The Fundamental Concept of Intelligence
Fields of Intelligence Studies
The concept of intelligence, as both a distinct and principal organic human function, and a national security imperative, has been notoriously resistant to capture in an adequate, commonly accepted, universal definition. However, among definitions that do exist, there are some similarities, but there are also significant differences. These differences emerge from the fact that intelligence is generally studied within four distinctly different fields: (1) human sciences, (2) computer sciences, (3) national security/military studies, and (4) the now well-established field of corporate competitive and market intelligence. Research into human intelligence (HI) seeks to understand evolved links between the brain, behaviour, the environment, and the concept of mind.[12] Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) research explores the science and engineering of making machines that can think and work like humans.[13] While “artificial intelligence” might not legitimately merit that moniker today, there is no doubt that researchers continue to pursue the singularity of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), the point at which a computer can think as effectively as a human, and perhaps even having the independent ability to replicate and improve upon itself.[14] The third field of study covers intelligence practices in topical fields such as international relations, national security, democratic governance, military art and science, and law enforcement studies.[15] The strong emergence of competitive and market intelligence was propelled by corporate funding and today can boast a professional development regime that rivals, indeed outstrips, that of many government agencies.[16]
Since the latter half of the twentieth century, the first two categories—human sciences and computer sciences—have developed an active symbiotic relationship driven by technological advances emanating from study of the human-machine interface. On the other hand, military and national security practitioners have not adequately interacted with human sciences community researchers studying intelligence. In fact, in Canada, military and national security intelligence practitioners have remained aloof from serious thought about intelligence, working in a cloak of secrecy and bullied by persistent budget cuts and directed reorganization.[17] To be fair though, in recent years military and national security intelligence authorities have embraced selected technological advances to manage “big data” collection, and its associated demand for fusion or integration, and deep predictive analytics at all levels. However, somewhat paradoxically, there has been little or no equivalent enthusiasm for the expansion, growth, and enhanced sophistication of human cognitive analysis. National security, law enforcement, and military intelligence practitioners remain obstinately fixated on the intelligence product, rather than the notion of intelligence qua intelligence, as a capacity for accomplishment. They are not alone in this limbo.
Many social scientists, particularly those working in fields such as international relations, political science, and politics have wrestled with the idea of intelligence theory and the need for a working definition. In 2005, a number of eminent American, British, and Canadian intelligence scholars participated in a workshop sponsored by the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the RAND Corporation, to discuss how theories underlie intelligence work and how they might lead to better understanding of intelligence. It began by addressing the question: what is intelligence theory?[18] Workshop participants generally agreed that a good definition is a prerequisite for sound theory, but beyond that there was no unanimous agreement on any of the definitions of intelligence discussed. Some argued that a workable theory should always be applicable in all contexts, but discussion of those contexts remained limited to the traditional boundaries of government and military intelligence activity. Ultimately, workshop participants remained divided over whether a theory of intelligence could be developed, in any form, at all.
Can we find a useful, fundamentally common and consistent idea of intelligence? We can, if we go sufficiently far back and deeper, to explore the bio-psychological and etymological-semantic roots of intelligence. Intelligence qua intelligence enjoyed the philosophical attention of pre-Socratic era thinkers, but by then, biology had already completed its work.[19]
Bio-Psychological Roots of Intelligence
There is abundant literature about the nature of intelligence beyond that currently found in traditional intelligence studies.[20] In fact, a Google search of “human intelligence” turns up more than 2 billion hits in less than half a second. Among these sites, the overwhelming weight of theoretical study lay in the biological and psychological sciences. In second place are hits related to artificial intelligence. Comparatively, the number of sites dealing with intelligence as practiced within government national security, defence/military, or law enforcement can be described as “miniscule” at best. The three apparent semi-solitudes of intelligence studies must be united if any single notion of intelligence is to be derived, nurtured, sustained, and understood. David Kahn, the eminent American intelligence scholar, and expert cryptologist, said:
The roots of intelligence are biological. Every animal, even a protozoan, must have a mechanism to perceive stimuli … and to judge whether they are good or bad for it. At that level intelligence is like breathing; essential to survival, but not to dominance.[21]
Regrettably, Kahn did not venture further into a discussion of relevant biology to prove his point. While he may be generally correct (intelligence is rooted in biology), there is a good deal of other literature, this paper included, that counters his assertion that intelligence is not essential for dominance.[22]
A variety of definitions of biological intelligence have appeared over the years, identifying attributes of general adaptability to new problems in life; abstract thinking; adjustment to the environment; capacity for knowledge and knowledge possessed; capacity for independence, originality, and productiveness in thinking; capacity to acquire capacity; apprehension of relevant relationships; ability to judge, to understand, and to reason; deduction of relationships; and innate, general cognitive ability.[23] Note the prevalence of inherent capacities for reasoning and adaptive action, in other words, of thinking and doing. It appears the main trend in defining intelligence is that intelligence is not itself just a cognitive or neural process, but rather a selective combination of these processes and resulting advantageous action purposely directed toward effective adaptation to the environment, which necessarily involves solving novel problems as they arise.[24]
Human intelligence research seeks to understand links between the brain and adaptive behaviour.[25] The idea of adapting to the environment runs through virtually all available human intelligence literature. It is essentially the story of life on earth, as explained in Darwin’s theory of natural selection.[26] In fact, so prominent are the ideas of advantageous adaptation within a contested environment throughout studies of human intelligence, seeking advantage can be considered an essential trait of intelligence. Brian Ford explains the test applied to prove intelligent behaviour in the simplest of life forms:
The definitive demonstration of intelligence must observe the cell encountering a situation which it cannot have previously experienced; it needs to demonstrate abnormal behaviour specifically in response; and the cell must act remedially to restore normality to its abnormal predicament.[27]
A more complete view of intelligence is offered by Louis Leon Thurston, an American psychologist, who in 1924 argued that the human power to reason sets intelligence apart from simple instinctive reaction and provides the capacity to infer and perceive an expected experience from accumulated stimuli. He describes intelligence as “…keen, when we find it capable of inferring the rest of a situation from the trivial … the capacity to make impulses focal at their early, unfinished stage of formation.”[28] Thurston also concluded that biological intelligence exists to protect an organism from bodily risk and to satisfy its “wants” with the least possible chance of failure.[29] Given Thurston’s work, it seems intelligence has a capacity for abstraction and reasoned anticipation.
Thurston’s notion of intelligence is valuable in two ways. First, it gives purpose to the action component of intelligence. Intelligence does not exist for its own sake, but to proactively seek advantage, or at least avoid failure, a kind of “advantage” in itself. Second, in describing intelligence as extending from impulse to satisfaction, Thurstone introduces the idea of intelligence as a cognitive system, not simply a single, abstract activity or tangible product. Moreover, intelligence is considered an adaptive, iterative process that culminates in satisfying the “want” through purposeful intended behaviour. To succeed against threats and overcome obstacles implies a role for advantage in doing so.
Some essential elements of the human intelligence process can be inferred from what has been covered thus far. First, note the presence of an initial operative intent of an entity that looks to achieve a preferred goal in the future. Second, there is a sensing exercise, which detects and analyses environmental conditions, including possible danger, leading to a perception of circumstances and anticipation of likely outcomes. Perception and judgement then lead to a decision to appropriately adapt behaviour in a manner that permits achievement of a preferred goal. All this tells us that intelligence has a point to it.
Etymology-Semantic Roots of Intelligence
Across generations, people have taken the one original idea of intelligence and re-shaped it into a number of derived, parochial versions. The task here is to corral those novel interpretations and determine if and how they relate to the essential idea of intelligence. Government and military intelligence practitioners tend to see “their” intelligence as somehow different from the intelligence practiced in other agencies and departments or studied in other academic fields. Might these different views of intelligence be reconciled?
The etymology of intelligence begins with the Latin verb intellegere, to understand.[30] Although there is no universally agreed definition of intelligence today, at least two complementary descriptions of intelligence can be found in established field literature. The first comes from a task force of eleven accomplished American psychology scholars.[31] They argued that individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought” [author’s italics]. Another perspective comes from 52 intelligence researchers who described intelligence as:
A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience …. …it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings … “figuring out” what to do.[32]
Two important inferences can be drawn from the preceding quote and information. First, if intelligence is related to applying knowledge, it suggests an ensuing action element. Second, if intelligence involves action that seeks to favourably manipulate the environment, it necessarily suggests the essential pursuit of advantage.
Elsewhere, the Merriam-Webster online medical dictionary defines intelligence as “the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations … [and] the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one’s environment.”[33] Traditional general dictionary definitions of intelligence tend to support these views, but dictionary definitions are usually bifurcated, describing intelligence first as a fundamentally human trait or process:
… the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations: REASON, also: the skilled use of reason … the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one’s environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria (such as tests) … mental acuteness: SHREWDNESS.[34]
However, dictionary definitions go further and describe intelligence as a more practical activity, to obtain and exchange information by organized groups of people, thereby presuming a socialized equivalent of individual human intelligence. The second half of such definitions usually read like the following, “information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area also: an agency engaged in obtaining such information.”[35] Note however, that this somewhat superficial description of intelligence simply outlines a process and organization, not intelligence as “the thing” itself. It presents the erroneous impression that “intelligence” and “information” are synonyms, which they decidedly are not. Canadian military intelligence doctrine makes it clear that “information consists of a single item or a group of data … Intelligence differs from information in that it is the end result of an analytical process.”[36]
Recognizing the difference is a major step in understanding intelligence but is not the only distinction to be made. Intelligence involves the accumulation of information, the ensuing onset of knowledge and the development of understanding, all of which are different degrees of cognitive accomplishment. Consideration of research in educational studies can be of value in understanding the intellectual building blocks of intelligence.
One example of prior academic education research in the cognitive domain is Bloom’s Taxonomy, an important contribution to the theory of mastery of learning.[37] Bloom's Taxonomy (2001) contained six hierarchical categories of learning described (from simple to complex) as: Remembering, Understanding, Applying, Analyzing, Evaluating, and Creating. When adapted to the human intelligence process, this taxonomy suggests an Intelligence Cognitive Hierarchy (ICH), which can be used to help understand the hierarchical arrangement of cognitive forms at play in building intelligence capacity. A clear distinction between information and intelligence, and other conceptual terms, can be seen in the ICH shown in Figure 6.2.
Much like Bloom’s Taxonomy, the ICH shows a pyramid of increasing cognitive complexity, culminating in the idea that intelligence is arguably the highest form of human cognition, or extra-cognition, because it goes beyond what is known, or can be known. It originates with the receipt of an individual datum that accumulate as data. Once collated and evaluated, data gains meaning and becomes information. At some point, with enough verified information, human learning will lead to knowledge of the issue at hand. With further thought, we subsequently acquire deeper understanding of events and an early perception of their anticipated consequences. At this point, generally known as situational awareness, we reach the limit of normal human cognition, having gone as far as our cognitive induction process can take us.[38] Beyond this, in the extra-cognitive realm, we can know nothing for certain. But we can try to surmise what will likely come next.
By building on our exceptional human reasoning capacity, fuelled by acquired wisdom, seasoning experience, imagination and steered by mature judgement, we can arrive at reasonable projections about what might probably occur in the future. This is not infallible prediction, but forecasting probabilities might be as good as it gets. In this way, intelligence exists beyond human cognition, in the extra-cognitive domain.
Regrettably, recognition of such distinctive extra-cognitive status is absent from Canadian intelligence discourse, which persists in its long-standing focus on a product, rather than the more substantial notion of intelligence as a capacity for enabling manifest advantage. This is not just a Canadian problem. Definitions of intelligence found in other Five Eyes government and agency documents generally conform to product-oriented descriptions without reference to the essential cognitive character of the intelligence process.[39]
Intelligence as a Capacity
What does intelligence look like? Again, it depends on whom you ask. In a national security framework, intelligence comes in the form of reports to department or ministerial staff, often, but not always in response to a question asked by a senior bureaucrat. National security intelligence agencies will also forward reports about issues they themselves have decided are noteworthy. Military commanders and intelligence staffs view intelligence as assessments, reports, or summaries flowing from a commander’s expression of intelligence requirements, and the priority in which those requirements should be addressed. In the law enforcement context, intelligence is conflated, and sometimes confused, with information and evidence. In all these cases, intelligence is considered a product, a deliverable that culminates in the hands of a client, consumer, or customer. There is no consideration about whether these deliverables have actually enabled any favourable manipulation of the contested environment, or any advantageous behaviour at all. In this sense, intelligence has not been seen.
Psychologists have a different take on intelligence, but they too have not actually seen intelligence. Psychometric measures only gauge the effects of intelligence. Modern brain imaging techniques also only show brain activity in the course of an intelligent act, which is an effect of intelligent behaviour, not intelligence itself. Historical research has shown that individual humans have different levels of intelligence, view problems differently, solve problems differently, and usually have different initial intentions. From this we can see that intelligence is at least a relative phenomenon, being manifest as more or less, better or worse, quicker or slower in any given circumstance.
This suggests that intelligence might more appropriately be viewed as an abstract capacity, rather than a tangible item or artifact. Intelligence, like power or stamina, is an unseen phenomenon of relative proportions. The effects of intelligence can only be experienced, and effects can only be felt or measured once they occur. In this way, intelligence is an abstract causal capacity, whose scope and effectiveness can only be seen and measured through its various manifest effects. Intelligence can thus only be evaluated once advantage has been manifested. Intelligence as a capacity is ignited by intent, fuelled by reasoning, and manifest in an ability to act in an advantageous manner.
Universal Definition of Intelligence
What makes intelligence special? It has been suggested that intelligence perceives not only what is, but what will probably be, so that behaviour can be adapted advantageously. Intelligence has a point to it. A range of scholarly and doctrinal definitions have also suggested that intelligence is essentially a cognitive activity that involves people, organized in functional groups, using a process to produce a product intended to guide subsequent decision-making and favourable action. However, that these elements exist within the intelligence process is interesting, but what is it that makes intelligence distinct from any other activity or process? What makes intelligence, intelligence?
Considering all above, it is suggested that intelligence is fundamentally the unchanging capacity to reason for the purpose of adapting behaviour advantageously, to prevail against adversarial influences, in a contested environment. Intelligence is more than simple situational awareness. It involves the ability to solve problems favourably by formulating appropriate intent; perceiving and interpreting circumstances; learning; anticipating, reasoning, and prioritizing likely outcomes; considering creative and effective optional behaviours; and having a capacity to adapt. Accordingly, we can say: Intelligence is the capacity for reasoned foresight that enables advantageous action.
Some might complain that this definition is too general, but there is more here than meets the eye. The definition highlights the idea that intelligence is all of a capacity (a relative attribute, not a mere artifact), a human cognitive exercise (“reasoned”), an extra-cognitive challenge (“foresight”), a catalyst (“enables”), and a purposeful endeavour (“advantageous action”). If any designated intelligence organization is not involved in all these aspects, it is not adequately fulfilling its intelligence role. True intelligence is all of this. It always has been and will continue to be.
What it all Means
The main conclusion to be drawn from all the above, is that a more fulsome exploration of the intelligence function can lead to a more complete understanding of the place of intelligence, not only in national security studies, but studies related to grand conflict. The limited and traditional understanding of intelligence as a deliverable product does little to explain the complexities involved in the onset and conduct of war and warfare. On the other hand, conceiving intelligence as an organic capacity involving expressed intent, reasoned foresight, and the pursuit of advantage brings a more substantial understanding of intelligence as a significant and unchanging function across the spectrum of conflict.
It can also be seen that there is a worrying lack of intellectual curiosity about the true nature of intelligence in Canada. However, there are glimmers of hope. One office willing to think outside the box is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Transformation Office, which has exhibited a refreshing curiosity about new ideas beyond the intelligence-as-product mindset. Government must establish a formal, intellectually robust program of intelligence studies, in concert with Canadian academia at all levels if the overall Canadian intelligence function is to ever move beyond the elementary level of understanding intelligence as a mere product. More thoughtful attention is required to ensure the Canadian profession of arms benefits from a full and modern understanding of the intelligence function so necessary to enable advantage in prevailing over all adversaries.
End Notes:
[1]. See an interesting brief by Hugh Smith, “Clausewitz’s Definition of War and it’s Limits,” Military Strategy Magazine, Special Edition Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2021), https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/clausewitzs-definition-of-war-and-its-limits/.
[2]. Howard Coombs, “Visualizing the Constantly Changing Character of War,” Presentation, Kingston Consortium on Security and Intelligence, 20 September 2023.
[3]. Frederick Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, (London, UK: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), ISBN 9780060146788 (ISBN10: 0060146788.
[4]. Harold C. Deutsch, “The Historical Impact of Revealing the ULTRA Secret,” Parameters 7, no. 1 (1977), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1102.
[5]. Winterbotham, Ultra, 30.
[6]. James Cox, “Defence Leadership of Intelligence Education,” Vimy Paper, Vol. 51 (Conference of Defence Associations, October 2022), https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Vimy_Paper_51.pdf.
[7]. National Defence, Joint Intelligence Doctrine. Joint Doctrine Manual B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, Issued on Authority of the Chief of Defence Staff (2003-05-21).
[8]. Government of Canada, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 2-0 Intelligence, Canadian Forces Joint Warfare Centre (2022). Not publicly available.
[9]. Justice Laws Website, Communications Security Establishment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 13, s. 76, paragraph 2, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-35.3/page-1.html.
[10]. In 2023, a graduate-level class of 24 largely early-mid career law-enforcement, emergency management, and other front-line security personnel were canvassed for definitions of intelligence used by their parent organizations. Sixteen (16) responded. Three (3) said their organization had no definition of intelligence. In addition, the same request was made of another 20 active and former intelligence practitioners with experience at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels. Their contributions are embedded in this paper.
[11]. No definition of intelligence is found in either the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-16.6/FullText.html, or the National Security Review Agency Act, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/n-16.62/page-1.html.
[12]. For example, see Western University’s Brain and Mind Institute, at https://www.uwo.ca/bmi/.
[13]. For example, see the University of Waterloo’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Group, at https://uwaterloo.ca/artificial-intelligence-group/.
[14]. See an explanation of AGI, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGOeBQQCzGk.
[15]. For example, see NPSIA, “Intelligence and International Affairs,” Specialized Fields in International Affairs, https://carleton.ca/npsia/program-hub/specialized-fields-in-international-affairs/; Royal Military College of Canada, War Studies Programs, https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/registrars-office/war-studies-programmes; CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/; IALEIA “Training,” https://www.ialeia.org/training.php; and SCIP “Events and Training,” https://www.scip.org/page/CompetitiveIntelligenceTraining-Certification.
[16]. See Strategic Consortium of Intelligence Professionals, https://www.scip.org/page/About-Us.
[17]. See a fulsome story in David A. Charters, Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution from the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2022), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2006/RAND_CF219.pdf.
[18]. Greg Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (RAND: National Security Research Division, 2006): iii.
[19]. Jonathan Barnes, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (London and New York: Routledge, 1982), 113; James Kaufman, Scott Kaufman, Jonathan Plucker, “Contemporary Theories of Intelligence,” in Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology, ed. D. Reisberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023), 811–822.
[20]. One example is Plucker, J. and Jonathan Esping, Intelligence 101 (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2014). See a reading sample at https://www.amazon.com/Intelligence-101-Psych-Jonathan-Plucker/dp/0826111254?.
[21]. David Kahn, “An historical theory of intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, 16:3 (2001): 79–92, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306220.
[22]. For instance, Steven Pinker, “The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and
Language,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), (2010), https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.0914630107, and L. L. Thurston, “A Definition of Intelligence,” The Nature of Intelligence (Oxon, U.K.: Routledge, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924). The Mead Project Digital edition 2007, https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Thurstone/1924/1924_12.html.
[23]. Shane Legg, and Marcus Hutter, A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence, (IDSIA, Galleria 2, Manno-Lugano CH-6928, Switzerland, June 2007), https://www.semanticscholar.org/reader/921328ec369ac8f30d719ec553dde0cb8b708ef4.
More than 71 definitions were reviewed from a number of fields of study. In the end, their preferred definition of intelligence was, “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.”
[24]. Britannica, “Human Intelligence,” https://www.britannica.com/science/human-intelligence-psychology.
[25]. Note here that human intelligence (HI) is different from HUMINT (intelligence derived from human sources). See Plucker, and Esping in Footnote 20.
[26]. Darwin, Charles, The Origin of Species (London, UK: Flame Tree Publishing, 2019).
[27]. Brian Ford, “Cellular intelligence: Microphenomenology and the realities of being,” Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 131 (2017): 273–287, https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology.
[28]. Thurstone, “A Definition of Intelligence,” 83.
[29]. Ibid., 156–163.
[30]. Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com.
[31]. Ulrich Neisser, et al, “Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns,” American Psychologist, 51:2 (1996): 77–101, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232430439_Intelligence_Knowns_and_Unknowns.
[32]. Linda Gottfredson, "Mainstream Science on Intelligence,” Intelligence, 24:1 (1997): 13–23. A later version of this editorial was subsequently published in Intelligence, 24:1 (1997): 13–23, https://www1.udel.edu/educ/gottfredson/reprints/1997mainstream.pdf.
[33]. Merriam-Webster Unabridged Medical Dictionary, Intelligence, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence.
[34]. Ibid.
[35]. Ibid.
[36]. National Defence, B-GJ-005-200/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 2-0 Intelligence (Chief of Defence Intelligence, October 2011) 2-2. Canadian intelligence doctrine is largely based on, and is compatible with, UK, US and NATO intelligence doctrine.
[37]. University of Waterloo, “Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning Domains,” https://uwaterloo.ca/centre-for-teaching-excellence/catalogs/tip-sheets/blooms-taxonomy.
[38]. For a detailed discussion of cognitive induction in the intelligence function see Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke, “On Analysis,” Chapter 5, in The Problem of Secret Intelligence, Chapter 5 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021).
[39]. The Australian Intelligence Services Act, 2001 confuses intelligence and information. See “Definitions” at https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A00928/2021-05-25/text. In New Zealand, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet says, “Simply put, intelligence is information which is collected, brought together, assessed and then used to make decisions. https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/intelligence-and-security-act-2017/what-is-intelligence. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence defines intelligence as: “…information gathered within or outside the U.S. that involves threats to our nation, its people, property, or interests; development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; and any other matter bearing on the U.S. national or homeland security.” See https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/what-is-intelligence.
[AH1]There is no closing single quotation mark, and it’s not clear to me whether it should be positioned after secret or at the end of the sentence.