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Strong, Secure, Engaged: A Policy without a Strategy

Absent a roadmap, there should be no expectation of reaching the destination

 Time to Read: 22 minutes

Introduction

Canada cannot independently safeguard itself or conduct military kinetic operations – it needs its allies and is not able to go it alone. This dependency implies a quid pro quo in the form of meaningful and predictable military contributions to meet existing and future threats. However, given current and emerging domestic, continental and international defence and security challenges and threats, and the stretched and under resourced state of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), one might ask if it will be ready to go at all.[1]

Do the continuing shortfalls in Canadian defence procurement, declared concerns by senior leadership over the operational readiness of the CAF, and the enduring lack of an articulated defence strategy indicate that Canada is failing to maintain its status as a “responsible and value added partner” on the global stage?[2] Are the days of Canada aspiring to have a “role of pride and influence in the world” through the employment of its armed forces waning?[3] Are the forces ready, ready enough or in dire need of attention and repair? Recent events, such as the pandemic, the return of great power competition, the rise of below threshold adversarial action and cyber threats, and the war in Ukraine, highlight operational shortfalls and expose the challenges faced by Canada’s military today, and those that will need to be addressed in the coming years.[4] Is there a clear plan for the way ahead?

This policy brief will seek to examine these questions, offering considerations on how to address current defence needs while positioning Canada for emerging and likely future threats. The brief will focus on the absence of a Canadian defence strategy that would link the aspirations noted in Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), in a meaningful manner, to the current and anticipated procurement, capability development and operational readiness requirements of the CAF.[5] This absence of strategy has characterized defence management for decades, and forces ad hoc decision making due to a lack of a common understanding of priorities and long term vision. Policy provides intent, but it is strategy that provides coherence on how to advance complex matters, providing the impetus for synchronized collective action by the numerous organizations responsible for policy implementation. Despite over twenty two billion dollars having been allocated annually to defence since 2018, Canada is unable to sustain or build the CAF its policy deems as essential – other countries do better.[6] Through a brief comparative case study with Australia, and specifically their articulation of strategy for capability development and global engagement, it will be demonstrated that a force of similar size and spending has built a military quantitatively and qualitatively superior to Canada’s.[7] This comparison aims to highlight a concerning shortfall in Canada’s defence management practices – the lack of strategy and the determination that accompanies it - that is both chronic and risks aggravating an already tenuous situation of poor recruitment, aging equipment, and increasing capability and operational demands.

Lastly, Canada is no stranger to finding itself unprepared for deployed operations despite having policies indicating it should have been equipped and prepared to fight. The significant amounts of equipment acquired following the deployment into Afghanistan to shore up capability gaps serve as a cautionary tale; specifically, this brief will highlight why attempting to address core capability shortfalls only after an immediate need has been identified for a specific theatre is likely to fail in the future. The aim of this retrospective look is to serve as a warning of what risk the future may hold; future warfighting implies a much more complex environment than past theatres, and our current state of affairs and the potential negative lessons learned from muddling through essential short term procurements of the past should be cause for concern. Canadian defence policy is in need of a supporting strategy. Similar sized allies spending similar amounts on defence are better prepared for integrating into multinational operations – acting as responsible and ready partners focused on technologically advanced capabilities.

 

Background

Policy is defined as the “authoritative aspirations, internal to a government, about outcomes.”[8] When viewed through this lens, SSE provides significant and meaningful policy guidance. It is issued from the highest levels of government and objectifies core missions and the broad defence capabilities that the government would like available for use in the national interest. It is, however, absent substantive detail concerning how, or in which order, to acquire, implement and employ the capabilities contained within the policy.[9] SSE simply provides the point of departure for an analysis that could complete the “convergence of the ends (objectives), ways (actions) and means (resources)” with an aim to bridging the divide between political intent, and available and anticipated defence assets.[10] Specifically, it sets the stage for the development of strategy, which is the articulation of how one will “use the available resources (human, technical, financial) to promote [the achievement of the interests and goals] in the current and perceived future environment.”[11] Canada needs to care about strategy, as it conveys how one engages with allies (in a predictable and deliberate manner) in the protection of individual and collective interests.[12] Importantly, strategy also establishes priorities to vis-à-vis the competing demands that may be articulated in policy; and, the Canadian military is faced with a scenario where multiple competing demands – operations, equipment acquisition, personnel recruitment, modernizing equipment, training – far outstrip the capacity of the organization to conduct concurrently, or potentially even over the next several years. How to manage this complexity over time is the role of strategy – it ensures that the desires articulated in policy are grounded in the realm of the possible, and managed over time based on the limited resources available to advance the numerous competing initiatives detailed in SSE.[13]

In the Canadian context, any assertion that a strategy has been clearly articulated in a manner that is accessible and endorsed by senior leaders is misplaced, and the reality is that “there is no clear answer to where Canadian defence strategy resides.”[14] Absent such thought, individual organizations are left to bargain amongst themselves concerning partnering, readiness and capability development priorities, thus making defence readiness subject to bureaucratic machinations that could otherwise be smoothed by a guiding strategy. The challenge is that the work requirement associated with implementing SSE far outstrips the capacity of the Department of National Defence (DND) and CAF in the short term.[15] Strategic thought and oversight should inform those resource allocation decisions.

Additionally, strategy would inform allies about the commitments and capabilities Canada has and is willing to bring to collective defence and security endeavours, and for what reasons it would do so.[16] While these declarations would not be a guarantee of support to allies in any eventuality, it would signal when there would be a high probability of Canada participating and enabling partnering in activities (e.g. capability development) that are of mutual interest amongst countries (e.g. cyber operations) but which Canada is unlikely or unable to develop independently. Fundamentally, strategy can provide an element of common understanding, predictability and the framework for integrated domestic and ally capability development, cost sharing, and a sustained commitment to collective security. However, absent a strategy that compliments policy, procurement and capability development linger or stall – there is no strategic imperative to achieve momentum, and achieving a common understanding of long term and sequential priorities becomes difficult. Additionally, uncertain of Canadian strategic intentions, allies are compelled to conduct informal queries concerning Canada’s willingness to engage in bilateral or multilateral initiatives or operations, often at the senior staff or bureaucrat levels. These ad hoc efforts to determine strategic intentions regarding military engagement objectives and prioritization, which is a cumbersome and time consuming process, risks inhibiting agility and responsiveness. This reality suggests that opportunities to be a reliable and value added partner, while concurrently conducting military operations that align with policy and the national interest, are likely being missed. This has been the Canadian story for decades, and it is manifesting as significant risk as shortages of people, equipment and capacity to resolve those shortfalls collide.[17] The procurement and sustainability challenge has hurt DND/CAF before, and it appears the absence of a global or regional engagement strategy is doing so again.

 

The Canadian Story

The CAF is no stranger to being caught short of the required equipment in a theatre of war despite being subject to a defence policy indicating that maintaining “multi-purpose combat capable forces [were] in the national interest.”[18] When Canada deployed into the Afghanistan theatre of operations in 2001, the most recent defence policy had been issued in 1994. While it was a document flush with mention of fiscal reductions, it also emphasized the need for the CAF to be able to “operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent – that is, they must able to fight "alongside the best, against the best.”[19] While well trained and well led, Canadian soldiers were poorly equipped for their initial years of deployment. Over the course of several years, following the return to Kandahar province from Kabul in 2005, the CAF would procure or source, and implement (in theatre) the following capabilities: Russian made Mi-17 helicopters (including contracted pilot training and maintenance) for use by Canadian Special Operations Forces; used CH-47 Chinook helicopters (and training and maintenance) for use by conventional forces; remotely piloted air systems – twice, once purchased once leased; used Leopard II main battle tanks; armoured patrol vehicles – the RG31; armoured recovery vehicles; armoured heavy support vehicles; two armament systems for the CH146 Griffon; Expedient Route Opening Capability; M777 Howitzer field artillery piece; and, light armoured vehicle remote weapons station.[20] Few, if any, of the capabilities noted above are unique to the demands of the Afghanistan theatre of operations. Conversely, they represent significant capability gaps that had been allowed to develop over time, and are core functions required of a modern force that is expected to integrate with allies to fight against a capable opponent. Tactically, the procurements were much needed and should be seen as successes; strategically, the fact that a “combat capable” force was absent so many core capabilities needs to be seen as a failure of strategic planning. We are risking going down the same road again.

The introduction of new equipment into Afghanistan was made possible by leveraging the transferable skill sets that were pre-existing among the CAF members given historical training regimens. The core competencies required to accept aircraft, weapons and vehicles – soldiering, piloting, engineering, etc. – had long been part of the CAF training system and provided the foundation for in-theatre implementation of new equipment.[21] Trying to do the same for future essential capabilities during times of crisis or operations may not work as well. Expanding capabilities in cyber, which is a key force protection and operational requirement, and NORAD modernization (including determining how to counter new threats such as hypersonic weapons) both figure heavily in SSE.[22] They are not capabilities that can be purchased today for delivery in the next months, as was the case for many Afghanistan procurements. Additionally, the implementation of these new capabilities will compete for the same resources that are tasked with rejuvenating or modernizing those capabilities that are newly required or rusting out. These decisions are strategic in nature, they imply risk when delayed or opportunity costs when prioritized above other requirements. Strategy is required but remains characteristically absent from Canadian defence guidance. Training systems need to be built and adjusted, partnering agreements with industry and allies need to be put in place, infrastructure built – this is how individual capabilities are built - and all while ensuring a readiness to deploy the CAF on operations. If one were to search for a template on how to address this myriad of issues required for the CAF to sustain operations and modernize, exploring Australia’s reaction to the rise of China in the mid-2000s is informative.[23]

The Australian Model

In 2003 the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was similarly equipped to the CAF, but the rising prominence and threat posed by China in the region forced adjustments to defence policy and strategic outlooks. This timeframe saw the evolution of a clear distinction between defence policies and strategies, and over the last twenty years has resulted in the ADF being a highly technical force that is well-positioned to look forward and develop and implement the capabilities needed to address future threats. For the most part, they have achieved their policy goals set out fifteen years ago. Unlike Canada, the ADF is not wrestling with how to resolve decade old gaps in capability or struggling to modernize multiple obsolescent fleets; conversely, through strategic agreements with allies, they are positioned to become the first non-nuclear country to operate nuclear submarines.[24] Notably, linked to their policy of  depending on “access to [and interoperability with] United States’(US) advanced technology for maintaining Australian Defence Forces’ potency and interoperability” they have developed a strategy to do so by entering into a key agreement with the US and United Kingdom.[25] This strategy is embodied in the AUKUS trilateral agreement that will focus on “deepening integration of defence related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains with emphasis being placed on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and underwater capabilities.”[26] Through a deliberate strategy of commitment and engagement, the ADF is well positioned to address the current and emerging threats to Australia.

This enviable situation can be contrasted against the decisions and tradeoffs that Canada must consider as it decides between how to address divested (but required), deteriorating and looming capability requirements, and to do so having not been invited into the key information sharing and capability development agreement noted above.[27] The Australian experience should tell us that Canada is facing a ten to fifteen year problem, which will require strategies that address industry engagement, priority allies for engagement, and resolving procurement shortfalls. All of this must be developed and advanced in an environment of reduced personnel post pandemic, and with a threat emanating from Russian aggression that demands sustained readiness of large amounts of CAF forces in order to meet alliance commitments. Where Canada wants to be is all there in SSE, but the roadmap is missing and the way is full of challenges that need to be navigated.

 

Conclusion 

The CAF is facing challenges to its operational readiness, procurement, personnel levels and capability development capacity amid an increasingly hostile and volatile environment. The demand for support to alliances and the ability to protect Canada hinges on realizing the aspirations detailed in SSE, but as the Australian example demonstrates, that effort will be measured in decades. Also demonstrated in that example is that national resolve is central to committing to a strategy that enables policy goals and outcomes. Too many defence policies of the past have failed to achieve the momentum that would have allowed them to be realized, and that has left the CAF in a state of having to address the problems of the past, present and future concurrently. Importantly, and as demonstrated by the rapid acquisitions for Afghanistan, momentum for procurement can be achieved when there is the resolve to do so. In those cases the purchases were fueled by the risks faced by CAF members on the ground, not by strategy to equip them as required in advance – even though that was the stated policy position.[28] The ad hoc approach to equipping for combat while concurrently in theatre should not be seen as a winning strategy for future conflicts.

The threats faced in Afghanistan will pale in comparison to the technologically advanced adversaries that are on the rise as great power competition returns. Proxy wars, below threshold activities, cyber operations, the exploitation of space and fragile supply chains are here or coming – they pose significant defence and security threats. Traditional threats to continental and regional security (i.e. territorial incursions, conventional or nuclear attack), terrorism and the requirement to provide humanitarian assistance at home and abroad will all remain as demands on the armed forces. SSE is clear that all these threats need to be addressed, and that the CAF plays a leading role in much of it. Defence spending allocations to achieve momentum exist, and yet progress on procurement and capability development remains slow. There is little doubt that the pandemic has played a role in this situation in the recent past; however, to only look that far risks disregarding the reality that militaries – as forces of last resort – need to be able to survive shock events and operate during crisis. Critical to surviving the inevitable crises of the coming decades is the systematic assessment and planning of how defence policy aims will be achieved given current and future personnel levels, platforms and processes. Strategy is that roadmap.

This paper is not recommending the adaptation of the Australian model of strategy; rather, it aims to highlight how a country with similar defence spending and policies has built and maintained a qualitatively superior force to Canada’s, while creating the relations to ensure close partnering with alliance partners for future capabilities.[29] Australia, like Canada, has a dependency on its allies for its domestic and regional security. That dependency ranges from conventional military support to partnering to develop future high end capabilities. They have achieved a momentum, through the resolve offered by strategy that finds them well positioned to be a reliable and value added partner when it comes to integrating with others to protect their nation and national interests into the today and into future. Canada needs to map its path in a similar manner. Absent that, there should be limited expectation of the CAF achieving the myriad of the missions and roles detailed in SSE in the future years; there are simply too many challenges, many decades in the making, that need to be considered in aggregate and addressed systematically. For Canadian security, and in the interest of being a “value added partner,” with whom our allies would like to operate, the requirement for a strategy to concurrently rebuild and employ the CAF is essential.

 

Colonel Trevor Teller, RCAF, is the 2021-22 Canadian Armed Forces Visiting Defence Fellow at the CIDP. 

Bibliography

 

Literature Review

  • Adams, John. “Canada and Cyber.” A 2016 Policy Review Series Paper. Ottawa: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2016.

  • Bland, Douglas. “Parliament’s Duty to Defence Canada.” Canadian Military Journal 1, 4 (Winter 2000-2001): 35-43.

  • Fitz-Gerald, Ann and Tracy, Marianne. “Developing a Decision-making Model for Security Sector Development in Uncertain Situations.” Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol 6 Issue 2 (July 2008): pp. 12-33.

  • Dupont, Alan. “Full Spectrum Defence: Re-Thinking the Fundamentals of Australian Defence Strategy.” 1 March 2015. Lowy Institute for International Policy.

  • Perry, David. “A Return to Realism: Canadian Defence Policy after the Great Depression.” Defence Studies 13, 3 (2013).

  • Schoemaker, Paul J. H. “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking.” Sloan Management Review 36, 2 (Winter 1995): pp. 25-40.

  • Simpson, E. War from the Ground up : Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics; Hurst & Co.: London, 2012. P 111-129.

  • Sokolsky, Joel, and Christian Leuprecht. “Defense Policy ‘Walmart Style’: Canadian Lessons in ‘not-so-grand’ Grand Strategy.” Armed Forces and Society 41, 3 (July 2015): 541-562.

  • Stone, Craig. “Implementing the Defence Procurement Strategy: Is it Working?” Ottawa: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, July 2016.

  • United States of America Department of National Defence. “Summary of the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the United States of America: “Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

  • Von Hlatky, Stéphanie. American Allies in Times of War the Great Asymmetry, 1st ed.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013.

  • Von Hlatky, Stéphanie. “Trudeau’s Promises: From Coalition Operations to Peacekeeping and Beyond.” Ottawa: CDA Institute, 2016.

Endnotes:

[1] Brewster, Murray. “Canada’s troop commitment to eastern Europe is exposing weak points in its military.” CBC News, 3 March 2022; Boudreau, Brett. “Re-imagining Canadian defence and security.” Institute of Research on Public Policy: Policy Options. 10 March 2022; Strong Secure Engaged (SSE); National Defence, 2017 indicates some of the challenges and threats as the following: NORAD modernization, multiple fleet recapitalization, reacquire divested capabilities (e.g. air defence), introduce new capabilities (e.g. cyber) , improve defence procurement, evolving nature of combat/conflict given rapid evolution of technology (e.g. cyber threat identification and response, exploitation of outer space),  grey zone / hybrid conflict, great power competition manifesting as open combat, autonomous vehicle use, etc.

[2] SSE; National Defence, 2017, p. 14; Nossal, K. Charlie Foxtrot : Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada; Dundurn: Toronto, 2016; Burke, Ashley. “Military Readiness ‘one of the things that keeps me awake at night’ says Canada’s top soldier; CBC News, 10 March 2022.

[3] Canada’s International Defence Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the world – Defence; National Defence, 2005.

[4] The shortfalls highlighted by the Ukraine war are in the context of the Russian capabilities being employed and what would be required should Canada join a coalition to counter that threat. Specific examples of shortfalls include air defence, front line/modern fighters for an air superiority role, and sufficient numbers of personnel to sustain a deployment of the size that would be required for a meaningful contribution to a NATO or multinational effort (i.e. battle groups or brigades, squadrons of aircraft, capability to operate in a contaminated (i.e. chemical) environment, etc.).

[5] SSE, p.17, 33-41. Mandated outputs for the CAF include the core missions and concurrent tasks articulated in defence policy. In sum, they are comprised of nine concurrent missions that represent a ~2050 to 6650 personnel commitment, depending on the size of each individual missions. SSE core missions range from responses to domestic and international disasters/ humanitarian assistance to combat operations abroad. Additionally, SSE focuses on recapitalization/improvement/modernization/replacement of capabilities such the previously divested capabilities; examples include the previously divested ground based air defence capability, replacing fighter aircraft that are approaching 40 years old, addressing the chronic state of the Canadian submarine fleet, and improving information operations and cyber capabilities.

[6] A summary of Canadian military spending/defence budget from 1960 to 2022 can be found at: Macrotrends. Canada Military Spending/Defence Budget 1960 – 2022. https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CAN/canada/military-spending-defense-budget

[7] Spending is in terms of dollars committed to defence. As of 2019, Australia spent $25.9 billion (US dollars) compared to Canada’s 22.2B (US). A relatively same ratio has been maintained for the last 15 years. Comparisons of the two military’s indicate that Australia ranks higher in overall in terms of numbers, modern equipment, capabilities (e.g. Australia possess many capabilities that are absent in the CAF, such as attack aviation, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance platforms, air defence, etc.). The analysis for this policy brief uses 2019 and earlier defence funding for comparison purposes given Australia has since seen significant increases in defence spending. For example, the 2022-2023 budget increased by 7.4% and not represents $36B USD.

[8] Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H. “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications.” World Politics 24 (1972): pp. 46

[9] SSE, p.71-75, 99. The one potential exception to this statement is the detail provided on efforts to improve defence procurement. Despite this “strategy-like” amplification, the inability to conduct effective procurement noted by Stone and Nossal continues to plague defence acquisition and capability modernization/development efforts. A most recent example is the three year delay to the RCAF’s new Search and Rescue aircraft, and the resultant requirement to backfill that domestic capability with the CC-130 air-to-air refueler capability that would otherwise be based out of Winnipeg, thus introducing a capability gap in Canada’s NORAD commitment.

[10] Simpson, E. War from the Ground up : Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics; Hurst & Co.: London, 2012. P 116.

[11] McNamara, W. D. and Fitz-Gerald, Ann. “A National Security Framework for Canada.” Policy Matters 3(2002).

[12] As with all previous defence policies, and for the last hundred years, Canada’s unwritten strategy is one that is focused on “contribution warfare.” This assertion is based both on history and the “meet NORAD and NATO commitments” and “contribute to…international security” focus of SSE core missions and operations. This reality implies and essential obligation to remain tightly partnered and interoperable with key allies in the development and sustainment of capabilities.

[13] Simpson, E. War from the….p.116. Possibility is defined by resources (funding, time, resources, etc.), which will change over time as policy goals are achieved (e.g. personnel strength increases). Consequently, while policy can endure over time, strategies will need to be adjusted to account for changes in the environment that demand reprioritization of limited resources; Note: It is worth mentioning that there is ample literature that blend, mixes and presents differing definitions of policy and strategy. It is not the intent of this brief to attempt to address that discussion; rather, the definitions above are provided to frame the rest of the paper in the generally agreed upon principle that policy and strategy are distinct components, albeit highly complementary.

[14] Boudreau, “Reimagining Canadian Defence and Security”; Chapnick and Stone, “From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes” in Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice; Rodman, 2020. p. 287.

[15] SSE contains no less than 111 new initiatives, many comprised of multiple embedded activities (e.g. acquire joint command and control systems and equipment, specifically for integrated information technology and communications; establish a CAF targeting capability to better leverage intelligence capabilities to support military operations).

[16] Such endeavours include military operations, the provision of military training to partner nations, cooperation and collaboration on capability development, etc. While SSE core missions and concurrent operations provide insight into Canadian intent, allies require more fidelity on Canadian commitment. For example, the recurring annual requirement for the government to expend Canada’s commitment to Op IMPACT (contribution to Middle East security) invites discussions and liaison from partner nations on Canadian intentions to contribute to the mission over the long term.

[17] The CAF CDS’ recent interview is telling in that he highlights the “need to rapidly invest in the Canadian Forces,” “the demand [on the forces] that will continue to increase,” “that the CAF we have today is not the one we need to the future threat…or even the current threat,” and that “future capability development is always a challenge.”  Zimonjic, Peter. “Canada’s top soldier says defence industry needs to ramp up production to ‘wartime footing.’” CBC News, 4 May 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-wartime-footing-supply-chains-1.6441720 .

[18] 1994 Defence White Paper, Art 24.

[19] Ibid, Art 25.

[20] CTV News. “Opposition wants to know more about leased choppers,” August 7, 2008; Mayers, Renaud. “CH178,” Defenceionem, July 31 2020; CTV News, “Canadian spy drones taking flight in Afghanistan,” February 7, 2009; Government of Canada. “2009 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 5

Acquiring Military Vehicles for Use in Afghanistan,” Office of the Auditor General of

Canada, Fall 2009; Mah, Spenser. “The Leopard 2: A Case Study in Procurement,” NATO Association of

Canada, February 11, 2017.

 

[21] This statement significantly oversimplifies the challenges of concurrently conducting combat operations while implementing numerous capabilities. While core skills were resident for the trades, every piece of equipment was new to the CAF and represented significant effort to introduce and operate in theatre.

[22] Hypersonics are not explicitly mentioned in SSE, but NORAD modernization is. Hypersonic missiles, which the responsibility of NORAD to detect and warn against at the current time, represent extant threats. The hypersonic missile topic is an example of a threat that is certainly intended to be covered under SSE, but is absent the strategy framework that would inform on its priority relative to other initiatives.

[23] While this paper uses Australia as a comparison, other countries of similar defence spending to Canada whose militaries are ranked as qualitatively higher than Canada’s include Brazil, Israel, Turkey and Poland. Any of these countries have defence strategies and policies, and could be similarly compared. The Australian comparison was chosen given the demographic, population and governmental similarities between it and Canada.

[24] Moloney, Cathy. “AUKUS and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.” The Interpreter – Lowy Institute, 28 Sept 2021

[25]  Australian Government Defence White Paper; Department of Defence , 2016, p.51. This expression of commitment to the US is the refinement of the 2009 strategic imperatives to have “access to [US] materiel, intelligence, research and development, communication systems, and skills and expertise that substantially strengthen the ADF; and “defence materiel relationships that identify interoperability issues, explore collaborative activities, share data...and streamline technology transfer.” (AG 2009, p.93, 126).

[26] Corben, Tom; Townshend, Ashley; Patton, Susannah, 16 Sept 2021. What is the AUKUS Partnership? United States Studies Centre.

[27] Corben, Tom et al. What is the….The United States Study Center based out of the University of Sydney the AUKUS agreement is much more than the submarine deal reported by mainstream media. The agreement is a niche grouping of countries advancing the FVEY raison’d’être to the next level; it will significantly strengthen the diplomatic, defence and security cooperation between the three nations. Specifically, it will focus on “deepening integration of defence related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains with emphasis being placed on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and underwater capabilities.”

[28] Ho, Ivan. “Sole Source Procurements and the Royal Canadian Air Force,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy, September 2014. Similar rapid procurements of the Globemaster II strategic airlift aircraft, CC130J and CH147F Chinook helicopters are highlighted in this paper, and represent the ability of rapid procurement even when not linked to ongoing combat operations.

[29] The comment of “qualitatively superior is focused primarily on the equipment and resulting technologically advanced, inter-operable, front line capabilities that have been developed.

Author:

Colonel Trevor Teller

2021-22 CAF Visiting Defence Fellow, Centre for International and Defence Policy

Published: August 30, 2022