References to “military culture” or the “culture of Special Operations Forces (SOF)” often have a negative connotation. When headlines about military or unit misconduct, abuse, and war crimes appear, questions are raised about military culture to explain or understand these actions and events. The purpose of this paper is to advocate for when and why SOF leadership and policy-makers, along with researchers, should study SOF culture by examining what is meant by “culture”; it will then highlight possible approaches by contrasting two recent case studies of SOF cultures in Norway and Australia.

Past inquiries – such as the Military Board of Inquiry into Canadian Forces members during deployment in Yugoslavia from 1993-1994, or Donna Winslow’s study of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) after the murder of 16-year old Somalia teen Shidane Arone – have found misconduct has “roots in military culture” and unit culture which “emphasized group loyalty, tolerated indiscipline, and erected a wall of silence against the chain of command”.[i] These studies examined the role of culture and questioned the extent culture played into the behaviour of soldiers.[ii]

In recent years, some Western SOF have had to reckon with their members’ transgressions, leading calls for the study of SOF culture. In January 2020, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) released a report following a review of its culture after “incidents of misconduct and unethical behavior caused the public and government leaders to question the culture and ethics of the SOF community.”[iii] In the same year, the Brereton Report, an inquiry into Australian SOF war crimes in Afghanistan, found that SOF units at home “bred” cultures and attitudes that enabled misconduct.[iv]   

The study of military culture and SOF culture often comes from moments of internal crisis when SOF members harm and abuse other military members and populations with which SOF interacts. However, the study of SOF culture can, and should, come from recognizing times of transition where asking questions about “culture” can be an opportunity for SOF organizational learning, growth and reflexivity.

SOF are people-centric. Catchy statements like “humans are more important than hardware” or “equip the operator, not operate the equipment” are frequently offered by leaders when trying to emphasize this important sentiment. However, people are indeed at the core of SOF’s ability to deliver effect, hence studying SOF culture is critical. For example, cultural studies can illustrate the role of institutional apprenticeship for new members of the organization; examine how decisions are made; and offer options for what SOF leadership should look like. For SOF organizations “at the tip of the spear” and tasked with politically sensitive missions that require excellence, the reliance on having the right people, and the right people working together, is paramount. Hence, the paper highlights what studying SOF culture can reveal and offer to strengthening the respective organization, along with considerations for studying SOF culture more comprehensively in the future. So what is culture anyway?

What is “Culture”

“Culture” can refer to “a set of common beliefs and values within a group of people that, combined, transform into attitudes that are expressed as behaviours.”[v] Winslow’s study in The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry draws attention to culture as the values shared by members of a group, persisting over time despite membership changes.[vi] Winslow sees culture as a “social force that controls patterns of organizational behaviour” shaping group member’s “cognitions and perceptions of meanings and realities.”[vii]

Culture can refer to common ways of thinking, acting, and meaning-making within a group that is enduring over time despite changes of group membership. However, culture is not easy to define, just as humans and human groups are not easy to understand, and there are many definitions of “culture”.[viii] However, the concept of culture has also become “drained and thereby analytically useless” given the many definitions and meanings.[ix] Culture has also become a “catch-all term” and seen as something leaders can shape while being an independent phenomena driving individual practices.[x]

To return to the basics, this paper adopts an anthropological definition of culture provided by Danielsen, where culture “is how people learn to think, act, and communicate within changeable communities.”[xi] Conceptualizations aside, what is important for the study of SOF is also how researchers might study this culture. Danielsen, again from an ethnographer’s perspective, offers this: we can observe and listen to local myths, rituals, symbols while also talking with people whose culture one studies to understand “their moral horizons and embodied meanings”.[xii] For studying the military, researchers can examine “formal structures, rules, and regulations” that are a part of military members’ everyday life.[xiii] With culture thusly explained and defined, how has it be applied to contemporary studies of SOF?

Norway’s MJK and transition vs. Australia’s SOF crisis

In 2010, the new commanding officer of Norway’s naval SOF Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) invited an anthropologist, Tone Danielsen, to study the culture of MJK.[xiv] This was prior to the establishment of Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) in 2014, and MJK Commander Tom Robertsen knew structural changes were coming.[xv]  He wanted an “outsider’s” understanding into the culture of MJK in order to know their path forward and keep the core of their culture of “SOFish strengths” during organizational transformation.[xvi] Since MJK was also pressed for time; with a high organizational tempo, there was not time or space for internal reflection, nor did they have the training.[xvii]

Danielsen’s book, Making Warriors in a Global Era, is the first in-depth ethnographic account of SOF culture from an anthropologist’s perspective and methods.[xviii] Through 18 months of participant observation, Danielsen studied “the making of warriors and their everyday life […] to give new perspectives to taken-for-granted, hard-programmed truths in MJK.[xix] Her unhindered participant observations as an outsider provided insights that one-time interviews and secondary sources could not.

Her ethnography “describes (MJK’s) history, skill set, mind-set, social practices” finding that theses elements “work as social fiber and keep them safe and sane”.[xx] Danielsen’s ethnography details the role of oral culture and how institutional apprenticeship socialized newcomers to military culture and the “SOFish” skill and mind-set; she describes MJK’s communication and bodily practices; leadership and forms of decision making (The Seamen’s Council); and how ritualized social practices allowed operators to release tension. Danielsen’s research found that MJK had the ability to switch between different social practices in order to use their collective memory, deal with uncertainties, outthink their opponents, and accomplish their mission as SOF.[xxi]

In Australia, the Commander of Australia’s Special Operations invited Samantha Compvoets to help support learning, development, realignment, and strategic planning.[xxii] The research focused on how SOF functions and works with other parts of the Australian military and Whole-of-Government (WoG).[xxiii] Contrary to Danielsen’s study of MJK, a detailed look into Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) culture was not the focus of Crompvoets’ study.[xxiv] However, her findings revealed “serious internal culture problems”.[xxv]  During her research, Crompvoets heard stories of terrible acts by SOF in Afghanistan, along with the phrase “it happened all the time.”[xxvi]

Crompvoets’ findings led to an inquiry, led by Major General Paul Le Gay Brereton, into the rumors of criminal and unlawful conduct surrounding Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) deployments in Afghanistan.[xxvii] The Brereton Report, published in the fall 2020, cited cases of cruel treatment of persons under Australian military members’ control, and 39 unlawful killings.[xxviii] The inquiry drew attention to a “warrior culture”, stating that “Special Forces operators should pride themselves on being model professional soldiers, not on being ‘warrior heroes’.”[xxix] The SOTG culture at large did not facilitate the misconduct, but rather the “cultures and attitudes” of SAS Regiment’s individual squadrons and each of the 2nd Commando Regiment Company Groups.[xxx] Brereton also cites a “tribal culture” which led to the ostracization of SOF members who may have questioned others,[xxxi] and other cultural factors include secrecy[xxxii] and loyalty[xxxiii].

Brereton looked to culture as the explanatory factor into the misconduct,[xxxiv] where instead Crompvoets in retrospect believes culture is a symptom that something is wrong, but easily “becomes a ‘thing’ to blame” as detailed in her 2021 book Blood Lust, Trust and Blame.[xxxv] Crompvoets believes focusing on culture and culture change as a “flawed framework” to address Australian SOF misconduct.[xxxvi] Where Brereton finds culture as a key factor into why SOF personnel behaved the way they did, Crompvoets weighs the role of “culture” less.

As Danielsen notes, culture is complex.[xxxvii] Meanwhile, Crompvoets argues culture is complicated when trying to determine the relationship between misconduct and a military organization’s culture.[xxxviii] Both Crompvoets and Danielsen were brought into study SOF organizations as “outsiders”, however their approach and findings lead to very different examinations and questions surrounding SOF culture, especially when done through the contexts of crisis in the case of Australian SOF versus transition for MJK and NORSOF. In addition, the study of MJK through intensive, long-term participant observation provided opportunities for SOF reflexivity and knowledge, rather than having to retrace the manifestations of culture to explain horrible actions. This policy paper, in considering the cases and contexts described above, advocates for the study of SOF culture during times of transition, when in-depth research including participant-observation can occur to understand SOF culture and its complexities.

Studying SOF Culture

The study of SOF culture can offer insights into organizations which concentrate on the selection of the “right” people and aid in understanding the strengths of SOF organizations. First, having an outsider study SOF culture can reveal things about SOF which those within SOF do not have the time and ability to question as exemplified by the anthropological study of MJK. In addition, the presence of a researcher and their professional gaze can instigate SOF’s study of themselves. For example, MJK members “could pay attention to things they just took for granted, and make more conscious changes.” after retelling their stories and having their discourses and practices brought to their attention by a researcher.[xxxix]

Studying SOF culture can help understand and improve the resiliency of SOF members. MJK’s social practices kept them grounded: allowing them to release tension and make space for members to “switch off”,[xl] within a “family” context.[xli] Both these activities instill social practices and rituals that enable short and long-term resiliency and growth. A recent study of Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) also highlights the connection between resiliency and SOF culture. Social interactions, team work and connections between team members, and commitment are “social-level resilience characteristics” that aid in individual resiliency.[xlii] The importance placed on “brotherhood” and “camaraderie” are parts of the social environmental characteristics of resilience.[xliii] While the study lacks specific examples, an ethnographer might wonder what social practices or socialized rituals exists within a CANSOF unit which contributes to such resiliency.

Finally, a reason why we should consider the importance of studying SOF is amplified in times of transition and change. These transitions can be organizational, as in the case of MJK, or prompted by acknowledging changes in today’s security environment which SOF will need to prepare for. Returning to the importance of having “the right people”, knowing SOF culture allows SOF to understand themselves and for others to understand them. Knowing how their culture has been shaped and how their culture may need to change or shift in new contexts recognizes that culture can affect SOF and be used by SOF to maintain their ability to do their job well.[xliv]  It is an opportunity for SOF to understand themselves and for others to understand them, the context in which they have existed and how that has shaped their culture, and how their culture may need to change or shift in new contexts.

Studying SOF can help identify healthy socialization practices, resiliency enablers, and mindsets that exist within SOF culture. Such study can offer space for reflexivity and for SOF members to develop new awareness of their own.[xlv] SOF benefit when they recognize that reflexively studying themselves and their organization can aid in change.[xlvi]

Anthropologists look “to make the foreign familiar and the familiar, strange”. Outsiders researching SOF culture take what is foreign – the world of SOF and the culture of a country’s SOF – and attempt to make it familiar while keeping the understanding that culture is complex and takes time to study. Meanwhile, the presence of participant observers and social scientists can offer the opportunity for SOF themselves to make what is familiar strange, and in doing so, establish new understandings of self and internal change.

This paper offers some considerations and questions to begin a conversation that leads to a more comprehensive study of SOF cultures:

1. Scope and (what) Culture. The scope of research on SOF culture should consider that many countries’ SOF are made up of multiple units with a central command. While a study of each individual unit in-depth may be out of the scope of a researcher or research team, one might consider what occurs when these different unit cultures have to work together. How is each unit sub-culture informed by the role that unit plays within a country’s larger SOF context, and how do these units interact with one another?

2. History and Lessons. In studying SOF culture, it is important to examine the role history has played in the country’s SOF culture. What parts of the history of SOF, including recent history such as Afghanistan and the last 20 years of counter-terrorism, have been deemed important, or help convey “lessons learned” or identity, within SOF?

3. Identities. Attention should be paid to the way culture influences identities and vice versa. SOF identities could be wrapped in terms for individuals such as “operator” or “warrior”, or be a part of a larger, collective SOF identity specific to a country. For example, what makes Canadian SOF, Canadian SOF?

4. Networks and Learning. The importance of the Global SOF Network, which is an “imagined community of choice” for some SOF[xlvii] should be explored in light of the role it plays in SOF culture. What diffusion of practices and mind-sets occur when countries’ SOF join together for training or missions?

5. Institutional and Social Culture. Researchers should consider where SOF culture appears, is taught, and reinforced. No doubt SOF culture appears outside the confines of “the job” and institutional structures. What is the role of the social, informal culture of SOF versus “sanctioned” organizational culture?

6. The Future and “Changing” Culture. Recognizing that culture is slow to change whereas realities can change quickly, how does the changing nature and threat environment have the potential to impact SOF culture? How can culture be used to build future SOF capacity in environments where SOF are likely to interact with peer adversaries in strategic maneuverings?

Inviting “outsiders” to study a closed community such as SOF requires courage on behalf of Commanders and members of SOF. Examining culture can provide perspective and balance[xlviii] and can be a type of “quality check”.[xlix] It is encouraging to see SOF Commanders[l] and communities recognize the need for the study of their culture, and what it can offer, especially in times of transition. SOF organizations and members need to think, act and communicate in ways that teach and enable resiliency, adaptability, and morality which can be seen in the “everyday” and when undertaking the roles assigned to SOF.

Erin Yantzi is a Master's Student in Political Science at the University of Waterloo, and her current research interests are Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) narratives and SOF culture. With a BA in Anthropology, and Peace and Conflict Studies, she published her thesis as “Embodying Refusal: Resistance, Pathologization, and Mental Health Exemption in the Israel Defense Forces” in Critical Theory and Social Justice: Journal of Undergraduate Research.

 End Notes

[i] Donna Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations: Organizational Crisis,” The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 35, no.3 (1998), 347.

[ii] Donna Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry, (Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), 1. online at https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/bcp-pco/CP32-64-6-1997-eng.pdf.

[iii] John Friberg, USSOCOM Report on SOF Culture and Ethics, SOF News, January 29, 2020, at https://sof.news/ussocom/ussocom-sof-culture-ethics-report-2020/.

[iv] Commonwealth of Australia, Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, (public release version, 2020), 32, at https://afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/IGADF-Afghanistan-Inquiry-Public-Release-Version.pdf.

[v] English (2004), 12,  as cited in Emily Spencer and Bernd Horn. Working with Others: Simples Guides to Maximize Effectiveness, (Winnipeg, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012), 23. 

[vi] Drawing upon Kotter and Heskett (1992), 4, as cited in Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, 1.

[vii] Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties”, 347.

[viii] Those who study military culture have focused on the “other” (those who do not belong) (see Hofstede (1991), 5, as cited in Joseph L. Soeters, Donna J. Winslow, and Alise Weibull, “Military Culture,” in Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York, Springer, 2006), 238, and Ott (1989), 27, as cited in Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties”, 347; and the importance of belonging in the military as detailed by Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties”, 246. Others have focused on the individual embodiment of military culture, see Brain Lande, “Breathing Like a Soldier: Culture Incarnate,” The Sociological Review 55, s.1 (2007), 96 and 106.

[ix] Tone Danielsen, Making Warriors in a Global Era: An Ethnographic Study of the

Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando (Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2018), xxix.

[x] Samantha Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame (Monash University Publishing, Kindle Edition, 2021), location 679 of 853.

[xi] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xxx.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xvi.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 1,2,176.

[xvii] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 176.

[xviii] Donna Winslow’s research into the Canadian Airborne Regiment, while rooted in anthropological understandings, used visual and personal records, literature, interviews and informants acting as “self-ethnographers” when unable to do participant observation, as discussed in Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, 2,4.

[xix] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xiv-xvi.

[xx] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xxxi.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Samantha Crompvoets, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) Culture and Interactions: perceptions, reputation and risk (February 2016), 3 at SOCOMD-Culture-and-Interactions-Perceptions-Reputation-and-Risk-Feb-16.pdf (defence.gov.au).

[xxiii] Crompvoets, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) Culture and Interactions: perceptions, reputation and risk, 3.

[xxiv] Crompvoets, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) Culture and Interactions: perceptions, reputation and risk, 4. The Brereton report does say that Dr. Crompvoets’ undertook a “cultural review” commissioned by Commander Sengelman, as cited in Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 26. Dr. Crompvoets’ details that when speaking to SOF “insiders” it was not about the units’ collective culture what she wanted to understand, but the functions of parts of SOF, as cited in Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame, location 208-217, 249 of 853.

[xxv]Crompvoets, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) Culture and Interactions: perceptions, reputation and risk, 36-37.  

[xxvi]Samantha Crompvoets, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) Culture and Interactions: Insight and reflection (January 2016) at https://afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/SOCOMD-Culture-and-Interactions-Insights-and-Reflection-Jan-16_0.pdf.

[xxvii] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 10.

[xxviii] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 2.

[xxix] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 33.

[xxx] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 32.

[xxxi] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 113.

[xxxii] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 332-333.

[xxxiii] Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 333.

[xxxiv] Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame, location 269 of 853.

[xxxv] Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame, location 279, and 288 of 853.

[xxxvi] Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame, location 185 of 853.

[xxxvii] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xxx.

[xxxviii] Crompvoets, Blood Lust, Trust and Blame, location 296 of 853.

[xxxix] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 176.

[xl] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 135.

[xli] Ibid.  

[xlii] Isabelle Richer and Christine Frank, “Facing Adversity and Factors Affecting Resilience: A Qualitative  Analysis of the Lived Experiences of Canadian Special Operations Forces,” Journal of Special Operations Medicine 20 no.4 (2020), 53, 57. 

[xliii] Richer and Frank, “Facing Adversity and Factors Affecting Resilience,” 52, 56.

[xliv] See H. Christian Breede, ed. Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values, and Norms in Military Engagements (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2019), viii, 2.

[xlv] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 4-5.

[xlvi] J.A.H Chorley, “Beyond Institutional Icebergs: CANSOFCOM, Reflexivity and the Drive for Competitive Advantage.” (Canadian Forces College, Masters of Defence Studies, 2014), 93, at https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/301/286/chorley.pdf.

[xlvii] Danielsen, Making Warriors, xxvi.

[xlviii] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 177.

[xlix] Danielsen, Making Warriors, 173.

[l] Steven Hunter, “Episode 5 – CANSOFCOM: A Leader’s Perspective,” interview by Christian Breede and Kevin D. Stringer, The Politics of Special Forces (The Kingston Consortium on International Security, November 1, 2021), audio 17:16-17:37, at https://www.spreaker.com/user/14025872/episode-5-cansofcom-a-leader-s-perspecti?utm_medium=widget&utm_source=user%3A14025872&utm_term=episode_title.

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Published: Dec 1, 2021