Issue

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, special operations forces (SOF) became the force of choice for decision makers in in the ensuing 9/11 Wars.[i] As a result, the past two decades have been described as the “golden age of special operations.”[ii] Focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations[iii] as part of expeditionary campaigns, SOF engaged mostly terrorist organizations—such as al-Qaeda and later Daesh—and other insurgent groups, most famously the Taliban in Afghanistan. More often than not, SOF had the upper hand tactically and militarily, although counter-terrorism campaigns and associated state-building ventures failed to deliver promised security and stability.  

After 20 years in the sandbox of the Greater Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the Sahara, Western SOF, military forces and governments are now reckoning with a rapidly changing threat environment. Strategic competition among major powers has replaced terrorism as the main national security concern of the United States and, consequently, American allies.[iv] Such a change in the threat environment means a shift in how SOF are employed. Moving forward, state-based threats are likely to attract the bulk of SOF attention, and the threat posed by violent extremist organizations will be reshaped as proxies of more dangerous adversaries. In light of those transformations, SOF must adapt. What does this reorientation look like? And what does it means for smaller SOF organizations like the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)?

CANSOFCOM and Liminal Warfare

Special operations forces are asked to do a lot. They are specialized generalists,[v] capable of performing a broad scope of potential tasks. Historically, SOF has employed tactical activities for strategic effect. Whether conducting iconic direct-action missions – the proverbial “door kicking” – or more subtle irregular warfare missions such as foreign internal defence, military assistance, or strategic reconnaissance, SOF has a long record of doing many different tasks for outsized effect. Indeed, in 2020, CANSOFCOM released its strategy entitled Beyond the Horizon in which it clearly articulates both what Canadian special operations forces (CANSOF) is and, more importantly, how the context in which it operates is changing.[vi]

Beyond the Horizon emphasizes two key features of the operating environment in which CANSOFCOM expects to operate moving forward: the national defence and national security nexus on the one hand, and the “grey space conflict” on the other. [vii] Both aspects reflects changes in Canada’s threat environment. New technologies and domains of operations are eroding Canada’s geostrategic sanctuary. Enduring American strategic and conventional deterrence is forcing adversaries to find new ways to compete against the United States and its allies. Consequently, if conventional attacks against Canada remain improbable, hostile activities such as disinformation, foreign interference and espionage are increasingly threatening the country’s strategic interests.[viii]

In this context, Canada’s SOF capability is expecting to increasingly work at the intersection of defence and national security as threats to the country no longer neatly fit in one category or the other. Responding to these complex threats requires a better integration of military forces and other government agencies, particularly with law enforcement and the intelligence community. As threats evolve, these organizations are often “boundary spanning”[ix] at the junction of national security and defence, making them likely partners for SOF.  

When it comes to the grey zone of conflict, deterrence continues to prevent escalation above the threshold of armed conflict or beyond geographically-bounded spaces such as Eastern Ukraine or Syria. Consequently, adversaries are finding ways to directly undermine Canadian interests while also making attribution more difficult and playing off the specific features of democracy: respect for the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. David Kilcullen defines such strategy as “liminal warfare”: “[riding] the edge, doing just enough to frustrate the United States [and its allies] and further their own interests but not enough to trigger and outright military response.”[x]

Framework

Such an ambiguous and challenging threat environment is shining light on some new challenges for CANSOF. Traditionally geared toward asymmetric threats on which they have a military advantage, CANSOF are not well positioned to compete against a so-called peer adversary that often has more advanced capabilities and greater numbers. CANSOF must find ways to operate in an environment where it does not have the upper hand or even the initiative. In other words, CANSOF might need to start thinking like those adversaries it used to hunt and find ways to gain back the initiative in this new, inverted asymmetry.  Insurgents – as many militaries have rediscovered in recent decades – often enjoy the initiative. While an oversimplification, having the initiative means that one is anticipating the actions of the opponent rather than reacting to them and setting the agenda, moving from reaction to anticipation.

Operating in an environment where CANSOF does not have superiority is an important shift for a force that has been defined by counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. One promising approach is a “Byzantine-style [foreign and security] policy”[xi] : small-footprint military forces matching a matrix of civilian agencies that because of their conservative numbers, can be deployed more widely into anticipatory roles. Doing so requires considering two important variables: response versus anticipation, and conflict versus competition.

An organization can react to an incident or an attack, or it can try anticipating those events. Crisis response has been a defining feature of CANSOFCOM, and the Command will continue to be Canada’s primary weapon in responding to critical national incidents that require precision action. Thereof, CANSOFCOM needs to maintain a reaction capacity. At the same time, CANSOF must recalibrate in ways that support not only finite objectives, like defeating an opponent, but also more infinite objectives such as sustaining competition against peer adversaries.[xii] In a peer-on-peer environment in which CANSOF does not have the upper hand, understanding the adversary and anticipating its moves become critical to the defence of the national interest.

Another way to think about the spectrum of reaction to anticipation is with respect to its proximity to an event. Reactions tend to be after the event, the response is all about mitigation as the opponent has shaped and set the agenda. Indeed, one is responding to something the opponent did: they have the initiative. Anticipation occurs before an event and involves forecasting and shaping in order to set the agenda and force an opponent to react. In other words, reaction is right of the proverbial bang, while anticipation is left of it. While not entirely new,[xiii] it is worth reframing here as part of a broader exercise to help situate CANSOF roles as the environment shifts.

A second important distinction is between competition and conflict. Again, at risk of oversimplifying, conflict is at its core a tactical activity with a focus on defeating an opponent. This defeat can be achieved in numerous ways and with lethal and non-lethal means, but the focus is clear. Conversely, competition is about thinking strategically with a focus on gaining access and influence in order to preserve and advance a national interest, while shaping the adversary’s behavior to our advantage. This can also be accomplished through lethal and non-lethal means but the objective is fundamentally different from defeating the adversary. Again, the logic of finite and infinite games come to mind. In a finite game, the rules and the players are known and the game has a defined conclusion. In an infinite game, some players – and even rules – may be unknown and the conditions for conclusion are illdefined. If conflict is about eliminating the enemy, competition is about understanding them. One does not win at competition, one wins by remaining competitive. What success means now becomes contingent on what type of game one is playing. If competition is an infinite game, conflict is a finite one.

With these two distinctions now understood, each can be treated as a set of questions policy makers should be asking. Is the objective to react or anticipate? Are we under a condition of conflict or competition? By combining these two questions, we come up with four possible future scenarios in which SOF can operate. Each of these quadrants could be treated as scenarios and fully developed into a forecasting framework, which we intend to do elsewhere. For the purpose of this brief however, we focus on how SOF position itself within the scenario most closely associated with conditions of strategic competition: the “maintaining the peace” quadrant (I).

Quadrant I combines anticipation and a focus on competition. In this quadrant, one enjoys the initiative and sets the agenda, choosing where to engage, how and to what degree. SOF can be employed to better understand the strategic and operational environment, sense adversaries, and develop influence. Doing so, one is influencing their adversary’s incentives and exploiting conditions to best defend their interests in ways that advance their interests. Under this scenario, CANSOF contributed to greater strategic awareness through a wide range of sensing and shielding capabilities and provides both kinetic and non-kinetic means through which Canadian intent and red lines can be signaled to the country’s opponents.

At the other end of the spectrum, quadrant III (called losing the war) combines reaction and conflict. In this scenario, CANSOF is used to react to an adversary’s actions against Canadian strategic interests. CANSOF is not setting the agenda nor deterring attacks, solely responding and potentially defeating the adversary from one conflict to the other. Under this scenario, CANSOF doubles down on the tactical use of kinetic capabilities, but the potential for strategic effect is reduced and conditions are set to lose the war. 

When comparing these two scenarios, it becomes obvious that the focus on direct action that was once CANSOF raison d’être becomes less central. This is not to say the kinetic or lethal activities are ignored, but they are far from the sole focus. Rather, under quadrant I (maintaining the peace) , CANSOF moves its attention to phase zero of military operations: shaping the environment. The emphasis shifts towards keeping CANSOF in the strategic game, as opposed to winning a specific battle. By remaining competitive and shaping the environment, the risk of armed conflict is diminished and the need to react is reduced.  

Implications for CANSOFCOM

How can CANSOFCOM shift from a reactive mindset focused on tactical conflict to one that anticipates challenges in a threat environment dominated by strategic competition? What does such a shift look like? As with the logic of the infinite game, the objective in quadrant I is not to win, but to remain relevant and continue to compete. Doing so requires a greater ability to sense and signal. It also implies moving away from an overwhelming focus on direct action toward a more comprehensive understanding of the operating environment. Direct action will certainly remain a defining element of SOF, but the diversity of effects SOF will be asked to generate as part of the joint force and the joint fight will be broader than that. This will include a reemphasis on special warfare, strategic reconnaissance, and resistance warfare, as well as greater capabilities dedicated to both sensing the environment to develop a better understanding of the adversary, and shielding across domains from a more capable and sophisticated opponent. Figure 2 offers a conceptualization of SOF employment within the ‘maintaining the peace’ quadrant. As the figure outlines, CANSOFCOM should be primarily oriented towards anticipatory functions that are critical to shape the environment 

Military assistance and capacity building programs are excellent examples of activities already conducted by CANSOF that could be leveraged toward more strategic sensing and signaling roles. Establishing and maintaining select partnerships helps build local capacity, but can also enable CANSOF to position itself advantageously in relation to adversaries. From a strategic sensing perspective, prepositioning small rotating teams in regions of interest can help develop greater understanding of regional dynamics, detect emerging patterns that can help prevent destabilization and escalation, and maintaining the peace without tipping or indeed tripping into the conflict space where one loses the initiative and must resort to reacting. CANSOFCOM could also leverage these partnerships and capacity building activities as a signaling function to competitors and potential opponents by demonstrating capability, having a stake in the game by putting soldiers in harm’s way, and making clear the results through an alignment of security interests among partner nations.

To be clear, this functional framework does not relegate the kinetic and lethal competencies that SOF enjoy to the sidelines, but it does deemphasize it. As mentioned earlier, CANSOFCOM will likely retain a strategic response function in support to CAF and other government organizations and agencies. Strategic response should not be equated nor hold the monopoly over the use of lethal force or other kinetic means. Indeed, strategic signaling can be achieved through the use of kinetic capabilities: the limited use of force can demonstrate resolve and force an opponent to reassess its position and actions. Like any use of lethal force, it should remain one of last resort and in order to optimize SOF employment for great power competition, CANSOF needs to think in increasingly indirect terms. In short, they need to keep the fight asymmetric. Ultimately, CANSOF will be more than Canada’s finest and most lethal weapon in response a national security incident or an attack against the country’s strategic interests. It will be a key partner in the joint fight against peer competitor, shaping the environment while supporting and enabling conventional forces and partner agencies.

 Gaëlle Rivard Piché is a Strategic Analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada and is embedded with CANSOFCOM. She has researched and published extensively on security sector reform, Latin American, the Arctic, Canadian foreign policy, and defence planning.

H. Christian Breede is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Deputy Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy. He has researched and published on the topics of military culture and security policy analysis.

End Notes:

[i] We use this term rather than the more normatively laden “global war on terror”, first coined by journalist Jason Burke 9/11 Wars. New York: Penguin, 2011.

[ii] Russell A. Burgos. “Pushing the Easy Button: Special Operations Forces, International Security, and the Use of Force” Special Operations Journal 4 (2018), 109-128.

[iii] Bernd Horn, John de B. Taillon, and David Last, eds. Force of Choice (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004). See also Christian Leuprecht and H. Christian Breede, Beyond the Movies: The Value Proposition of Canada’s Special Operations Forces (Ottawa; Conference of Defence Associations Institute and MacDonald Laurier Institute, December 2016), see also Erin Yantzi, “Initial Insights: Understanding Canada’s Special Operations Forces” WIIS Canada (poster, 2020) online at https://wiiscanada.org/research-posters

[iv] Summary of the National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018 1; Uri Freedman, “The New Concept Everyone In Washington is Talking About”, The Atlantic (6 Aug 19), at https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/what-genesis-great-power-competition/595405/, accessed October 26, 2020, and Ali Wyne, “Need to Think More Clearly About Great Power Competition” Rand Corporation (11 Feb 19), at https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/02/the-need-to-think-more-clearly-about-great-power-competition.html, accessed October 26, 2020.

[v] Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari “The Rise of SOF” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2016) 21, see also H. Christian Breede “Special (Peace) Operations” International Journal 73, no. 2, (2018) 2.

[vi] Beyond the Horizon: A Strategy for Canada’s Special Operations Forces in an Evolving Security Environment Ottawa: Department of National Defence 2020

[vii] Beyond the Horizon: A Strategy for Canada’s Special Operations Forces in an Evolving Security Environment Ottawa: Department of National Defence 2020, 8

[viii] Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Standing on Guard: Canadian Strategic Interest in a Competing International Order, Canadian Defence Associations Institute, April 2021; David Vigneault, “Remarks by Director David Vigneault to the Centre for International Governance Innovation.” Center for International Governance Innovation, February 9, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/news/2021/02/remarks-by-director-david-vigneault-to-the-centre-for-international-governance-innovation.html 

[ix] Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari “The Rise of SOF” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2016) 21, see also H. Christian Breede “Special (Peace) Operations” International Journal 73, no. 2, (2018), 22.

[x] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 29.

[xi] David Kilcullen The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 247

[xii] While the concept of finite and infinite games is popularly attributed to Simon Sinek’s The Infinite Game (New York: Portfolio, 2019), the term is originates from James Carse, Finite and Infinte Games: A Vision of Play and Possibility (New York: Free Press, 2013)

[xiii] The ability to anticipate in order to seize and maintain initiative is at the heart of most military doctrines around the world. Notwithstanding this, reminders are always useful.

Authors:

Published: June 14, 2021