Introduction and Background

With the return of conventional conflict, Western liberal democracies have reluctantly embraced the importance of strategic alliances and capability-sharing. Ukraine’s war effort against Russia has largely been funded by NATO’s members, with variations from state to state.[1] In the Pacific, cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the United States has been increasingly important in countering Chinese regional influence.[2] When faced with conventional and asymmetric threats, Western liberal democracies are quick to recall the importance of strategic cooperation, particularly in the defence context. When considering the security challenges related to climate change, however, the concept of formal alliances becomes secondary to domestic preparedness. 

The security threats posed by climate change will be widespread and discriminate on the axes of geography and wealth. According to a 2020 report from the Institute for Economics and Peace over one billion people will live in countries unable to “sufficiently withstand the impact of ecological events by 2050.”[3] Moreover, it predicts that 5.4 billion people will live in countries with heightened water stress by 2040.[4] Presently, there are over 110 million displaced people worldwide, a figure which will no doubt increase as the severity of the crisis worsens.[5] The adaptation deficit in Less Economically Developed Countries (LEDCs) suggests that government services may not be able to rapidly adjust to address immediate and long-term shocks stemming from climate change, necessitating outside intervention. For militaries in More Economically Developed Countries (MEDCs), this will mean forging partnerships to share resources and collectively plan transnational responses to climate emergencies.

In the Americas, some regions and people are particularly vulnerable to climate shocks. In the Canadian Arctic, “thawing permafrost and coastal erosion [will] destabilize the ground on which many communities are built,” endangering predominantly indigenous communities.[6] Increasing instances of natural disasters, on the coasts, will disrupt local economic activity. Despite the challenges posed domestically, Canada’s developed economy, relative wealth, and modern infrastructure position it better than other countries to respond to climate shocks. In this context, Canadian policy has outlined the importance of assisting LEDCs. Canada’s Defence Climate and Sustainability Strategy 2023-2027 highlights the heightened vulnerability of LEDCs, in addition to establishing a mandate for global security cooperation through NATO’s Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence.[7] Strong, Secure Engaged correctly frames climate change as a security issue and, as one of its eight core missions, specifies “provid[ing] assistance to civil authorities […] in responding to international or domestic disasters.”[8] To address the monumental security challenges of climate change in the coming decades, Canada’s defence community, particularly its military, must forge new alliances that permit it to assist the world’s most vulnerable regions through extensive cooperation, in a more in-depth capacity than short deployments following a highly publicized disaster. Due to its vulnerability, strategic importance, and geographic proximity, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) may be considered a focal point for Canadian-led climate security initiatives. By considering LAC’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change, and discussing strategic opportunities for Western Hemispheric cooperation, this paper will propose a framework through which Canada can lead and implement a regional climate security strategy.

The Climate Crisis and LAC

            LAC’s existing socio-economic challenges, coupled with adverse geography, render the region vulnerable to the effects of climate change. According to the OECD, from 2002 to 2021 “extreme climate‑related weather events in the region increased by 62%, and exposure of people, ecosystems and infrastructure to climate-related hazards is growing.”[9] The social fragility of some areas due to crime and poverty further exacerbate regional vulnerability. In the coming decades, security actors within LAC, particularly militaries, will be faced with significant challenges as the region faces new climate-based threats.

            Large swaths of the resource-rich and diverse geography of LAC are highly vulnerable to climate shocks. Sea-level rise will impact Latin American coastlines and islands in the Caribbean, with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina as “three countries in which the largest number of people are likely to be impacted.”[10] Almost a third of the region’s area is vulnerable to forest fires, particularly in Mexico and Paraguay where 70% of forests are vulnerable and in Brazil where the figure is 46%.[11] Croplands, which account for 38% of the region’s land use and 20% of its GDP are equally threatened by rising instances of extreme precipitation, particularly in Guyana and Suriname.[12] Conversely, in other parts of the region, croplands have experienced a decline in soil moisture, worsening the duration and intensity of droughts.[13] Disruption to agricultural production will be impactful on micro and macro scales. On a micro-scale, it will disrupt subsistence farming in poor communities and lead to starvation, illness and even death. On a macro-scale, key agricultural exports will be interrupted or reduced, leading to reduced economic growth and global supply chain shortages. Another example of these “bi-level” climatic shocks is in Panama, where reduced rainfall “exacerbated by the El Niño weather phenomenon” has led to lower water levels in Lake Gatun, which is critical for the functioning of the Panama Canal and a water source for over two million people.[14] Continued rainfall deficits in the region threaten both global supply chains, which rely on the canal for expedient shipping, and the lives of locals who risk running out of potable water. Instances of severe tropical storms are also expected to rise, which will be catastrophic for one of the region’s economic powerhouses, Mexico, where “50% of their population and built-up area [are] exposed to extreme tropical cyclones.”[15] Apart from the disruption to local livelihoods, the resulting economic interruption may impact the production of manufactured goods which are exported to the United States and elsewhere. Militaries, the likely first responders following a climate shock, must be prepared to operate in all terrains and deploy logistical and humanitarian capacity to affected areas regardless of geography. This will necessitate investment to improve lines of communication, build multi-modal logistics, and implement supply chain redundancies. By rapidly mitigating the impact of a sudden shock, the resulting economic disruption can also be managed. Latin American military leadership has already recognized the importance of multinational alliances to respond to climate shocks, evidenced by exercises like Tradewinds and UNITAS, as well as major conferences on the subject.[16] These events have been planned, however, in the context of  disaster relief operations.[17] Thus far, a holistic strategy to build resilient infrastructure and logistics has not been formalized.

            Geographic vulnerabilities are worsened by adverse socio-economic conditions. Numerous studies have concluded that impoverished people are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, notably natural disasters, food insecurity, and disease.[18] In regions with heightened inequality, like LAC, cyclic poverty becomes difficult to combat. According to the IMF, Latin America is 30% more unequal than the global average, with Brazil and Colombia both ranking in the top ten highest GINI coefficients.[19] Without a comprehensive strategy to combat inequality, poverty will persist, and climate vulnerability will worsen. Across LAC, 180 million people live in poverty and 70 million in extreme poverty.[20] In the region, 21% of urban dwellers reside in slums, with reduced access to food, water, and electricity.[21] These neighbourhoods are often built “over floodplains or up mountain slopes, or in other zones ill-suited to settlement such as areas prone to flooding or affected by seasonal storms, sea surges or other weather-related risks,” which, due to their informal nature, may not be rebuilt after a shock.[22] Impoverished and vulnerable people may not have the means to evacuate before a disaster, leaving them stuck in areas where their chances of survival are reduced. Worse still, climate change is expected to worsen extreme poverty by as much as 300% by 2030.[23] In LAC, this may result in a significantly reduced tax base. The consequences of less of revenue, as it pertains to climate security are potentially three-fold. One, for regions where extreme poverty is concentrated especially, tax revenues may be insufficient to undertake infrastructure improvement projects. Second, austerity measures, including cuts to services, may be economically necessary. Third, cuts to defence may be warranted, especially in the development of new capabilities. While all three may occur, or a combination thereof, even the fulfillment of one risks reducing state capacity.  Areas with higher instances of poverty will require more assistance as they are less resilient to shocks and are unable to build the capacity to prepare for them. The cycle of poverty may become more difficult to escape if services are reduced, resulting in even more dramatic growth in vulnerable populations. Cuts to the military reduces their ability to respond to emergencies. If one or more of these risks materialize, Latin American states will have to look externally to compensate for lost capacity.

            In LAC, crime worsens the threat of climate change for its poorest citizens. Weapons trafficking from Central American countries with recent civil conflicts, like Guatemala or Nicaragua, as well as from the United States has contributed to a surge in unregistered firearms in the region, especially in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia.[24] According to the UNODC, “roughly half of all [LAC’] homicide victims in 2021 were linked to organized crime.”[25] Competition between drug cartels has contributed to an increase in violence in the region, exemplified by the homicide rate in Ecuador, which quadrupled from 2016 to 2022.[26] Latin American cartels are major players in the global drug trade, which is estimated to be worth up to $652 billion.[27] Mexican and Colombian drug cartels are responsible for a significant portion of the drug trade and finance the production and distribution of drugs like cocaine and marijuana to the United States and use their considerable resources to challenge state authority, either by buying influence or through outright violence.[28] Crime exacerbates development challenges in the region, perpetuating “unequal access to employment, education, health, and basic physical infrastructure.”[29] Where organized crime exists, cartels have an interest in hindering local economic growth that may challenge their dominance. In a crisis, social order will be threatened, and local authorities may be unable to restore it. The unfortunate recent outbreak of gang violence in Haiti has been a stark reminder of the volatility of LEDCs.[30] Furthermore, when order breaks down, the group that can project force wins control. Powerful cartels with considerable wealth and armies of foot soldiers will be well-positioned to exploit chaos stemming from environmental catastrophes. Humanitarian aid may be lucrative targets for organized criminals, as was demonstrated after the 2021 earthquake in Haiti where gangs targeted supplies like food and medicine, denying access to devastated communities.[31] In the chaotic atmosphere of a major environmental disaster, a strong and credible response is needed to quell malicious actors. Human trafficking may also increase as cartels offer exits for people in devasted areas. Militaries must be prepared to act swiftly to restore order and dissuade local and transnational organized crime from exploiting weakened regional capacity. When crime festers following a shock, it leads to protracted local conflicts or worsen the quality of life of already desperate people.

The security challenges detailed above may have the following effects on the region:

1.     Supply Chain Disruptions. Climate change may cause supply chain disruption due to decreased agricultural activity and damage to lines of communication from disasters. Shortages of key resources like fresh water in Panama may be a catalyst for social instability. Moreover, isolated farming communities like those in Guatemala or Honduras, may not have the resources to build climate-resilient farming infrastructure. In Brazil or Chile, where remote communities rely on sparse roads for delivery of necessity goods, a natural disaster leading to road closures may be catastrophic. Providing immediate humanitarian relief and ensuring its effective distribution will be a critical activity following climatic shocks. For countries that are net importers of necessary goods, like Nicaragua for cereals, keeping global ports of entry accessible will also be important. Another threat is if cartels attempt to create a black market that challenges legitimate authority. They may seek to control or sabotage the distribution of medicine, food, and water. Militaries must be prepared to adopt multi-modal transportation to ensure the survivability of distribution networks and to protect lines of communication from bad actors. This will include ensuring distribution to remote areas, far from urban centers, that cannot sustain themselves due to reduced crop yields.

2.     Infrastructure Damage. Critical infrastructure like roads and power centers may be threatened, in addition to buildings needed to perpetuate the functioning of society, like hospitals, may be destroyed in natural disasters. Military engineers and logistics can be leveraged in these situations to build a patchwork of temporary infrastructure. For example, engineers can use bridging equipment to keep land routes open following floods while logisticians distribute generators to keep power on in hospitals. Building temporary shelters for evacuees will also be necessary. Given that one of the secondary impacts of climate shocks are increased instances of disease and illness, robust health care is necessary.[32] In countries like Peru, the fragility of the healthcare system was apparent during COVID.[33] While this is also attributed to systemic problems, if infrastructure is damaged it will amplify the crisis. Therefore, militaries must also be prepared to rapidly mobilize field hospitals in areas where local healthcare infrastructure is vulnerable.

3.     Mass Displacement. Large-scale natural disasters may necessitate mass evacuations of vulnerable urban and rural areas. When disasters strike with short notice and people cannot evacuate, a military’s logistical capabilities will be necessary to rapidly extract groups of survivors. This may be the case in the Caribbean or coastal areas vulnerable to tropical storms. For millions whose farms or homes will be destroyed in natural disasters, the logistics of long-term shelter and permanent resettlement in safer parts of their country or within the Western hemisphere must be considered. A pertinent example is Brazil’s relocation of Venezuelan migrants arriving in Roraima under Operation Alcolhida, whereby the military has built camps for newcomers and civilian agencies have overseen their relocation to other Brazilian states.[34] A military’s logistical capability and capacity to rapidly deploy humanitarian aid will be vital to managing displacement following a crisis and will be just as important when efforts are under way to manage post-shock movement of survivors.

Strategic Opportunities for Cooperation

            The strategic advantages for the West, create a powerful argument for security cooperation within the Americas. Although some scholars and NGOs have proposed climate change “reparations,” mostly funded by “countries and private corporations most responsible historically for the CO2 emissions” which damage other countries, this approach risks creating division in partnerships between more and less wealthy countries.[35] Moreover, it requires acceptance of a compelling, but absolutist moral position. Rather than advocate a “moral” or normative approach to justify climate cooperation, it is perhaps more productive to frame this initiative in terms of mutual benefit. While not a transformational solution, comprehensive hemispheric cooperation will provide security for some of the world’s most vulnerable people, in addition to strengthening economic ties in the Western hemisphere. The logistical expertise of militaries is ideal for responding to the immediate impacts of natural disasters, supply chain interruptions, and resulting physical security threats. A strategy that permits the sharing of capabilities is the most effective security adaptation strategy available to governments. 

            As detailed in Strong, Secure, Engaged and according to conventional strategic thought, forging strong alliances is beneficial in the face of uncertainty. Alliances serve to amplify, multiply, accelerate, and extend an actor’s power.[36] They also create opportunities for resource sharing, which can amplify the capacities of allies, in addition to accelerating the development of new capabilities. When faced with the magnitude of the climate crisis, countries working in isolation are not well-equipped to deal with shocks. Resource-sharing between states, particularly MEDCs amplifying the capacities of LEDCs, creates an effective framework to bolster the resilience of both, but especially the latter. Resilience amid shocks creates stability in vulnerable areas and long-term conditions for economic development, meaning more investment opportunities for its partners. In Latin America, this will be especially true as unequal countries with the highest level of vulnerability, like Brazil, have incredible economic potential and existing capacity. The region’s most powerful economies, namely Brazil and Mexico, can also be leveraged to play leadership roles in resource sharing and capacity building. For smaller countries in the region, the benefit of such an agreement is direct investment from the West that facilitates the infrastructure and capacity-building necessary to withstand climate shocks. For the regional powers, direct investment may be less impactful, but cooperation opens their militaries further to technological/knowledge exchange and creates an opening for their defence leaders to influence Western security policy.  Conversely, North America can also benefit from the collective knowledge of LAC governments to perfect their domestic frameworks to address climate vulnerabilities. It also provides a measure of long-term regional stability, as a more prepared Latin America is one that maintains order amid the chaos of a climate shock. By leveraging security cooperation as a pretext for economic partnerships, Canada and the USA can extend their influence in LAC and create a zone for lucrative investment that builds strategic buffers to counter growing influence from rival powers in the region. This cooperation can take the form of investments in infrastructure, starting with critical logistical networks like rebuilding roads and airfields in remote areas, and later transition to long-term projects, including investment in green energy and climate-resilient housing. 

            China is an effective model for how to engage in productive economic relationships with LAC. Presently, Chinese-Latin American cooperation includes investment in projects like modernizing telecommunications infrastructure, enabling electric vehicle manufacturing in Brazil, and significant investment in renewable energy production.[37] Generous direct foreign investment ($180 billion since 2002) and funding in mining and other extractive activities have secured critical resources for China, including extensive mining rights in the lithium triangle (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile).[38] With the return of great power competition, there is an imperative for the USA and Canada to compete and project influence within the Western hemisphere. While the USA remains Mexico’s largest trading partner, and maintains a leading position in Central America, their economic influence has been surpassed in South America (which accounts for 82% of regional GDP).[39] Excluding Mexico, Chinese trade flows with Latin America were $247 billion compared to the USA’s $174 billion.[40] In 2020, there were 12 countries more economically reliant on China than the United States, versus just two in 2000.[41] Although China may be rising in the economic competition, they have left a gap for security cooperation which can be exploited. A formal, climate-centred regional military alliance in the Americas would be an important step to hedging against growing Chinese influence in the region. Under the pretext of climate defence cooperation, Western investment in repairing defence critical infrastructure can materialize. This investment, which can privilege domestic firms, can in turn stimulate job creation and economic opportunity in impoverished places in Latin America. Although limited, it provides a bridgehead by which economic influence can begin to expand and counter a growingly Chinese-aligned Latin America. Consequently, investment in infrastructure and the logistics to counter climate shocks must be integral to any strategy working toward climate security.  

Policy Recommendations

            Canada is well-positioned to lead the development and implementation of a security alliance for climate change. Its objectives would center on providing humanitarian, developing logistical capacity to build resilience against climate events, and providing a framework to share capabilities to respond to crises. The robust institutions and learning culture of the Canadian Armed Forces, coupled with profound humanitarian operational experience, are valuable for any multinational partnership. Successful implementation of this strategy must also involve the leadership of the regional hegemon, the USA, and LAC’s economic and military powers, namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Moreover, smaller countries in Latin America and the Caribbean must be treated as equal partners as they will be equally severely impacted by climate events and therefore have an important stake in championing the interests of their people . Addressing climate change requires profound economic changes and social changes, but shared security planning can create effective mechanisms to adapt to immediate and severe shocks, especially when leveraging the expertise of several militaries. The first step in a hemispheric climate security framework will be to conduct working groups to study feasibility, necessity, and existing gaps, specifically around how to action the following:

1.     Exercises and wargaming. In 2017, Brazil invited several militaries, including Peru and Colombia to support Exercise AMAZONLOG, which practiced delivering humanitarian aid in the Amazon’s austere environment.[42] This exercise is a relevant example of the type of humanitarian training necessary to confront the growing severity of climate shocks. Canada and the USA, which benefit from modern doctrine, advanced training facilities, and expertise in conducting multinational training, are ideal to direct this line of effort. Multinational training must emphasize rebuilding and emergency rescue following a disaster and providing short and long-term humanitarian assistance to mitigate climate shocks. This training must also include maintaining social order and using force to keep critical supply networks, infrastructure, and resources safe from asymmetric threats. They must also emphasize wargaming long-term logistical support to areas where rebuilding after a disaster will be prolonged or where vulnerable populations cannot rely on local capacity.

2.     Resource sharing. Responding to immediate shocks from climate change will require considerable logistical resources. Building alliances and formal agreements on how to distribute essential capabilities will enable the implementation of a framework whereby every member can benefit from access to shared resources. This can include military capabilities like vehicles and weapons or even include a plan that distributes responsibility for providing humanitarian aid. In LAC, this will particularly benefit poor countries or those with smaller militaries but may also benefit wealthier and larger ones that have difficulty force projecting into remote areas (like along Colombia’s border with Brazil). Resource sharing can also be practiced or war-gamed in multinational exercises. Projection is also important, as countries must ensure that they can rapidly mobilize forces to respond to crises in vulnerable areas.

3.     Emergency displacement strategy. As short and long-term environmental crises impact the livelihoods of urban and rural populations alike, a strategy to mitigate and manage the flow of migrants is necessary. By leveraging tools like artificial intelligence and through extensive geographic study of the region, governments can determine where population displacement is most likely to occur. Planners can use mathematical models to code vulnerable areas and estimate the magnitude of disruption of several different climate events, from sudden and short-term shocks like cyclones to prolonged disruptions like droughts and plan effective responses. The distinction must be made, however, between short and long-term resettlement and where militaries’ responsibilities end. Militaries must be responsible for tactical evacuation planning and transportation of affected people using available logistical capabilities. Long-term resettlement, including ensuring economic and physical security of migrants, must by managed by civil authority. The first reason for civilian control is coordination. The burden of resettlement, which would include ensuring the long-term wellbeing of displaced people, exceeds the military’s purview of logistics and security by entering the realm of social services. It is important that oversight of this function remains with civilian experts, as it has in Operation Acolhida.[43] Another important reason is to maintain trust of local communities. The atrocities committed by the Guatemalan or Argentine militaries still reside in living memory.[44] In countries with a similar history, vulnerable people may not have trust in their soldiers, so signalling oversight and control by civil authority is an important tool to reign in excesses, or perceived excess, of armed forces.  

4.     Emergency capacity investment. Logistics planners must identify vulnerabilities in key distribution networks and critical infrastructure. Significant investment must be made to improve their survivability, either by improving existing capacity or with new projects. The effective distribution of humanitarian aid following a natural disaster or during a prolonged crisis will rely on the efficacy of distribution networks and supporting infrastructure. Consequently, collective investment in improving roads in the Amazon, or new power grids to reduce reliance on fossil fuels in the Caribbean, are investments not just in development, but in assuring security for the region. In this context, Canada and the United States can direct foreign aid budgets or incentivize domestic firms to implement projects in LAC. Militaries will be key consultants in this domain, as their expertise can be leveraged to prioritize infrastructure projects.

Security adaptation is just one piece of the puzzle when addressing the existential threat of climate change. Although important for the survivability of vulnerable communities, the only long-term solutions are policies to reduce carbon emissions and to invest in reducing inequality.

            Societal and geographic factors worsen Latin America’s vulnerability to climate change. Where there is crisis, however, there is opportunity. Cooperation on climate security in the Western Hemisphere is both an opportunity to prepare for the devastating impacts on the crisis and to strengthen the strategic ties between North and South. The first step in realizing an ambitious cooperative is to begin the planning. To this end, Canada can leverage existing platforms and champion the integration of Latin America into the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (conveniently headquartered in Montreal). From there, Canada can publicly call upon the defence communities in the United States and Latin America to collaborate on a formal climate security alliance, which would be primarily focused on building the logistical capacity to respond to the various dimensions of a climate shock. Short-term policy should emphasize messaging and bringing others to the table, while in the medium-term, robust capability planning and formalizing agreements for capacity sharing are steps towards an enduring alliance. While these efforts will be time consuming and certainly have an attached cost, the reward of doing so is both strategically beneficial and an important humanitarian cause.

Pablo Cardona is currently an army logistics Captain, employed at the Valcartier Research Centre in Quebec as the Explosives Safety Officer. Before his current posting, he was the Ammunition Technical Officer for 2 Canadian Division Support Group. He graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a BA (Hons) in Military and Strategic Studies in 2019 and is currently pursuing an MBA through the same institution. His research interests are Latin American international relations, climate security, emerging technology in developing economies, and cybersecurity.

End Notes:

[1] Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much U.S. Aid Is Going to Ukraine?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 9, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts.

[2] Andrew Shearer, “U.S.–Japan–Australia Strategic Cooperation in the Trump Era,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2017, December 31, 2017, 83–85, https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-008

[3] “Over One Billion People at Threat of Being Displaced by 2050 Due to Environmental Change, Conflict and Civil Unrest,” Institute for Economics and Peace, September 9, 2020, Institute for Economics and Peace , https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Ecological-Threat-Register-Press-Release-27.08-FINAL.pdf.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Refugee Statistics: USA FOR UNHCR,” USA for UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency, accessed May 11, 2024, https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/#:~:text=More%20than%20114%20million%20individuals,levels%20of%20displacement%20on%20record.

[6] Wilfrid Greaves, “Climate Change and Security in Canada,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 76, no. 2 (June 2021): 183–203, https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020211019325, 184.

[7] Canada, National Defence, Defence Climate and Sustainability Strategy 2023-2027 (Ottawa, ON: National Defence, 2023), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/corporate/reports-publications/dcss/dcss-e-signed.pdf, 12.

[8] Canada, National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa, ON, National Defence, 2017), http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf, 17.

[9] OECD (2023), Environment at a Glance in Latin America and the Caribbean: Spotlight on Climate Change, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2431bd6c-en, 40.

[10] UN ECLAC (2015), The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Publication, Santiago, https://hdl.handle.net/11362/37955m, 29, 101.

[11] OECD, Environment at a Glance in Latin American and the Caribbean, 40.

[12] OECD/FAO (2019), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2019-2028, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2019-en, 71; OECD, Environment at a Glance in Latin American and the Caribbean, 40.

[13] OECD, Environment at a Glance in Latin American and the Caribbean, 40-41.

[14] Jonathan Yerushalmy, “Changing Climate Casts a Shadow over the Future of the Panama Canal – and Global Trade,” The Guardian, December 22, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/22/changing-climate-casts-a-shadow-over-the-future-of-the-panama-canal-and-global-trade.

[15] OECD, Environment at a Glance in Latin American and the Caribbean, 40.

[16] Wilder Alejandro Sánchez, “The 21st Century Latin American Military: Climate Change and the Future of HA/DR Operations,” William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, United States Department of Defense, April 2022, https://wjpcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/21cent_LATAM_mil_HADR_ops.pdf

[17] Ibid., 9.

[18] Ruma Bhargava and Megha Bhargava, “The Climate Crisis Disproportionately Hits the Poor. How Can We Protect Them?,” World Economic Forum, January 13, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/climate-crisis-poor-davos2023/, 1-7.

Piya Abeygunawardena et al., Poverty and climate change: reducing the vulnerability of the poor through adaptation (English), Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534871468155709473/Poverty-and-climate-change-reducing-the-vulnerability-of-the-poor-through-adaptation

[19] Nora Lustig, “Most Unequal on Earth,” Finance & Development 52, no. 3 (September 2015):  https://doi.org/xhttps://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/09/pdf/fd0915.pdf, 14-15; “The World Factbook - Gini Index Coefficient - Distribution of Family Income,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May 11, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/gini-index-coefficient-distribution-of-family-income/country-comparison/.

[20] “Poverty in Latin America Returned to Pre-Pandemic Levels in 2022, ECLAC Reports with an Urgent Call for Progress on Labour Inclusion,” United Nations, November 23, 2023, UN ECLAC, https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/poverty-latin-america-returned-pre-pandemic-levels-2022-eclac-reports-urgent-call.

[21] OECD (2023), "Achieving climate resilience in the Latin America and Caribbean region", in Towards Climate Resilience and Neutrality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Policy Priorities, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6fe283b6-en.

[22] Jorgelina Hardoy and Gustavo Pandiella, “Urban Poverty and Vulnerability to Climate Change in Latin America,” Environment and Urbanization 21, no. 1 (April 2009): 203–24, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247809103019, 204.

[23] Anna Wellenstein et al., “Climate Change and Poverty: The Perfect Storm,” World Bank Blogs, February 2, 2022, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/climate-change-and-poverty-perfect-storm?cid=SHR_BlogSiteTweetable_EN_EXT.

[24] Carina Solmirano, “Behind a Rise in Latin America’s Violent Crime, a Deadly Flow of Illegal Guns,” Americas Quarterly, May 18, 2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/behind-a-rise-in-latin-americas-violent-crime-a-deadly-flow-of-illegal-guns/.

[25] United Nations (2023), UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, United Nations Publication, New York, https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf, 102.

[26] Ibid, 107. 

[27] Channing May (2017), Transnational Crime and the Developing World, Global Financial Integrity, https://secureservercdn.net/45.40.149.159/34n.8bd.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf, xi.

[28] Diego Legrand and Hector Velasco, “Mexican Cartels: The Hidden Hand behind Colombia’s Drug Trade,” Barron’s, January 16, 2023, https://www.barrons.com/news/mexican-cartels-the-hidden-hand-behind-colombia-s-drug-trade-01673838009.

[29] Marianne Fay, The Urban Poor in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 137.

[30] Bryan Pietsch, “Crisis in Haiti Comes after Decades of Turmoil: A Chronology,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/16/haiti-crisis-history-timeline/.

[31] Bethany Dawson, “Reports of criminal gangs stealing aid shipments at gunpoint are hampering the effort to help Haiti’s earthquake victims,” Business Insider, August 21, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/haiti-armed-gangs-seize-aid-deliveries-to-earthquake-victims-2021-8.

[32] “Climate Change,” World Health Organization, October 12, 2023, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health.

[33] “A Year of Pandemic, a Year of Action in Peru,” UNICEF, accessed May 11, 2024, https://www.unicef.org/peru/en/coronavirus/a-year-pandemic-year-action-Peru.

[34] Matheus Augusto Soares and Nerissa Krebs Farret, “Brazilian Response to the Venezuelan Humanitarian Crisis: Operation Acolhida as a Politics of Hope,” Contexto Internacional 45, no. 1 (April 2023), https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.20234501e2021036.

[35] Audrey Chapman and Karim Ahmed, “Climate Justice, Humans Rights, and the Case for Reparations,” Health and Human Rights 23, no. 2 (December 2021): 81–94, https://doi.org/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8694300/.

[36] Gabriel Elefteriu, William Freer, and James Rogers, “What Is Strategic Advantage?,” Council on Geostrategy, December 4, 2023, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/what-is-strategic-advantage/.

[37] “China’s BYD Starts Construction on Manufacturing Complex in Brazil | Reuters,” Reuters, March 6, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chinas-byd-starts-construction-manufacturing-complex-brazil-2024-03-06/.

[38] “China Regional Snapshot: South America,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2022, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/.

[39] Adam Jourdan, Marco Aquino, and Matt Spetalnick, “Exclusive: Under Biden, China has widened trade lead in much of Latin America,” Reuters, June 28, 2022, accessed September 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/exclusive-under-biden-china-has-widened-trade-lead-much-latin-america-2022-06-08/.

[40] Ibid

[41] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/economic-displacement-chinas-growing-influence-latin-america

[42] “SOUTHCOM to Observe Humanitarian Logistics in the Amazon,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, November 3, 2017, https://br.usembassy.gov/southcom-observe-humanitarian-logistics-amazon/.

[43] Mauricio Rocha, Maiara Folly, and Tassio Franchi, “Brazil and Venezuela’s migration crisis: Dealing with a regional emergency in a time of national crisis,” in Handbook of Regional Conflict Resolution Initiatives in the Global South, ed. Jeronimo Delgado-Caicedo, 1st ed. (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2022), 285–300, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003287018.

[44] Patrick Smith, “Memory without history: Who owns Guatemala’s past?,” The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 59–72, https://doi.org/10.1162/016366001300093002.