Introduction

 Following substantial equipment modernizations, the Belgian armed forces will be undergoing a major evolution. Among the many evolving capabilities, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are at the forefront of a true capability transformation.

The purpose of this paper is to briefly trace the evolution of the Belgian Special Operations Forces from their origin until today, to describe its current transformation and to define how we see its potential for further development in the light of the multiple security challenges defying us.

Unde venis? Where do we come from?

Lieutenant-Colonel Edouard Blondeel, commanding Belgian SAS during the Second World War, often said that “he who ignores History is an orphan of the past, a bewildered of the present and a disoriented of the future”. Therefore, before considering the future, let us see what the past teaches us with regard to Special Forces development in Belgium.

Today's Belgian Special Forces find their roots in the Second World War. It is in the framework of Winston Churchill's call for "specially trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of terror down the enemy coast" that the first Belgian SAS parachutist (5th Special Air Service) and commando units (4th Troop -10th Inter-allied Commando) were created and engaged.

After the war, the fate of these two special units, which had become battalions, was debated at length. Should they be kept or not? Finally, in 1951 it was decided to reorient their mission and regroup them under one command, the Para-Commando Regiment which was to be an elite airborne unit that could be quickly engaged in a variety of scenarios. Instead of maintaining small teams capable of working clandestinely and autonomously in enemy territory, the Battalions were organized as regular airborne forces.

But already in 1955, in the early years of the Cold War, the need for a unit capable of carrying out clandestine intelligence missions resurfaced. To this end, the 1st Company Special Reconnaissance Teams (ESR) was created in 1961, and specialized in operations behind enemy lines. The end of the Cold War following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact lead, it seemed, to a perception that the threat had disappeared. As in most Western Nations, Belgian policy-makers felt it was time to reap the proverbial peace dividend. This caused a period of uninterrupted reorganizations and downsizings affecting all components of the Armed Forces, including the Para-Commando and ESR units, which were gradually reduced or partially abolished.

The downsizing continued in the 2000s for the rest of the Belgian Armed Forces including the Para-Commando units, which were witnessing the deactivation of 1 Para and rebranded into a Light Brigade. However, following the events of 11 September 2001, the trend was reversed. Belgian policymakers reestablished the need for a special forces capability and elements were gradually reconstituted, leading to the formation of a Belgian Special Forces Group in 2003.

In 2016, the “Strategic Vision” document[1], which was approved by the Belgian Government, established a plan for the modernization of the Belgian Armed Forces. Notably, the document called for the deactivation of the Light Brigade and the regrouping of the Para-Commando units and the Special Forces Group under a single Command known as the Special Operations Regiment (SO Regt).

Quo vadis? The transformation 

Ensuring our security requires robust and well-tailored military assets. The new security environment requires more than ever, in addition to effective conventional forces, forces that are rapidly available, agile, multi-purpose and highly specialized. On the national level, SOF are a tool of choice to intervene rapidly abroad (such as the evacuation of Belgian nationals, rescue of isolated detachments, or hostage rescue operations) and on national soil (such as support to the federal police). At the same time, they have an important role to play in collective defence operations within NATO and in collective security not only in the European sphere, but also in the rest of the world.

In order to meet this requirement, the Belgian government decided to strengthen the BEL SOF capability and to create the Special Operations Regiment, now composed of a Special Forces unit, two Para-commando battalions, a Communications and Information Systems unit, and a Parachute and a Commando Training Centre.

Because Special Operations are inherently joint[2], a critical factor for the transformation of BELSOF was to establish an entity in the core of the Defence Staff capable of carrying the project through its capability development. After weighing the pros and cons of various options for its structure and location within the Command Structure, the choice was made to introduce a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) within the Joint Operations Staff.

Consequently, the Belgian Special Operations (BELSOF) capability is represented at the highest level of the Defense Staff. Furthermore, although the majority of SOF in Belgium remain within the Land Component, the joint nature is reinforced. Not being linked to a single Component, SOCOM is able to encourage the development of SOF capabilities within all components and strengthen relevant innovation efforts throughout Defence.

The SOCOM Director is the Chief of Defence’s primary advisor on Special Operations. Within the Joint Operations Staff, SOCOM conducts planning for the use of SOF and in the event of a sensitive operation also commands the execution. This ensures the appropriate use of resources, with full discretion if necessary. As Special Operations do not take place in total isolation, SOCOM ensures good interoperability with its partners. This implies not only maintaining close links with the other services, but also with international SOF partners and the inter-agency counterparts.

As for the SO Regt, in order to best support its evolution towards an effective SOF capability, its missions have been clearly redefined. The missions now include the conduct of Rapid Reaction Operations and Special Operations, comprising Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance and Military Assistance.

Military Assistance (MA), all too often underestimated, has an important place in this spectrum of missions. It contributes to the stabilization of countries facing security challenges and counters the terrorist threat either in supporting the direct fight against it - when it has already taken root - or in helping to prevent its emergence. In addition, MA can disrupt activities of other criminal organizations. MA also builds a relationship of trust with the country concerned and allows monitoring the evolution of the security situation in a given geographical area with a very limited number of personnel. Last but not least, a preventive presence before the crisis (the proverbial “left of the bang”) is a priori more beneficial than actions in the remediation (right – or after – “the bang”).

As far as Rapid Reaction Operations are concerned, it is useful to specify that they can take wide range of forms and take place abroad or on national soil as part of homeland security operations. This was the case in the aftermath of the March 22, 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, as but one example.

Another critical factor for Special Operations is the quality of the personnel. The target profile is that of the "quiet professional", available and flexible, able to adapt to a wide variety of situations, courageous and, if necessary, willing to take risks, while being able to cope with discomfort. The selected personnel must be trustworthy and understand the overall objectives of their mission. In the absence of clear guidelines, they must be able to take initiative to contribute to the desired effects. This is a far cry from the cliché of the elite soldier pulling a stunt and flexing muscles. The regimental motto "Nec jactantia, nec metu", which translates into “no boasting, no fear”, clearly embodies this sentiment.

Implementing or reinforcing the mindset of the quiet professional in our personnel and units is one of the main objectives of the BELSOF transformation. The development of this mentality is a guiding principle from the start of the education and training and progressively developed through individual and collective training to ensure continuous growth in the experience and maturity of the personnel. The standards are high and the activities are very demanding on a physical and cognitive plane, and indeed test the character of BELSOF operators. Assigning a large amount of responsibility to each individual is also an important motivating factor. Feeling appreciated for what they do and what they are, many of them invest in further training or opt for social promotion, which is also structurally encouraged. This approach also has a positive impact on external and internal recruitment.

A broad spectrum of skills is even more essential as the forms of employment and the organization of operational detachments can vary considerably depending on the tasks to be performed. Some missions require the commitment of significant forces, for others a much smaller detachment is recommended. The same person could have to operate in both circumstances one after the other and must therefore be very flexible. Adaptability and versatility are a must.

The composition of operational detachments is closely linked to the tasks to be performed and involves a wide range of sub-entities or specialties operating together. A typical Special Operation Task Group (SOTG), ranging in size from 50 to 250 personnel, will incorporate command elements, combatants, force protection, logisticians, signalers, and various specialists who augment the group with their own advanced skills, such as dog handlers, bomb disposal experts, combat divers, intelligence specialists, or drone-operators, to name but a few. The size and composition of the SOTG will also vary over time according to the evolution of the tasks to execute, knowing that missions can last from a few days to several years.

To assure collaboration with all enablers and assure “jointness”, personnel from other services are integrated systematically into SOF training courses. A specific course has been developed just for this purpose. Known as the SOF Enablers Course, this course is designed for personnel working within the Special Operations community without being qualified as SF operators or Para-Commando. This joint integration does not come naturally, but requires de facto extensive and regular training.

Globalization, with its constant information flows and nearly unlimited mobility, has led us to a non-linear and interconnected operating environment. A threat facing our forces in a distant operational theatre can be found active a few days later in our homeland. Such was the case for Foreign Terrorist Fighters, who were first seen in Iraq or Syria and then in Belgium. A similar situation could easily occur in other asymmetric or hybrid contexts. Obviously good interoperability between the different national security actors is therefore becoming crucial and information gathered by one service can be of great importance to others. SOCOM plays an important role in persuading partners to overcome the hurdles of stovepipe and parochial thinking. As foreign and domestic threats blend, so too must our ability to respond and BELSOF, as a quintessential boundary spanner[3], plays a critical role in this effort.

In the same vein, international cooperation is becoming increasingly fundamental to planning and execution. Indeed, for a small nation such as Belgium, it has become the norm. To remain relevant, it is essential to maintain or strengthen credible military capabilities within the European Union while being a reliable partner in NATO as well as in ad hoc coalitions. This can only be achieved if policy makers capitalize on Belgium’s privileged links with other European and transatlantic partners. A recent joint venture with Denmark and the Netherlands led to the creation of a Composite Special Operations Component Command (C-SOCC), designed to command multiple SOTGs in operation and in a truly multinational context. Together with its two partners, Belgium has been able to strengthen NATO’s SOF command and control capacity, something that could only be achieved through this unique cooperation.

After a promising initial study and powered by political will, the parties signed a Letter of intent in 2017 and formalized the project in 2018 with a Memorandum of Understanding. Although based on NATO doctrine, the project team had to overcome many obstacles to include the identification of common procedures, establishment of ways to share classified information, and the creation of an multi-year training schedule to build the capacity. Arrangements were made to reflect equal burden and responsibility sharing. With regard to staffing, positions had to be distributed in a balanced manner between the three nations, with the key positions rotating according a fixed schedule. Moreover, a common procurement mechanism was set up to acquire the necessary equipment, especially in the CIS domain, and financial agreements allowed common funding of C-SOCC related specificities. During the years of preparation, the NATO SOF School (NSOS) in Chièvres, provided full support, and the complete staff went through all the mandatory courses. Eventually, after having conducted multiple exercises under scrutiny of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), C-SOCC was declared full operational capable end 2020 to become NATO Response Force’s SOCC in 2021.

BELSOF related to Great Power Competition (GPC)?

 Considering the above, the question obviously arises: What is the utility of a capability as BELSOF, especially from the perspective of Great Power Competition?

As the answer to GPC should be a Whole-of-Society approach, the military and more specifically BELSOF will have its role to play. Whether GPC takes the form of direct open military confrontation, hybrid warfare, proxy warfare or any other possibilities for competition, it will take extensive networks of people and innovative technologies, competencies, and tactics to counter these threats abroad and at home, in addition to continuing the pressure on terrorist organizations globally.

Essentially, the SOF capability provides the government with scalable options able to act timely and discreetly anywhere in the world. Hence, BELSOF offers a proportional reaction to a large number of situations, up to the deployment of relatively robust combat forces.

These rapidly deployable, light capabilities, with reduced logistical requirements and a high degree of autonomy, both in terms of sustainment and decision making, can conduct reconnaissance, link up with local forces, make an initial assessment, and thus provide a reliable picture of the situation in theater for the national decision-making authorities. Indeed, BELSOF provides a critical strategic sensor capability. Well-trained, discreet and equipped with the latest technology, these forces can access hostile or politically sensitive areas and, when needed, deliver high-precision, kinetic (lethal) and non-kinetic (non-lethal) effects.

Their small footprint allows them to be less intrusive with the authorities or the local population. Their training to be empathetic for local cultural aspects and respect for local customs facilitates close cooperation with regional civilian and military authorities, as well as with the population. These characteristics, although originally applied to Unconventional Irregular Warfare, are equally useful in the context of great power competition, when the aim is to gain local governments and population support for a desired cause.

If the adversary aims to weaken the authority of our national democratic system, BELSOF are able to rapidly reinforce homeland security forces, such as police, state security, intelligence services and support them in countering subversive activities orchestrated by the opposing power.

The role of SOF against the so-called Eastern threat or in the more general framework of the great power competition is obvious when actions remain constrained to the so-called gray zone and stay below the threshold of open warfare. Here SOF again has to be prepared for Irregular Warfare and may have to relearn more traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) such as non-conventional communication, the use of dead letter boxes, safe havens and local networks. Within the context of their contribution to the C-SOCC in the framework of the NATO Graduated Response Plans[4] and their participation in NATO SOF exercises, Belgian Special Forces progressively retrain these TTPs in order to fully assume their responsibility in the field of collective defence.

In Europe’s underbelly, also referred to as the Southern threat, BELSOF can intervene, as mentioned above, by providing direct MA to partner states and, indirectly, by combating terrorism, organized crime and the various illicit activities that go with it. By doing this, they connect with partners in geo-strategic important places and, indirectly, also influence and contribute to the balance of power in the GPC framework.  

Conclusion

 In conclusion, the SOF capability is poised to provide policymakers with an expanded range of scalable, immediately available, and increasingly sophisticated options that can be employed as an initial response to a variety of crises or as a complement to other national, international, or interdepartmental capabilities. SOF is committed to continually challenging and reinventing itself to remain effective and relevant especially in the new security environment, seemingly subjected once again to Great Power Competition.  This desire to adapt will be a major asset in the years to come, especially given the rapid expansion of possibilities generated by cyber, artificial intelligence, the ever-increasing accessibility of information via the Internet, or additive manufacturing. As the adversary has access to the same technology, it will be necessary to be truly creative in order to keep the initiative or, failing that, to be resilient enough to recover quickly from an attack. With this in mind, BELSOF, together with its allies and partners, will need to continue to prepare for the unexpected and remain ready to respond quickly and creatively to any anticipated or unexpected threat.                                     

Colonel Tom Bilo is currently serving as the Commander of the Belgian Special Operations Regiment. He has spent most of his career working within the Special Operations Forces community, having commanded at the platoon, company, and battalion levels as well as in the schools and staff as an instructor and member of the general staff. A former deputy director of Belgian Special Operations Command, COL Bilo is slated to become the next director of the Belgian Special Operations Command in the Fall of 2021.

 End Notes

[1] Strategic Vision for Defence edited by BEL MOD , 29 Jun 2016

[2] Joint: connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate and support each other.

[3] Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari “The Rise of SOF” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2016) 21, see also H. Christian Breede “Special (Peace) Operations” International Journal 73, no. 2, (2018) 229.

[4] NATO’s Graduated Response Plans (GRP) are plans being prepared at SHAPE, which determine which quantity and quality of capabilities are needed for what mission and where, thus taking into account the different troop requirements on NATO’s various flanks (Northeast, East, South, Southeast).

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Published: June 30, 2021