Israel and Iran used to be allies, until 1979. Since then, following the Islamic revolution, Iran sees Israel as its arch - enemy.[i] Iranian leaders had threatened over and again to destroy Israel.[ii] Brigadier General Amir Hatami, the former Iranian defense minister and an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, claimed in late August 2022 that Israel has no legitimacy, and it is about to crumble.[iii] Israel has nuclear weapons, according to non-Israeli sources.[iv] Iran has chemical weapons,[v] and an advanced nuclear program, which eventually might produce nuclear weapons, allowing Iran to annihilate Israel.

In late July 2022 Ehud Barak, Israel’s former prime minister, who served also as minister of defense and chief of general staff of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), argued that “the effort to block Iran from turning into a nuclear power is at its lowest ebb ever, apparently headed for failure.”[vi] This article examines Israel’s efforts in the last decade, aimed at stopping and at least slowing down Iran’s nuclear program. Israel considered to launch an air attack on Iran, but such a strategy had many constraints and risks. At the same time Israel strove, including by threatening to bomb Iran, to convince the international community, mostly the United States, to use diplomacy to isolate and to impose crippling sanctions on Iran. The Israeli goal was to put enormous pressure on Iran, forcing the latter to accept major concessions regarding its nuclear program while hoping to drive the Iranian people to topple the regime there. 

The diplomatic way

On July 14, 2015, after long negotiations, the JCPOA – (The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was sigbned between Iran and world powers. It put serious restrains on Iran’s nuclear program. The JCPOA did not include Iran’s missile project, which can serve Iran to deliver a nuclear cargo. The JCPOA also left out Iran’s regional aggressive policy, such as its support of proxies and allies. Israel strongly opposed the JCPOA.[vii]  Israel was not part of the negotiations, yet it strove to influence them as much as possible. Israel ran a diplomatic campaign, which included a threat to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. It is not clear if Israel was willing to attack Iran. Either way it brought pressure on the Obama administration, but it also might have backfired, if it urged the Obama administration to reach an agreement as soon as possible.

The Obama administration strove to prove the JCPOA is the best solution, for Israel too. Israel hoped to force Iran to accept harsher concessions. However, the United States ignored the Israeli position, to a large extent, since the United States did not want to risk a breakdown in the negotiations, which might have coerced the United States to strike Iran. The Obama administration was determined to rely on diplomacy to restrain and monitor Iran’s nuclear program, allowing the Obama administration to focus on other regions, mostly East Asia.  Eventually, Israel, by using diplomacy, gained modest results as far as Israel was concerned. Despite the influence and support Israel has in the United States it was not enough to make the Obama administration to adopt the Israeli position.

On May 8, 2018, President Trump declared the United States would pull out of the JCPOA. the Trump administration imposed heavy sanctions on Iran, hoping the economic pressure would force Iran to negotiate on accepting severe constraints, including on its nuclear program. The United States also might have hoped Iran’s deep economic problems would drive the Iranian population to topple the regime. Israel encouraged Trump to implement this strategy that might have worked, but it did not. Maybe the chances of success were too low to begin with. It is also possible the United States and Israel could have done more to destabilize the Iranian regime, yet this move was complicated and there were serious risks like an escalation. Eventually Iran decided to breach the JCPOA, and it got closer to producing nuclear weapons.

The Iranian regime, in order to secure its rule, becomes more authoritarian, by suppressing the opposition.[viii] As part of defending itself the Iranian regime also assumes having nuclear weapons would prevent the United States from attacking Iran,[ix] but actually it is the opposite. Iran’s nuclear project increased the chances Iran would be attacked by the United States and / or Israel.

Matthew Kroenig claimed on August 26, 2022, that “military threats are most effective when they don’t have to be used. If there were a credible military option on the table, then it is much more likely that Iran would agree to a good deal.”[x] Israel urged the Biden administration to implement such an approach. Officially the Biden administration did not rule out completely the military option, but actually it did. The Biden administration refused to use the military option as leverage during the talks with Iran, fearing it would be counterproductive, leading maybe to the end of the negotiations.  

From US perspective Israel had to avoid bombing Iran during the negotiations between the Biden administration and Iran.[xi] The United States was concerned an Israeli raid in Iran might ignite a war, dragging the United States into it. Former Israeli strikes, on Arab nuclear reactors, in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007, did not bring a war, but the Biden administration did not want to take a risk that seemed too high. The Biden administration relied on diplomacy, talks combined with sanctions, to make Iran accept strict restrictions, more than those that were in the JCPOA, but eventually the Biden administration might have to compromise on a similar version of the JCPOA.

President Biden visited Israel in mid July 2022. Tehran Times claimed “the American President followed all the guidelines when visiting Israeli leaders. He lashed out at Iran, threatening to use force to stop Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”[xii] Iran’s news agency argued in late August 2022 that “the US administration has tried to convince the Israelis that the White House would not give any new concession to Iran, but it seems that the Tel Aviv regime has not been persuaded.”[xiii]  Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid claimed then that Israeli pressure on the United States had some positive effects. He argued the United States “accepted a large part of the things that we wanted them to include in the drafts” of the agreement with Iran.[xiv] Israel’s Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, said, during a visit to United States in late August 2022, that Israel and the United States would continue to build their cooperation and take actions to make sure Iran would never obtain nuclear weapons.[xv] There are close ties between Israel and its American patron, but they also have disputes, so they have to be careful not to have a rift between them that would weaken the effort to supervise and restrain Iran’s nuclear program.

On August 25, 2022, at the Tenth NPT Review Conference, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, Majid Takht Ravanchi, called “upon Israel to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and eliminate its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons.”[xvi] It was part of an ongoing effort by Iran and other states too, such as Egypt, to try to disarm Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Iran also hoped to divert the attention from her, a state that does not have nuclear weapons, to Israel since the latter has them. However, Israel has them for several decades, without trying to use them such as to force Arab states to recognize Israel’s right to exist. In contrast, if Iran has a nuclear arsenal, it might have a much more aggressive approach in this matter. Iran might not carry out a nuclear attack, but Iran can exploit its nuclear weapons to intimidate its foes, indirectly or not. This potential Iranian threat serves Israel in trying to convince the international community to make sure Iran would not hold nuclear weapons. 

Covert actions and an air raid 

Over the years Israel had conducted various covert actions against Iran’s nuclear program. One of the most famous one happened in 2010, when the Stuxnet computer virus had damaged up to 1,000 centrifuges, out of 5,000, located in Natanz. The same site was sabotaged again on July 2, 2020, when an explosion occurred there.[xvii] Another method was aimed at those who work for Iran’s nuclear program. In 2010-2012 several Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated. On November 27, 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated. He was the mastermind of Iran’s nuclear project.[xviii] Israel did not take responsibility for those strikes. At most Israel repeated its claim it would not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons. Those operations disrupted but they did not stop Iran’s nuclear program. It might have even made Iran more determined to proceed and even to expedite its nuclear program. Israel therefore took risks, and the outcome maybe was counter - productive.  

Israel destroyed Arab nuclear reactors, in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007.[xix] Israel could have tried to do the same in Iran, but there this task would be much more complicated. In Syria and Iraq there was only one objective while in Iran there are several key nuclear sites, which are spread across a vast area. The IAF (Israeli Air Force) has to bomb all of them at the same time, in order to gain surprise, which could be quite a challenge, considering the size of the Israeli force. The IAF might have to send to Iran up to a hundred aircraft, mostly F- 35, F- 15I and F- 16I fighters together with command-and-control aircraft, tankers, rescue helicopters and drones. Controlling and hiding all of them on their way to Iran is a tall order.

Some of Iran’s nuclear sites are well protected by heavy fortifications and / or they enjoy natural protection such as mountains. The IAF has “the GBU-28, which can penetrate underground fortifications, The 5,000-pound laser-guided bombs could be used in a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, though analysts say the weapon would be too small to take out Iran’s Fordo nuclear site.” In 2015 the Pentagon tested a “30,000-pound bunker-buster which could reportedly penetrate Fordo, but the Obama administration has refused to sell the weapon to Israel.”[xx] Therefore the IAF might not have bombs powerful enough to crack some of the Iranian defenses. The IAF can use special tactics and measures to overcome this problem, but this mission would not be easy. The IAF might also not be able to destroy all the targets, which would require the IAF to launch more sorties, with all the risks it involves.

The IAF will have to fly more than a thousand kilometers, to reach its targets in Iran, and then of course to get back to Israel. Israeli aircraft might not be able to use the shortest route to Iran due to political and military issues. Israeli air crews might also have to maneuver on their way to their objectives. All those constraints mean that Israeli aircraft would have to consume significant amount of fuel. Israeli aircraft could carry drop tanks, but it might not be enough. The IAF has some tankers, yet they are very old. The IAF plans to assimilate new ones, the KC – 46 yet it might take two years until the later arrive to Israel.

Iran invested in its military industry.[xxi] Iran has some old air defense but some new one as well, like the S-300, an advanced Russian antiaircraft missile. The IAF has been learning how to suppress this system. Iran’s air force would be less of a problem for Israel. Even Iran’s best fighters like the F- 14 and Mig – 29 are quite absolute. However, the Iranian air forces does have some advantages such as fighting near its airfields, which would save fuel during a flight, a crucial factor in air-to-air combat and as stated the IAF might struggle to provide enough fuel to its aircraft. The IAF, due to Iranian fire, lack of fuel or technical problems might lose aircraft. The IDF might have to invest a major effort in rescuing air crews who would be forced to abandon their aircraft over Iran or near it. Saving them, so far away from Israel, might be quite a demanding task.

Overall, in mid-2022 it seems the IDF was not ready to attack Iran’s nuclear sites.[xxii] The IAF has to deal with several serious constraints and obstacles. Attacking Iran would be a dangerous, complicated and difficult mission that could be quite costly for Israel, in several levels. One of them has to do with the Iranian response. Iran might retaliate by hitting Israel with surface-to-surface missiles, drones and SU – 24 attack planes. The IAF, with its aircraft and air defense, would protect Israel.  The IAF will also try to destroy launchers of Iranian missiles, before they can fire their missiles. Iran might not focus on striking Israel directly, but instead Iran might conduct massive cyber-attacks and / or carry out terror assaults against Israeli and/or Jewish objectives worldwide.

Hezbollah, a powerful pro – Iranian group, is based in Lebanon. Hezbollah had fought Israel since the 1980s. In 2006 there was a major confrontation between them.[xxiii] Hezbollah depends on Iran for military and economic aid.[xxiv] However, on February 8, 2022, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, argued Hezbollah might not strike Israel, if the latter attacks Iran.[xxv]. Hezbollah is aware of the high cost of such a war. Hezbollah already absorbed heavy casualties, following its involvement in the Syrian civil war. Those constraints might deter or at least limit Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel in a time of war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah that holds 150,000 rockets and missiles, could inflict severe casualties and damages. Israel must take into account other pro – Iranian groups that are based around Israel such as Hamas, yet Hezbollah is much stronger than them. Therefore, estimating if and in what scale Hezbollah confronts Israel, following her strike in Iran, has been a key consideration for Israel if and when to bomb Iran. 

Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia fear Iran let alone if Iran holds nuclear weapons. Most Gulf Arab states have ties with Israel, officially or not, and there is a cooperation between them, including in the security level. Arab states like Saudi Arabia might want Israel to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites, but without supporting it publicly, fearing an Iranian retribution. Some Gulf Arab states might allow Israeli aircraft to cross their air space, yet Israel has to be careful in this matter. This factor would not prevent an Israeli strike in Iran, but it might make such a strike more difficult to execute.  

Conclusion

Israel tried to stop and at least to cause delays to Iran’s nuclear program. Israel’s diplomatic option was based on convincing the international community, and mostly the United States, of the danger Iran would impose, not only to Israel, if Iran has nuclear weapons. The Obama and Biden administrations opposed launching an air raid, by Israel or the United States, against Iran, out of concern it might ignite a war, one which might involve the United States. Israel urged its American patron to make the agreement with Iran as tough as possible. This effort had modest results. The Trump administration imposed heavy sanctions on Iran in order to force it to accept harsh terms, including on its nuclear program, a policy which pleased Israel. It was a certain gamble, which did not work since Iran got closer to producing nuclear weapons.   

Israel took actions against Iran yet covert operations were not enough and maybe they were even counterproductive. An air raid could gain better results, but it has many constraints regarding the ability to crack Iranian fortifications, fuel etc. Israel also would have to deal with Iranian retribution, including from Hezbollah. An Israeli strike is therefore quite problematic and maybe not very practical. Yet by mentioning the possibility of a strike, even without conducting it, Israel could urge the international community to put pressure on Iran, if Israel does not overuse this method.

All in all, Israel achieved moderate success, by using diplomacy and covert operations. It might not be sufficient to prevent Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons. If Iran tries to do it then Israel might bomb Iran, as a last resort, despite all the risks and drawbacks of such an attack.    

Dr. Ehud Eilam has been dealing and studying Israel’s national security for more than 25 years. He served in the Israeli military and later he worked for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, as a researcher. He has a Ph.D and he had published eight books in the U.S / U.K. His latest book is Israeli Strategies in the Middle East: The Case of Iran (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

Endnotes:

[i] Yoaz Hendel and  Yaakov Katz, Israel vs. Iran: the Shadow War (Dulles: Virginia Potomac Books, 2012); Ephraim Kam, From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2004).

[ii] On Iran’s desire to destroy Israel see for example: Times of Israel staff, “Khamenei explains ‘final solution’ poster: I want Israel destroyed, not all Jews”, The Times of Israel, May 20, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-explains-final-solution-poster-i-favor-destroying-israel-not-jews/

[iii] Islamic Republic News Agency, August 22, 2022.  https://en.irna.ir/news/84861002/Iran-turns-into-important-regional-power-plays-key-role-worldwide

[iv] On the Israeli Bomb see: Avner Cohen, The Last Taboo (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora – Bitan, Dvir, 2005). Shlaomo Aronson, Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (Jerusalem: Akademon 1995).

[v] Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Grace Hwang, The Changing Security Dynamics of the MENA Region, Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), March 22, 2021.

[vi] Ehud Barak, “Iran Can Transform Itself into a Nuclear Power—And It's Too Late to Stop It by Surgical Attack”, Time, July 25, 2022. https://time.com/6199552/iran-nuclear-power-ehud-barak/

[vii] Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy, (Yale university press: New Haven, 2017), pp.319-320. Michael Oren, Ally, (Random house, New York: 2016), pp.384-387

[viii] Raz Zimmt, Iran from Inside: Politics and Society in the Islamic Republic (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2022).

[ix]  Ofira Seliktar and Rezaei, Farhad, Iran, Israel, and the United States: The Politics of Counter-Proliferation Intelligence Hardcover, (Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books, 2018), p.25.

[x] Emma Ashford, “Who Benefits From a New Iran Deal?” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/26/new-iran-deal-nuclear-dugina-oil-ukraine-war-russia/

[xi] On Israeli policy see: Daniel Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller and Steven Simon, “Netanyahu’s new campaign against the Iran deal is a risky gambit”, Responsible Statecraft, January 28, 2021

[xii] Tehran Times, July 15, 2022. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/474691/Biden-s-desperate-trip-to-Israel

[xiii] The Islamic Republic News Agency, August 22, 2022. https://en.irna.ir/news/84861895/US-dragging-feet-in-responding-to-Vienna-talks-draft

[xiv] Ami spiro, “Lapid says Israeli pressure campaign against Iran deal bore fruit with White House”, The Times of Israel, August 25, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-pressure-campaign-against-iran-deal-reportedly-bears-fruit-with-white-house/

[xv] Tobias Siegal, "Visiting US, Gantz emphasizes Israel-US cooperation ‘in face of Iran’s aggression", The Times of Israel, August 28, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/visiting-us-gantz-emphasizes-israel-us-cooperation-in-face-of-irans-aggression/

[xvi] The Islamic Republic News Agency, August 23, 2022. https://en.irna.ir/news/84862828/Iran-stresses-real-nuclear-disarmament-of-US-pressure-on-Israel

[xvii] Times of Israel staff, “Israel’s alleged Natanz strike ‘as complex as Stuxnet,’ a major blow to Iran”, The Times of Israel, July 10, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-alleged-natanz-strike-as-complex-as-stuxnet-a-major-blow-to-iran/

[xviii]  (No Author), “Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran's top nuclear scientist, assassinated near Tehran”, BBC, November 27, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55105934

[xix] On the 1981 raid see: Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb Paperback (New York: Crown, 2005). On the 2007 raid see: Yaakov Katz, Shadow Strike: Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2017).

[xx] The Times of Israel, May 7, 2015 https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-may-sell-saudis-bombs-once-only-offered-to-israel-report/

[xxi] Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami Bahgat, Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles. Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 2021)

[xxii] Efraim Inbar: Israel Will Confront Iran Militarily, Deal or No Deal, Middle East Forum Webinar, (by Marilyn Stern), June 24, 2022. https://www.meforum.org/63356/efraim-inbar-deal-or-no-deal-israel-will-confront

[xxiii] Raphael D. Marcus, Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire, (Georgetown university press, 2018). Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

[xxiv] Kaunert Christian and Ori Wertman. “The Securitisation of Hybrid Warfare through Practices within the Iran-Israeli Conflict: Israel’s Practices for Securitising Hezbollah’s Proxy War”. Security & Defence Quarterly 31, 2020, pp. 99-114.

[xxv] Times of Israel staff, “Nasrallah: If Israel attacks Iran, Hezbollah won’t necessarily join fight”, The Times of Israel, February 9, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/nasrallah-if-israel-attacks-iran-hezbollah-wont-necessarily-join-fight/

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Published: October 17, 2022