Introduction

After some years, if not decades, of relative neglect, the Arctic is coming under greater scrutiny and drawing considerable political attention. In line with this, there is no shortage of discussion and opinion on policy and activities that are occurring in the Arctic. The changing Arctic environment – both its physical composition and the turbulent political circumstances that underpin activities – means that there is considerable utility in considering an array of possible futures. In line with this, the intrigue and multiplicity of possible policy pathways in the Arctic make it extremely tempting to engage in breathless speculation about what is likely to occur in the future, and what we should do about it. This paper, however, takes a different approach. Rather than giving narrow policy prescriptions, or providing opinion on the likely direction of action or activities, it is designed to step back from this position and open the conversation to a broader discussion about how we understand, analyse, and use information in, or about, the Arctic.

The paper therefore proceeds in four broad sections, each of which is designed to shed light on a different opportunity to optimise Arctic policy. The paper is written primarily with Canada in mind, but the principles on which it is based are more broadly applicable. The first section stresses the need for a stronger understanding of the way in which threat is perceived by the different states engaging in the Arctic, and the importance of accounting for these differences. The second section is on a similar theme, but focuses attention on the significance of aligning strategic messaging and the need for awareness of nuances in understanding of the key concepts of security and confidence. The third section brings the Canadian concept of Pan-Domain Operations into the Arctic context, emphasising the challenges and opportunities inherent in linking military and non-military organisations and capabilities. The final section again draws on the need for introspection, focusing on identifying biases that can undermine decision-making.

Threat Perception and Differing Priorities

Threat perception and interpreting others’ intent is central to understanding and shaping activities in the Arctic. This subject intersects with the longstanding discussion about domain awareness that has framed much of the discourse around capability enhancement.[i] However, rather than the tangible information about physical presence on (or in) land, sea, air, or space that is usually addressed in discussion of ‘domain awareness’, this is linked to the more nebulous, but equally important, cognitive domain.[ii] This starts with developing a comprehensive knowledge of how others think and react to their environment. The importance of being able to link awareness of what is occurring to a deeper understanding of why they are taking place cannot be overstated. Canada’s 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework indicates that the long-term objectives of Russia and China in the Arctic are not fully understood and, even if this was published three years ago, it appears that this has not been fully rectified.[iii] This represents a significant challenge: an inability to understand others’ objectives makes it very difficult to create medium- and long-term plans that optimise the use of resources and limit friction in international interactions.

Changing this reality is not a simple task, and accurately determining others’ objectives is always challenging. In coming to conclusions on the basis of observation it is important to understand that we interpret, rather than objectively observe, others’ actions. Consequently, ensuring that we understand how our interpretation could be founded on miscalculation or misunderstanding is vital. Therefore, while it is helpful to pay attention to the actions of others and trace patterns of activities, it is important to ensure that we do not make lazy assumptions about their broader function. Extrapolating an actor’s goal, or their prioritization of goals, solely on the basis of observing their actions, without accounting for potential biases, is risky. For example, the standing-up and continued training of the U.S. 11th Division in Alaska could be taken to indicate an expectation that there will be a need to fight a large-scale ground-based conflict in the North American Arctic.[iv] This is patently untrue, but it is conceivable that a clear linear connection could be drawn between the U.S. and its allies training to fight in the North American Arctic and an expectation of initiating combat. The fact that the connection and the assumed outcome misses the reality of the situation highlights the need for caution when seeking to understand the motives behind others’ actions.

Furthermore, in focusing on individual actions, particularly those that are perceived to be particularly problematic, it is tempting to concentrate on how to counteract or prevent that particular event on the basis of its immediate effects. This is not intrinsically wrong, but there must also be an awareness that basing our response on specific events can result in the inadvertent development of self-created cognitive boundaries that prevent the most efficient use of resources. Instead, thinking more holistically about the broader objectives being sought from individual actions generates greater latitude for creativity in how we use our resources. Threatening or problematic actions should, of course, still be addressed, but it is important to be appreciate where they lie in the larger arc of a state’s activities, how this intersects with our own priorities, and be aware that they can potentially be counteracted more effectively by an oblique approach, rather than direct.

In addition, it is important to remember that not all threats are perceived or prioritized equally by different actors. At the highest political levels most state actors in the Arctic have broadly similar interests and objectives, such as generating economic gains and enhancing their defence environment, but the way that these objectives are manifested in practice and across actors can be very different. This becomes even more prominent in considering what constitutes a ‘threat’ for each actor. Thus, for example, it appears that, for Russia, the Northern Sea Route is perceived as a critical component of their future economy.[v] This importance, in combination with distinct strategic culture, leads to an approach to developing and posturing military capability in the Arctic that will differ from other states. Determining the specific defence needs of state actors in the Arctic, and building understanding of how and when they differ between countries, is a necessary precondition in engaging with them efficiently and successfully. This is particularly significant in efforts to create arms control regimes, and crucial to the successful development of Confidence-Building Measures that have been discussed in relation to the Arctic. Confidence-Building Measures will only be effective if there is a robust understanding of the specific concerns of different participants.

Strategic Messaging and Self-Reflection

Taking this a stage further, adequately navigating this diplomatic environment therefore requires exploring the rationale behind different courses of action, rather than assuming that the decision-making process is identical for everyone.[vi] The example of competing interpretations of the most effective deterrent posture is a clear example of the way in which complications can arise from insufficient attention being paid to potential differences in perceptions of how international relations should be approached: One approach to deterrence, and seemingly favoured by NATO and the west more generally, is through indicating clear red lines with broadly and mutually understood costs that would be incurred were they to be crossed. A second approach would eschew such clarity and instead rely on brinkmanship driven by ambiguity to generate a tenuous stability that is founded on caution. In recent years we have seen North Korea and Russia using this form of approach to deterrence, creating an impression of a decision-making ‘rationality’ that, at best, does not accord with our own.[vii] The debate about the most effective form of deterrence is unerringly interesting and will no doubt continue, but the key point here is to ensure that we understand that different actors may be taking different approaches to deterrence. From this point of departure, we can identify which approach our adversaries are using, better understand what actions these adversaries are seeking to deter, and how our own actions have been influenced by the deterrent posture of others. Unacknowledged disconnect between approaches to deterrence can lead to misunderstanding, presaging dangerous and unanticipated escalation.

Consequently, managing our strategic messaging is crucial. As the 2020 Canadian Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept tells us, we send a message with every action, but we do not always realise that we are doing so.[viii] In the Canadian context it is also important to note that ‘strategic messaging’ is not limited to the armed forces, nor to Canadian troops. As a result, it is important to understand the process behind our strategic messaging, aligning the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) efforts with those of other government agencies, and ensuring that there is co-ordination with allies. NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence is an excellent hub to engage the latter process, and the central message of ensuring an holistic approach to messaging, rather than ad hoc efforts by differing organisations, cannot be overstated.[ix] Although not a shortcut to success, greater attention (and funding) being paid to structuring this messaging is highly likely to result in lowered uncertainty and smooth the process to achieving political objectives.

The centrepoint of this strategic messaging is the clarity of the message and, while it may seem simplistic, this requires understanding the messages that we are sending. This means not only understanding what message we believe that we are sending, but how they are being interpreted by the intended recipients. Without this process any intended signalling is, at best, whistling into the wind and, at worst, is actively harmful, resulting in false impressions about our behaviour that lead to unanticipated reactions.

Furthermore, even if the messages that we send are being received and understood in the way that we intended, observing and measuring whether they are having the effects on policy and action than we expected is a vital next step. Signalling is ultimately for effect, intended to shape the environment by changing or reinforcing others’ perception of our intent.[x] Consequently, without a clear understanding of the response to the signals that we send, the process is incomplete and signalling itself is, at best, imprecise. It is also important to remember that signalling and messaging is significant in the context of alliances, not only in our relationship with adversaries. The refrain that participation in a multilateral exercise signals commitment to the relationship with other participants is frequently repeated, but the determining the metrics for measuring whether this occurred, let alone a full indication of success, is less straightforward.[xi] Again, understanding the actual signalling effect of different actions is an important part of determining the most effective way of developing a positive relationship.

In sum, ascertaining whether or not signalling is successful requires an understanding of the tangible outcome that is intended to be achieved. This is likely to be difficult, not least because of the challenge of isolating the effect of particular signalling activities amongst other events, and this is exacerbated when attempting to determine outcomes over the medium term. Patience is required, in addition to an acceptance of a potentially high degree of uncertainty, as relationships and the political context evolves. Nevertheless, rising to this challenge is crucial. In optimising activities and reducing the potential for miscalculation and misunderstanding it is extremely important to think carefully about the messages that we are sending and the effects that we anticipate. Ultimately, it is through signalling and messaging, both deliberate and inadvertent, that an understanding of the threat environment is developed. The need to build expertise in signalling through action and interpreting the actions of others has become even more important given that it is increasingly unlikely that we will be able to engage in discussions with Russia about Arctic defence in a formal institutional context in the near future.[xii]

It is also important that there is honest self-reflection about the extent of our own capabilities. As it stands it is not unfair to characterise Canadian military capability as the classic ‘short blanket’ metaphor, capable of covering the feet or the shoulders, but not both simultaneously. That is, there are a high number of missions that the CAF would be willing to undertake, but performing them all simultaneously is impossible.[xiii] This is not a criticism – every country and its military has to make decisions about their priorities and operations. Nevertheless, honesty is required about the missions that we are capable of undertaking. Even speaking about our own ability represents part of signalling: if we want to avoid being seen as bluffing, there is little point in over-stating our capabilities in areas in which potential adversaries are already aware (at least in broad brush-strokes) of the accuracy of such statements.

Extending this, critical self-reflection is also required about what it is we understand to be ‘adequate security’. For example, would Canada be comfortable with U.S. military aircraft operating in Canadian airspace and being responsible for a more significant component of Canadian air defence as a matter of course? If so, some Canadian aircraft will be freed from this role and the CAF will therefore have greater scope to engage in other operations, but Canada’s degree of self-reliance in matters of defence would also have been limited. Consequently, it is critical to be able to give a satisfactory explanation of what it is that we need in order to be confident in our own security. And, in this context, how do we appropriately differentiate between developing confidence in our ability to counteract aggression versus confidence in our ability to determine the short- and medium-term intent of others? In addition, in responding to both questions given that ‘confidence’ should be seen as a sliding scale rather than an absolute, what level is required for us to feel adequately ‘secure’?

Pan-Domain Approaches and Civilian-Military Interaction

Canada’s consideration and development of the Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept represents an intriguing new lens through which to consider Arctic defence, regardless of whether or not the concept is ultimately developed into doctrine. The concept overlaps considerably with the U.S. Multi-Domain Operations concept, albeit adding a more concrete reference to the need to enhance the ability of the military to work in conjunction with other government organisations.[xiv] The Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept emphasises that the current and future threat environment requires there to be a strong connection between the various levers or instruments of national power.[xv] In itself this is not new – the idea of looking beyond military capability to understand state power and to achieve political objectives is longstanding.[xvi] Nevertheless, paying greater attention to the intersection of the whole spectrum of capabilities and assets in the Arctic represents an opportunity to draw from a broader range of policy options and generate more creative solutions to problems and challenges.

The note in the Canadian 2008 Operational Planning Process on “visualis[ing] the synergistic effects of all available capabilities in the achievement of the strategic goal” (author emphasis) foreshadows the more recent Pan-Domain concept, and highlights the need to understand how we can affect the defense environment by leveraging capabilities in potentially non-traditional ways.[xvii] Existing efforts to align and better integrate the range of Canadian capabilities that help to address issues arising in the Arctic are encapsulated by the Canadian Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs).[xviii] As relatively new organisations, first created in 2004, further work is required to fully understand the best way of unlocking the potential of what is, at present, solely an intelligence-sharing structure. Nevertheless, the MSOCs in their current configuration represent a point of connection between different ‘silos’ of Canadian organisations. This is an excellent foundation from which lessons can be learned that will smooth the transition towards a Pan-Domain approach in which CAF capabilities are fused with those of other organisations. Such fusion rests on keen knowledge of what assets and capabilities are available across the spectrum of national power, and the ability to determine how they can be employed in conjunction or sequence to achieve effects that would have otherwise been unobtainable. This creates a broader and more flexible array of options and opportunities to meet a rapidly-changing panoply of challenges.

Dual-use infrastructure is one area of fusing capabilities that has already been explored. The potential development of new or upgraded air basing facilities in northern Canada provides a clear example of the way which actions that are ostensibly focused on developing CAF capability can also provide an opportunity to benefit non-military organisations and communities well outside the scope of combat operations.[xix] However, while dual-use infrastructure has indisputable upside, care must also be taken to ensure that the inadvertent signalling implications of dual-use infrastructure are considered. This is not to suggest that dual-use infrastructure is inherently problematic, but ignoring others’ perception of its development could lead to further misunderstanding. Discussion of dual-use infrastructure in the context of Russia, for example, is frequently framed as an indication of subterfuge or enhancing the potential for future aggression.[xx] Consequently, aligning the very real practical benefit of dual-use infrastructure with the broader arc of strategic messaging is an important step in clarifying and attaining political objectives.

The potential development of links between the CAF and non-military agencies that are noted in the Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept also raises questions about how this engagement may function regarding areas of responsibility, information sharing, and the legal frameworks that currently regulate such interaction. The Pan-Domain concept is not synonymous with creating a flat ‘whole of government’ approach to every problem, but the importance of the military engaging with other organisations’ features is an important part of the concept. The significance of this in the context of the Arctic cannot be overstated, given both the overlapping efforts of government agencies in the region and its critical importance to Canadian defence.

Enhancing Decision-Making and Eliminating Bias

In the absence of time-travelling capability that would enable counterfactuals to be tested, determining the optimal approach to a given situation is essentially impossible. Consequently, selecting the right policy from the plethora of available options is a timeless challenge, and the uncertainty surrounding the Arctic renders the problem particularly acute. Accepting this reality, continually seeking to improve the decision-making processes is vital. Notably, while enhancing situational awareness is beneficial, increasing the quantity or quality of information available to decision-makers is not in itself a comprehensive guarantee of optimal policy. As a result, improved decision-making requires an examination of the way in which decisions are made rather than relying solely on increasing the quantity of information and data available. This examination requires careful self-reflection and attention being paid to understanding the assumptions and priors that underpin what we see as our own knowledge, and the lenses through which we assess and analyse the information that we receive.[xxi] Without this reflection, we leave ourselves open to foundational misunderstanding about what is occurring in the Arctic and in the international community more broadly, both of which limit our ability to accomplish our objectives efficiently.

The introduction of the GBA+ framework as a component of decision-making in the CAF demonstrates both the value of challenging assumptions and our ability to integrate this thinking into our decision-making processes. Gaps remain in the implementation of GBA+, but the way in which the framework has been developed and the work that has been put in to integrate the analysis into practice represents an effort to improve long-term effectiveness in military operations through adding depth to the way in which the environment is understood.[xxii] At the centre of the development GBA+ is ensuring that we interrogate the processes through which we gather, analyze, and operationalize information. In short, the process asks us to better understand how we make decisions in order to ensure holistic benefit from the actions that we take. This same form of interrogation about our assumptions, biases, and cognitive lenses need to be applied in the context of our decision-making about the Arctic. This self-awareness about how we process information also feeds into the process by which we make decisions. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of the operational planning process, if the inputs are not questioned, the resulting operations are less likely to be successful.

In parallel with this, and as a guiding principle through this decision-making process, it is important to ensure that focus remains on the objective, with each action taken a paving-stone in the pathway to that point. By definition, this means that the objective is the first item to be defined, despite being the end of the pathway. Working ‘backwards’ from an objective, however, may be challenging in practice, and clear unchanging endpoints may not always be evident - the dynamic international environment and fluctuating government priorities rendering long-term planning an inherently difficult process. Nevertheless, while it is unhelpful to set arbitrary objectives simply to enable planning, it is important for politicians to remain aware of the need to provide the signposts relevant to defence activities that military leadership can use to orient force development.

Conclusion

As the Arctic has become more prominent in political discourse, the discussion of potential strategies and opining on the implications of various decisions and events has become ever-more widespread. Regardless of the depth and quality of the preparations that are made, however, in the coming decades Canada and its allies will undoubtedly be buffeted by international events beyond their direct control. Whether these events stem from unanticipated effects of climate change, the decisions made by other states, or the actions of other non-state actors, such external shocks will require alteration to the course that we are attempting to chart. Notwithstanding this uncertainty and the consequent need for flexibility, it is important for Canada and its allies to shape the political environment and material context that forms the framework within which all Arctic activity occurs. The more comprehensive this framework, the more predictable the region will be.

In order to develop such a framework, as well as the ability respond quickly and effectively to events that shake its foundations, holistic thinking about our decisions and our decision-making process is necessary. Questioning our assumptions is the critical first step to creating policy that is optimal for short- and medium-term effect. To be clear, such introspection does not necessarily mean a fundamental re-configuration of policy. It is possible (albeit implausible) that our existing cognitive biases have been bypassed and we are left with an accurate representations of the Arctic environment and the actors within it. Even if this is the case, however, the process of actively exploring our own priors is useful in ensuring that we are aware of alternative policy approaches. This creativity in thinking is important in ensuring that we ask ourselves the right questions, and that we understand the intended and actual effects of our actions across multiple time horizons.

Importantly, exploring our assumptions and biases requires engaging with, and actively listening to, a diverse array of groups, organizations, and individuals who may have very different understanding of the Arctic from ourselves, especially those with whom we ordinarily have limited contact. It is dangerously easy to become enmeshed in a network of contacts that are concentrated inside our own organization or discipline. While these forms of networks are natural and valuable, it is critical that we are also able to include other voices and learn from what they have learned. There have been great strides made in developing and hosting events that bring together individuals with a range of different Arctic experiences and expertise. However, this engagement needs to become normal practice outside of prescribed events, and there is a collective responsibility to develop a realistic pathway that enables the ideas and insights that are generated to be translated into meaningful action.

Dr. Thomas Hughes is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Manitoba, funded by the Canadian Defence and Security Network. His research centres on threat perception and confidence-building, and he is currently working on Arctic defence policy. This project focuses on developing understanding of how Arctic states are interpreting and reacting to the changing security environment, and the influence of strategic culture in shaping Arctic defence activities. He completed his award-winning PhD, The Art of War Games, which explored confidence-building measures and the political effects of military exercises in Europe, at Queen’s University in 2021. Thomas co-edited the 2018 volume North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century, and has published further research on military exercises and NATO.

End Notes:

[i] U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, “Arctic Domain Awareness Centre,” https://arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org; B. T. Johnson, “Sensing the Arctic: Situational awareness and the future of northern security.” International Journal 76, no. 3 (2021): 404–426. https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020211048424.

[ii] Peter Nicholson. “Effects-Based Strategy: Operations in the Cognitive Domain.” Security Challenges 2, no. 1 (2006): 133–46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26458841.

[iii] Government of Canada, Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019), 74.

[iv] U.S. Army, “Arctic Airborne: 11th Airborne Division,” https://11thairbornedivision.army.mil.

[v] Vitaly Yermakov and Anastasia Yermakova, The Northern Sea Route: A state priority in Russia’s strategy of delivering Arctic hydrocarbons to global markets (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 2021).

[vi] Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[vii] Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (RAND Corporation, 2018); James M. Acton, Is it a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).

[viii] Canada Department of National Defence, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept: Prevailing in an Uncertain World (2020), 16.

[ix] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellent, “About NATO StratCom COE,” https://stratcomcoe.org.

[x] Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[xi] Canada Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army to take part in Multinational Military Exercise to Enhance Interoperability with our Allies,” Canada.ca May 2, 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2018/05/canadian-army-to-take-part-in-multinational-military-exercise-to-enhance-interoperability-with-our-allies.html.

[xii] Rob Huebert, “Canada, the Arctic and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” The Polar Connection 12 March, 2022. https://polarconnection.org/canada-arctic-russia-ukraine/.

[xiii] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Military Underfunded: The Walk Must Match the Talk (April, 2017).

[xiv] U.S. Army, Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict (March, 2021).

[xv] Canada Department of National Defence, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept (2020), 3.

[xvi] Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).

[xvii] Government of Canada, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 5.0: The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (Department of National Defence, 2008), 1-4.

[xviii] Government of Canada, “Marine Security Operations Centres,” Transport Canada. https://tc.canada.ca/en/marine-transportation/marine-security/marine-security-operation-centres.

[xix] Bill March, “Continental Air Defence and NORAD Modernization,” Vanguard Canada August 28, 2022. https://vanguardcanada.com/continental-air-defence-and-norad-modernization%EF%BF%BC/.

[xx] Mathieu Boulègue, The Militarization of Russian Polar Politics (London: Chatham House, 2022).

[xxi] Charles P. Ries, Improving Decisionmaking in a Turbulent World (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016), 42.

[xxii] Rachael Johnstone and Bessma Momani, “Gender Mainstreaming in the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence: Lessons on the Implementation of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), Armed Forces and Society 48, no.2 (2022): 247-273.