The rapidly changing High North presents both opportunities and challenges that necessitate closer cooperation between Canada and the United States (CANUS). As climate change reshapes the Arctic landscape, opening new maritime routes and exposing untapped natural resources, and with Russian and Chinese interests in the region increasing, the need for a coordinated approach becomes critical. This policy brief aims to provide insights into the benefits, avenues, and challenges for closer CANUS cooperation in the Arctic.

This policy brief will first discuss the benefits of strengthened CANUS collaboration in the Arctic, ranging from enhanced security in a rapidly shifting geopolitical region and diplomatic cooperation. Then examine the existing frameworks and bilateral institutions that can facilitate this partnership, discussing multilateral institutions, military-to-military (mil-to-mil) bilateral forums, and NATO. Finally, this policy brief will discuss potential challenges that could hinder closer bilateral CANUS cooperation in the Arctic.

Benefits of Closer Cooperation

Fostering closer bilateral collaboration for CANUS in the Arctic region holds the potential to substantially progress shared interests and goals. As other international organizations experience stagnation and Arctic cooperation faces challenges, the bilateral CANUS partnership can swiftly initiate dialogues and cooperate without the complexities of involving all members when facilitating the development of policies and plans for CANUS.[1]

A simplified, two-sided strategy allows for quick responses to emergencies like Search and Rescue (SAR) missions and practicing contingency plans.[2] Moreover, closer cooperation can promote sustainable tourism practices in the region, safeguard the environment, and promote cooperation with indigenous communities.[3] CANUS can also promote scientific research through joint initiatives that can yield invaluable insights, particularly with a focus on climate change since environmental monitoring is critical considering the Arctic’s unprecedented transformation.[4] Economic cooperation in sectors like oil and gas exploration and fisheries management can foster trade, economic growth, and responsible resource utilization.[5] By capitalizing on our longstanding partnership and shared interests in the Arctic, CANUS can work together to further our shared interests and goals.

With a foundation of shared interests and mutual benefits in the Arctic, CANUS also has a diplomatic basis on which to further collaborate. As outlined in the 2023 U.S. White House's policy, “United States and Canada Strengthen Their Alliance”, an expanded CANUS Arctic Dialogue is going to be launched to further “continental security, economic and social development, and Arctic governance.”[6] This comprehensive framework aligns with a former Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership released in 2021, which emphasizes the urgency of tackling climate change, promoting sustainable energy solutions, and strengthening Arctic cooperation.[7] Moreover, the U.S.-Canada Joint Strategy for Modernizing Energy Cooperation from 2019 allows an avenue for closer cooperation on responsible resource development and transitioning towards a low-carbon future in the Arctic region.[8] By leveraging joint statements and diplomatic precedent, CANUS can move forward with a unified approach to address the multifaceted challenges and opportunities that the Arctic presents.

The 2024 Canadian Department of Defence Policy, “Our North, Strong and Free” outlines the urgency of Arctic security and the need for enhanced CANUS cooperation through NORAD, including plans for “a new deployment of Arctic and polar 'over-the-horizon' radar installations.” The policy outlines improvements to Canada's Arctic capabilities, such as “enhanced basing capabilities,” AWACS, underwater sensors, a satellite ground station, and the potential acquisition of nuclear submarines, all of which will contribute to joint defence efforts with the U.S. in the region. Canada also recognizes the importance of having “much better eyes and ears in space,” particularly for monitoring the Arctic, which will be crucial for the future of Canadian defence policy and its collaboration with the U.S. The commitment to regular national security strategies and defence policy reviews demonstrates a comprehensive approach to defence planning, acknowledging the significance of the Arctic and the importance of CANUS cooperation in this domain.[9]

Cooperation to Counter Geopolitical Threats

An increasingly complex geopolitical landscape is unfolding in the Arctic. Russia and China's growing assertiveness poses significant challenges, closer CANUS cooperation will be beneficial. Russia's militarization of the Arctic, coupled with its territorial claims and attempts to control vital shipping routes, poses a direct threat to the strategic interests of CANUS.[10] Simultaneously, China's self-proclaimed status as a “near-Arctic state” and its pursuit of economic and scientific activities in the region raise concerns about its long-term intentions and threat.[11]

By strengthening their partnership, CANUS can collectively enhance capabilities to monitor and respond to these emerging threats, safeguarding sovereignty and national security interests in the Arctic.[12] Joint maritime domain awareness initiatives, intelligence sharing, and coordinated military exercises can bolster deterrence and rapid response capabilities.[13] CANUS cooperation can also facilitate the development of resilient infrastructure and sustainable resource management to counter the potentially destabilizing effects of unchecked resource exploitation by rival powers.[14] CANUS can leverage combined diplomatic and military assets to counterbalance the influence of Russia and China in the Arctic to safeguard national interests and promote stability in the region.[15]

Venues of Cooperation

Multilateral Institutions

CANUS already collaborates within various multilateral Arctic governance forums where coordination can be leveraged to use these platforms for multilateral projects that also promote CANUS goals. The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for addressing Arctic issues, provides an avenue for CANUS to jointly advocate for their shared interests and shape the region's agenda.[16] Similarly, the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable offer opportunities for enhancing military cooperation, interoperability, and strategic alignment.[17] The Arctic Coast Guard Forum, focused on maritime safety and environmental protection, is a platform for maritime Arctic cooperation.[18] By working together within these multilateral bodies, CANUS can amplify their collective influence, promote their common vision for a stable and sustainable Arctic, and foster greater cooperation among Arctic and non-Arctic nations.[19] Stronger CANUS collaboration within these forums could also facilitate the development of unified, allied positions on critical issues, joint initiatives, and the pooling of resources and expertise to strengthen CANUS’ ability to counter the growing influence of actors like Russia and China, whose interests and goals in the region may diverge from those of CANUS..[20]

NATO

Leveraging the framework of NATO provides an additional avenue for CANUS to safeguard and progress mutual interests in the region. Through NATO's forums, CANUS can spearhead efforts to enhance situational awareness, information sharing, and joint training exercise.[21] NATO offers a platform for synchronizing military exercises, interoperability standards, and contingency planning, ensuring that CANUS in coordination with allies is prepared to respond effectively to potential crises or emergencies in the Arctic.

With NATO's defense investment and capability development programs, CANUS could collaborate on procuring specialized Arctic equipment, infrastructure, and technologies, benefiting from economies of scale and shared expertise. NATO's partnerships with non-Arctic nations, such as the United Kingdom and France, provide opportunities for CANUS to foster broader cooperation and burden-sharing in areas like scientific research, environmental monitoring, and SAR operations in the Arctic .[22] By aligning their Arctic strategies within the NATO framework, CANUS can increase their influence, project a united front, and deter potential challenges to the rules-based international order in the region.[23]

Bilateral Mil-to-Mil Cooperation

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

The longstanding North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a “bi-national organization” between the U.S. and Canada serves as a cornerstone for CANUS cooperation.[24] Through NORAD's integrated aerospace warning and control systems, CANUS has established a comprehensive domain awareness capability, enabling the monitoring and tracking of air and maritime threats across the Arctic. This collaborative approach through NORAD has facilitated the successful execution of operations, and training exercises tailored to the Arctic's unique operational environment.[25] However, as the strategic significance of the Arctic increases because of factors like climate change, increased maritime traffic, and growing geopolitical tensions, there is a pressing need to further bolster CANUS cooperation within NORAD and modernize its capabilities.

One area prime for deeper CANUS collaboration is the modernization and expansion of critical infrastructure in the Arctic, including early warning systems, communications networks, and forward-operating locations, to enhance situational awareness and rapid response capabilities.[26] Joint investments in cutting-edge technologies, such as unmanned aerial systems, satellite constellations, and advanced sensors, could revolutionize all-domain awareness in the Arctic while optimizing resource allocation.[27]Additionally, NORAD could serve as a platform for coordinating and integrating comprehensive maritime domain awareness efforts for CANUS, encompassing maritime security operations, search and rescue missions, and environmental monitoring.[28]

Leveraging NORAD's bilateral mechanisms, CANUS can streamline intelligence sharing, threat assessments, and contingency planning, ensuring a unified approach to addressing emerging challenges in the Arctic.[29] Moreover, a strengthened CANUS partnership through NORAD sends a powerful signal of deterrence to potential adversaries, reinforcing the rules-based international order and promoting stability in the rapidly evolving Arctic region.[30]

Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD)

The CANUS Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), established in 1940, offers a long-standing and critical forum for binational defense cooperation between the two nations. As a policy-level consultative body jointly led by co-chairs designated by the U.S. President and Canadian Prime Minister, the PJBD brings together key defense and security stakeholders from both sides, including the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of National Defence, and Public Safety Canada.[31] This high-level representation allows the PJBD to facilitate strategic alignment, coordinate policies, and harmonize approaches to address the multifaceted security challenges for CANUS.[32] Through the PJBD's framework, CANUS can increase information sharing and coordination specific to the Arctic domain. The board can serve as a platform for developing joint contingency plans, exercises, and training initiatives tailored to the unique operating environment of the Arctic, bolstering readiness and interoperability.[33] The PJBD's mandate extends beyond traditional military defense, encompassing areas such as maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency preparedness – all of which are crucial for ensuring a stable and secure Arctic.[34]

Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)

The CANUS Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), established in 1946, is a link between the joint military staffs, reporting directly to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Co-chaired by representatives from the Canadian Strategic Joint Staff and the U.S. Joint Staff, the MCC provides another platform for advancing bilateral military cooperation and strategic alignment.[35] The MCC hosts biannual meetings alternating between Ottawa and Washington, D.C.

Through the MCC's frameworks, CANUS can coordinate their Arctic defense policies, strategies, and operational plans, ensuring a unified approach to addressing emerging challenges and threats.[36] Similar to the PJBD, the MCC can develop interoperability, joint training excises, and information sharing in the Arctic.[37] The MCC’s mandate also extends beyond traditional defense matters, encompassing areas such as SAR operations, environmental monitoring, and disaster response – all of which are critical in the rapidly changing Arctic landscape.[38]

Challenges to CANUS Cooperation

A longstanding point of contention that could impede deeper CANUS cooperation in the Arctic pertains to the legal status and governance of the Northwest Passage. Canada claims that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters subject to Canadian sovereignty, while the U.S. maintains that it is an international strait open to freedom of navigation.[39] As melting icecaps continue to increase Arctic accessibility, with the passage remaining open for extended periods in recent summers, the potential for unregulated commercial and maritime traffic through these waters has intensified.[40] This ongoing divergence in legal interpretations has persisted for long enough according to Canadian Lawyer Brian Flemming who argues that it is time for CANUS to set aside its formal legal claims and return to a cooperative approach through bilateral agreements.[41] Failure to resolve this dispute could undermine efforts to establish a unified front in the Arctic, hampering joint initiatives in areas such as environmental protection, maritime security, and resource management.[42] Addressing this long-standing disagreement through diplomatic channels, seeking compromises, or exploring innovative governance frameworks will be crucial to ensuring that the Northwest Passage does not become a perpetual source of friction, hindering the realization of the full potential of CANUS collaboration in the Arctic.[43]

Beyond the legal and territorial complexities, domestic political dynamics within both states have the potential to impede or accelerate bilateral cooperation efforts in the Arctic region. Public opinion, interest group pressures, and politics can influence the extent to which governments prioritize and allocate resources towards Arctic initiatives bilaterally.[44] Changes in government leadership or shifts in policy priorities, driven by evolving political landscapes, may impact the willingness and urgency to engage in cooperative efforts.[45] For instance, the degree of emphasis placed on environmental stewardship, indigenous rights, resource development, or national security concerns can fluctuate based on the ideological leanings of the ruling party or administration.[46] Furthermore, domestic interest groups, such as environmental organizations, industry associations, or indigenous communities, may exert pressure on decision-makers, shaping the parameters and scope of Arctic cooperation.[47]

Lastly, developing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure to support Arctic operations and initiatives poses a formidable challenge to CANUS cooperation. The vast, remote, and harsh Arctic environment demands substantial investment in ports, research stations, transportation networks, and other critical infrastructure.[48] Discrepancies in funding priorities, resource allocation, and financial capabilities between Canada and the U.S. could also impede the seamless coordination required for large-scale infrastructure projects.[49] And if either the U.S. or Canada perceives an imbalance in burden-sharing, with the other shouldering a disproportionate share of the costs, resentment and political friction may arise. Furthermore, differences in procurement processes, regulatory frameworks, and contracting mechanisms could lead to compatibility issues, hampering the efficient integration of infrastructure development efforts.[50] Logistical challenges, such as transporting materials and personnel across vast Arctic distances, compound these difficulties, necessitating intricate planning and coordination.[51] Overcoming these obstacles will require a commitment to joint strategic planning, interoperability, cohesion of procurement practices, and innovative financing mechanisms that fairly distribute costs and responsibilities.[52]  

Conclusion

In conclusion, the rapidly evolving Arctic landscape presents a unique opportunity for CANUS to strengthen their bilateral cooperation and address the multifaceted challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. By leveraging existing frameworks such as NORAD, the PJBD, and the MCC, and actively engaging in multilateral forums like the Arctic Council and NATO, CANUS can develop a comprehensive and coordinated approach to safeguarding their shared interests in the region. Moving forward, it is crucial for both nations to prioritize investments in critical infrastructure, cutting-edge technologies, and joint initiatives that enhance situational awareness, interoperability, and rapid response capabilities. Furthermore, resolving long-standing disputes, such as the legal status of the Northwest Passage, through diplomatic channels and innovative governance frameworks will be essential to fostering a unified front and realizing the full potential of CANUS collaboration in the Arctic.

As the geopolitical significance of the Arctic continues to grow, with increased interest from actors like Russia and China, it is imperative that Canada and the U.S. remain proactive, adaptable, and committed to working together to shape the future of this vital region. By embracing the challenges and seizing the opportunities that lie ahead, CANUS can set a powerful example of effective bilateral cooperation, promoting stability, sustainability, and prosperity in the Arctic for generations to come.

Allison Brown in a visiting Fulbright Research Fellow (2023-2024) at the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP). She brings with her experience from the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Senate, and other government agencies. Her research at CIDP focuses on Arctic Security and Canada/U.S. Relations.

End Notes:

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[2] Funston, B. (2018). Emergency Preparedness in Canada's Arctic: A Case Study of Iqaluit. Disaster Prevention and Management, 27(4), 472-485.

[3] Lemelin, H., Dawson, J., Stewart, E. J., Maher, P., & Lueck, M. (2010). Last-chance tourism: The boom, doom, and gloom of visiting the world's polar regions. Current Issues in Tourism, 13(6), 477-493.

[4] Overland, J. E., & Wang, M. (2013). When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free? Geophysical Research Letters, 40(10), 2097-2101.

[5] Byers, M. (2009). Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Arctic Agenda for Canada and the United States. Rideau Institute.

[6] The White House (2023). FACT SHEET: The United States and Canada Strengthen Their Alliance. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/24/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-united-states-canada-partnership/

[7] The White House (2021). Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/24/joint-statement-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-trudeau/#:~:text=Protecting%20Our%20Shared%20Waters%20and,transboundary%20waters%20and%20the%20Arctic.

[8] U.S. Department of Energy (2019). U.S.-Canada Joint Strategy for Modernizing Energy Cooperation. https://www.energy.gov/articles/joint-statement-between-department-energy-united-states-america-and-department-natural

[9] Government of Canada, North Strong and Free: Canada's Defence Policy, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2024), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/corporate/reports-publications/2024/north-strong-free-2024.pdf

[10] Lackenbauer, P. W., & Lajeunesse, A. (2016). The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building situational awareness and capabilities. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17(2).

[11] Rainwater, S. (2023). Race to the North: China's Arctic strategy and its implications. Naval War College Review, 66(2), 62-82.

[12] Brewster, M. (2021). From Northern Guard to Arctic Shield: Defining Canada's Arctic Security Interests (No. 2021-02). Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

[13] U.S. Coast Guard (2019). Arctic Strategic Outlook Plan, .https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/25/2003327838/-1/-1/0/ARCTIC%20STRATEGIC%20OUTLOOK%20IMPLEMENTATION%20PLAN%20508%20COMPLIANT.PDF

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[18] Arctic Coast Guard Forum. (2023). https://arctic-coastguard-forum.org/

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[20] Lackenbauer, P. W., & Lajeunesse, A. (2022). Canada and the Arctic: Comprehensive security in a warming world. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 22(2).

[21] Boulden, J. (2021). The Arctic and Canadian Grand Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan.

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[24] NORAD (2023). NORAD History. https://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/NORAD-History/

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[30] Boulden, J., & Sokolsky, J. (2021). NATO's Arctic challenge: A transformative role in the high north. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 19(3), 333-352.

[31] U.S. Department of State (2023). U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-canada/

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[37] Huebert, R. (2019). The Arctic and the new concept of Canadian comprehensive Arctic security. Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, 6(2), 1-20.

[38] Østhagen, A. (2020). Maritime transportation in Arctic waters: A challenge for good governance. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, 110-137.

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[42] Huebert, R. (2011). Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security in a transforming circumpolar world. Canadian International Council.

[43] Byers, M., & Bakkehøi, S. (2020). Changing lanes: An international system for governing the Northwest Passage. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, 86-109

[44] Steinberg, P. E., & Dodds, K. (2015). The Arctic Council after Kiruna. Polar Record, 51(1), 108-117.

[45] Coates, K., Holroyd, C., & Lecours, A. (2022). Canada in the Arctic World. University of Toronto Press.

[46] Lackenbauer, P. W., & Lajeunesse, A. (2016). The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building situational awareness and capabilities. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17(2).

[47] Keskitalo, E. C. H. (2004). Negotiating the Arctic: The construction of an international region. Routledge.

[48] Wilson, G. N. (2018). Exploring Parallel Perspectives for Sustainable Arctic Shipping in Changing Environmental and Geopolitics. In Arctic Shipping (pp. 23-42). Springer, Cham.

[49] Conley, H. A., & Melino, M. (2019). The Implications of US Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region. CSIS Brief.

[50] Lackenbauer, P. W., & Lajeunesse, A. (2016). The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building situational awareness and capabilities. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17(2).

[51] Østhagen, A. (2020). Maritime transportation in Arctic waters: A challenge for good governance. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, 110-137.

[52] Conley, H. A., & Olmsted, J. D. (2019). Greenland Gets Militarized: Stretched Resources and Diverted Focus in the Arctic. Foreign Affairs.