Taking stock of the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, the international community has experienced shock and awe. While a return to normalcy still remains uncertain Armed forces have continued to play a role in preventing war as well as protecting countries and their population. The primary role of militaries has not changed per se, but adapts in terms of addressing these crises, in a way that is consistent with the expectations of governments. In this context, this KCIS Insight reviews this lesson in adaptation from a Korean perspective, focusing on specific implications for the South Korean Army.

South Korea’s Security Challenges

Canada, the United States and South Korea are quite different in terms of population, territory size and military strength. Yet even though South Korea is 100 times smaller than Canada and 6 times less populous than the United States, Korea maintains a relatively large army as seen in Table 1. The need for this army arises because of various threats coming from North Korea such as nuclear first strike, terrorism, and cyber-attack.

Canada, the United States and South Korea are quite different in terms of population, territory size and military strength. Yet even though South Korea is 100 times smaller than Canada and 6 times less populous than the United States, Korea maintains a relatively large army as seen in Table 1. The need for this army arises because of various threats coming from North Korea such as nuclear first strike, terrorism, and cyber-attack.

 To provide more context on these successive crises, a brief chronological overview is warranted. In 1968, North Korean forces raided the Blue House, the South Korean Presidential Office, to assassinate then President Park Junghee. Even if thwarted, it was an unexpected direct military attack on South Korean soil. Ten years later, North Korean soldiers attacked U.S. soldiers in the Joint Security Area located in the Demilitarized Zone. In fact, U.S. soldiers were cutting a tree to secure a better view of the North when they were attacked by North Korean soldiers wielding clubs and sticks. Two U.S. officers were killed in what became known as the 1976 Korean axe murder incident. In 1983, during a visit to Burma’s national cemetery by President Chun Doo-hwan and his entourage, a bomb planted by North Korean operatives exploded and killed 17 cabinet members. The only survivor was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1987, just 1 year before the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korean Air Flight 858 exploded in mid-air after North Korean operatives had planted a bomb. It resulted in the death of all 114 people on board with the vast majority being South Korean.

North Korea has resorted to terrorism and small-scale military provocations because of the widening political, economic and military gap in South Korea’s favor. These acts of terrorism and military provocation were virtually impossible to prevent due to the isolated nature of the Hermit kingdom. In fact, Pyongyang’s intention and the exact time and location of the attacks often remained unknown until it was too late. To this day, South Korea is also unable to retaliate due to fears of escalating hostilities to a full-scale war. Terrorist threats from other foreign actors have however been relatively low in Korea.

When it comes to natural disasters, Korea is situated on the pathway of typhoons originating from the Pacific Ocean which result in significant damage on a regular basis. In addition, man-made disasters such as the 2003 Daegu subway fire and the 2014 sinking of the MV Sewolho are powerful reminders of the price of complacency in disaster prevention and management. The threat of cyber-attacks is also raising the stakes. As the famous Korean saying goes, “ten police officers cannot catch up to one thief.” Likewise, hackers can seemingly infiltrate any cyber system when they deploy enough resources or use the right methods with little law enforcement interference. So, Korea needs to build up robust defenses against attacks. With regards to pandemics, before Covid-19, Korea had already experienced the MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) in 2015. During this public health crisis, the Korean government learned a lot of lessons which they integrated in their emergency response system. One of these lessons regarded the importance of transparency in public communication, to keep the population informed and dispel misinformation.

Even with the lessons learned from MERS and the severe acute respiratory syndrome  (SARS), the initial outbreak of COVID-19 in Korea led to important failures on the part of the government. It included not initiating stricter travel restrictions with China in the early stages of the pandemic when it was still its undisputed epicenter. Trying to restrict cases in Korea without restricting travel with China can be compared to trying to catch mosquitoes with the window open. In addition, a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) resulted in long distribution lines, where many left empty-handed. The spread of disinformation strained societal resilience and also contributed to risk management issue. For a more nuanced assessment, however, it is important to weigh the differences between COVID-19 and previous epidemics. In fact, experts asserted that unlike SARS and MERS, which were brought under control in 5 months and 10 months, respectively, the COVID-19 pandemic’s longevity is much greater. It is also significantly more contagious than the two other epidemics Korea faced. These problems were compounded by the relatively long development time of the vaccine.

Over the course of the pandemic, South Korea improved in its capacity to adapt. Although it had initially failed to prevent the entry of COVID-19 from China, South Korea was able to surmount the 2nd wave of the pandemic. This success is attributed to the adherence to and trust in public health measures, the competency and high spirit of medical teams, and Korea’s advanced health insurance system. The importance of public communication, learned from previous epidemic,s resulted in daily disclosure of information and fact-checking by the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These centres have become instrumental in preventing misinformation and ensuring public safety.

ROK Armed Forces and Pandemic Response

Armed forces have historically focused on conventional threat, on peer-to-peer conflict. However, they will face a large spectrum of threats that are most definitely not conventional. In this context, military downsizing in the Western Hemisphere should be reconsidered. There is also a need to redefine the raison d'être of the military, i.e., protecting both nation and people. Still, there should be a distinction between the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military forces in terms of maintaining law-and-order. Governments will also need to fill the capability gap that would enable them to deal with future crises relying solely on civilian assets. In preparation for future crises, the military is not the solution, but rather, is an insurance policy paid in advance.

To respond to various threats, the Korean government codified laws, established a Central HQ and designated leading agencies to address crises. The military is now part of the Korean response to emergencies. Military engineer units are dispatched to restore infrastructure damaged by floods and typhoons and counterterrorism special units operate in concert with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and Police. More recently during the pandemic, senior cadets from the Korean Armed Forces Nursing Academy were sent to civilian hospitals to supplement the personnel since they received specialty training during the initial COVID-19 outbreak.

In sum, the military is the most effective and efficient organization to operate during crises while carrying its original mission to protect the nation: it is adaptive, flexible, and versatile with expertise in national level crisis management. A gradual reduction of the army based on the changing situation could, however, jeopardize this expertise. Beyond a military role in national emergency preparedness, South Korea should also increase its civilian capacity, as a means by which to improve its ability to respond to crises like COVID-19.

Professor Yoonkap ‘Kristopher’ LIM is currently serving at the Peacekeeping Center, National Defense University, Nonsan Korea. Professor Lim graduated from the Korean Military Academy in 1987 and was commissioned as an Infantry officer. He held command position at the platoon, company and battalion level. He also served as a director of the Situation Room in the National Security Council, Presidential Office from 2006 to 2008. He retired after 33 year of service with the Korean Army. He publishes on International Conflict and Peacekeeping and many other topics.

Endnotes

Published: Feb 28, 2022