Introduction

Recent defence policies, punditry, media attention as well as profound changes to the climate have raised the profile of the Arctic region in the minds of Canadians. Talk of potential stocks of natural resources, new avenues for shipping, and even tourism have brought renewed attention to this important region from not just the government of Canada, but others as well.

Coupled with this renewed attention is the return of what many now call great power competition. China, Russia, and the United States are now competing to set the agenda for the coming decades. While the United States enjoyed a position of leadership and indeed dominance in this regard since the end of the Cold War, this position is now being challenged by China most notably, but also by Russia.

Canada, as an Arctic nation, but also a middle power, is now squarely in the middle of this competition, in particular with Russia. While much has been written and discussed about Canada’s geostrategic position, options, and need for a strategy, equally important is how a strategy – any strategy – might be implemented and what challenges any such strategy might face. In short, what are the planning and leadership considerations – what is often referred to as the operational art – for Arctic security?

This policy brief will begin by examining the Arctic environment as both a condition and a region. With this in mind, the brief will then frame our analysis around the idea of the operational art, identifying a set of security planning and leadership considerations that will be applied to the Arctic as both a region and condition.

Background

The Arctic is both a region and a condition.[i] It is a region in that the Arctic is a specific geographical location, consisting of the space above 66.5 degrees North latitude on Earth. This space includes land, waterways, and airspace, and due to its location on the planet, presents some unique conditions.

As a condition, the Arctic possess a set of unique variables. First, it is cold. Indeed, it presents the coldest sustained condition on Earth with temperatures frequently falling below -40 degrees (Fahrenheit or Celsius – they are one and the same at that level of cold). The cold also creates a second condition – snow which can accumulate quickly and not only reduce visibility, but also mobility. The Arctic is also mountainous, offering challenges related to altitude through reduced air pressure and oxygen content, as well as terrain unevenness. Finally, the high latitudes of the Arctic also pose unique communications, surveillance, and navigation challenges as most space-based assets are optimized for operations at lower latitudes.

The Arctic also has particular actors, including not just countries but non- and sub-state actors as well. China and Russia are two key state-level competitors in the Arctic that not only have a desire for influence but are also demonstrating increasing capability.[ii] There are others as well, including non-state actors such as multinational corporations who, while not exactly competitors, certainly share motivations for influence that are not simply security related. Sub-state actors such as local communities, which includes indigenous people, are also seeking to influence who is doing what in the Arctic as this space is indeed their home and one that is of greater salience than for those in the South who are frequently making the decisions.

 Despite these challenges, geopolitical and environmental realties dictate that circumpolar states such as Canada and the United States need to be prepared to operate in this region under these conditions. As a former Prime Minister of Canada once said, “the first principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose it.”[iii] The ability of a state to ‘use it’ demands not just unique strategies, but unique planning considerations as well.

In January of 2021, the United States Army released Regaining Arctic Dominance (RAD). This document, while billed as a strategy, is very much focused on matters that connect strategy with tactics: otherwise often referred to as the operational level. This document presents what it calls the Army’s “arctic path”[iv] which includes commitments to improve existing capabilities, infrastructure, readiness, procurement, force projection, cooperation, and quality of life for those deployed to the region.[v] In short, the document is broad in its scope and ambitious in its pledge to indeed regain dominance. This breadth, however, comes at a cost of depth and this policy brief aims to fill that gap by offering a slightly more focused, operational level, set of considerations for any military considering the delivery of effects in the region North of 60. Moreover, RAD is notable in that Canada has no such analogue.

Framework and Analysis

The term operational art is not without confusion or controversy. Often conflated with the operational level of war as a via media between strategy and tactics,[vi] the operational art is in fact something entirely different.[vii] In order to fully unpack the concept of operational art, this section begins with a brief definition of what constitutes the operational level. In order to do so, we turn away from theory and instead look at how doctrine in both Canada and the United States has variously defined the term and we find, unsurprisingly, significant overlap in terms of what the operational level means. In both the Canadian and United States context, the operational level of war is an amorphous level at which strategic objectives are translated into tactical activities.[viii]

While early discussions on the operational level suggest specific force sizes, more recent efforts indicate a move away from such rigid thinking. This is most clearly articulated in the Canadian definition, which states simply that “a military force tasked to achieve a strategic objective, is being employed at the operational level.”[ix] Rather than claiming the operational level exists somewhere between division- and corps-level (in the order of some ten to forty thousand soldiers), this perspective allows for a more flexible, role-based distinction that is altogether more helpful. What becomes clear through the definitions is that the operational level is focused on the sustainment and sequencing of units and their actions within the battlespace. How this is achieved is the essence of the operational art. [x]

Within Canadian doctrine, the operational art is defined as the “skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives” and this is achieved through the “the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.”[xi] In the United States, this same concept is held as a “cognitive approach” that leaders and planners employ in order to “integrat[e] ends, ways, and means” so as to “mitigate ambiguity and uncertainty … and develop insight into the problems at hand.”[xii] This detailed definition from the United States suggests that not only is the operational art a skill to be learned, but that it is also fundamentally concerned with anticipating what will need to be done in addition to what is being done at a particular moment.

As Lawrence Doane astutely noted, the operational level is really just scaled up tactics while the operational art is a form of scaled-down strategy.[xiii] In his 2015 critique, he argued that as a level of war, the operational level simply implied a particular size or composition of organization rather than something that demanded a unique way of thinking.[xiv] However, he argued, the idea of the operational art was much more useful as this can occur at any point where strategy meets tactics.[xv] With this in mind, we are using the concept of the operational ‘art’ rather than ‘level’ to assess how the Arctic may demand unique planning considerations. Based on the definitions offered above, an operational art framework is composed of three factors to include sequencing, anticipating, and sustaining. What does an operational art look like for the Arctic?

Sustaining

The first factor – sustaining – has implications for both institutions and infrastructure. In terms of institutions, militaries that are considering Arctic engagement need to ensure that they are procuring the right equipment. While the United States Army’s RAD speaks to the importance of equipment, this requirement in particular means considering conditions at the tails of the bell curve. Recent procurement decisions such as the increasing reliance on wheeled vehicles such as LAV 6.0, Stryker, TAPV and indeed legacy operational procurement of MRAPs all illustrate this approach to procuring vehicles based on the most likely operational environment. Wheeled vehicles such as these are ill-suited to the conditions found in the Arctic, in particular the deep snow. Tracked systems, like the TLAV or BV206 fare far better under such conditions.

            In terms of the infrastructure requirements, the Arctic poses similar challenges. Any physical plant requires additional design considerations due to extreme temperature changes as well as the presence of permafrost. Moreover, planners need to assess the relative costs and benefits of maintaining physical plants as potentially turnkey capable or simply falling onto previously occupied infrastructure and modifying it to suit the episodic needs of the force.

CAF presence in Canada’s Arctic has indeed been episodic, based around the concept of surging capabilities as needed for short periods of time. This is the result of two seemingly unrelated factors. First, the episodic presence is the result of an increased general cost of living when compared to Southern regions. Put simply, it is expensive to post CAF and DND personnel to Canada’s Arctic. A second factor is the CAF career management system which sees officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, rotated in and out of positions at intervals of 18 to 24 months as promotion implies the occupation of a new role and the current system values breadth of experience. Staying too long in a single position can hurt chances at future promotions. The combination of cost of living and frequent postings – especially within leadership positions – combine to create episodic presence.

Anticipating

Anticipating, as the second factor of the operational art, has both tactical and safety components. In terms of tactics – to include training for tactics – planners must understand that everything is slower in the North. Whether a cross-country movement or the mounting of an activity, extra time needs to be allocated to account for changes in weather, the verification of life-saving equipment, and simply the added efforts incurred by moving in cold weather. Indeed, many areas are simply inaccessible without air assets and these are very much beholden to the ever-changing weather. At the most tactical levels, certain skills are required such as snow shoeing, operation of snowmobiles, and cross-country skiing, in order to simply allow the force to move. Like skating for a hockey player, these skills need to be developed and practiced by units operating in Canada’s North: time and resources need to be allocated in advance to prepare units.

The Arctic conditions also demand unique maintenance requirements, such as bespoke fluids, from those employed in more temperate conditions. Such fluids need to be procured and time needs to be set aside for ensuring vehicles are properly prepared for sustained operations in the extreme cold of the Arctic. Hydraulic systems that are not prepared for extreme cold will freeze, as will lubricants or even fuel. These requirements need to be anticipated prior to deployment in Arctic regions.

Sequencing

The last factor – that of sequencing – relates closely to the factor of anticipation. However, when it comes to sequencing, the Arctic also demands specific planning considerations once units have arrived. Given the episodic nature of CAF Arctic capability, reception, staging, on-ward movement (RSOMI), and integration of units surging into the region is another major anticipatory consideration. However, these efforts need to be centrally coordinated to include joint requirements as air, sea, and land capability need to be integrated at the lowest levels. Indeed, RSOMI needs to reflect this jointness. Ineffective RSOMI will simply turn arriving forces into liabilities rather than enablers.

For most units in the CAF and United States Military, the Arctic is a foreign environment which means that the operational risks are elevated. Just as in operations, aviation (meaning helicopters) are a lifeline to units for training as well. Safety considerations – considerations that will retain the forces’ ability to add value rather than liability, revolves around understanding the way in which weather and latitude reduce the effectiveness of communications, and even the electronics themselves. Again, anticipating these challenges prior to deployment and verifying the readiness as part of an RSOMI process are vital.

Recommendation

 The Arctic demands unique planning considerations. The application of the operational art and subsequent deduction of sequencing, anticipating, and sustaining factors help reveal several meaningful recommendations. First forces aiming to deploy to the Arctic need to conduct meaningful high-readiness training to include routine development and maintenance of individual soldier skills unique to the condition. In short, focus needs to shift from an assumed Middle East or European theatre of operations to the Arctic region typified by extreme cold, snow, and high latitudes. Moreover, this high-readiness training must be joint as no single element can operate and dominate without the other. Air, land, and sea assets are required to interoperate at the lowest levels and not just for tactical reasons, but safety reasons as well. High-readiness gateway training, similar to that which is conducted at the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre (CMTC) in Wainwright, AB could be replicated in the Arctic region for the Arctic condition.

            In addition, procurement needs to account for the Arctic conditions. Not only in terms of large capital investments such as new armoured vehicles, aircraft, or ships, but also in terms of sustainment and maintenance capabilities such as clothing, parts, lubricants, and fuel. The Arctic conditions cannot be an add-on requirement or afterthought, but rather needs to be part of the original statement of requirements.

            Lastly, militaries need to ensure that leadership exercises patience when working in the Arctic. The dynamic weather, the harsh climate, and the limitations of latitude demand flexibility in both thinking and time management. Related to this is the importance of developing and sustaining Arctic understanding among military leaders, and this may demand a new form of talent management that enables individual to build – through increased time in Arctic positions – genuine understanding of the challenges associated with living and working in Canada’s far North. The path to Arctic dominance needs to be a deliberate one and leaders can start by building a cold weather culture based around the factors of sustaining, anticipating, and sequencing.

Craig Aitchison is a career Canadian Army Officer who most recently spent two years as the Deputy Commanding General for Operations in U.S. Army Alaska. He is presently the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, and therefore responsible for the Canadian Forces Common Professional Development of the Profession of Arms.

H. Christian Breede is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Deputy Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy. He has researched and published on the topics of military culture and security policy analysis.

End Notes:

[i] Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance: The US Army in the Arctic, Washington: Department of the Army, 19 January 2021

[ii] Chris Bott, “Responding to Russia’s Northern Fleet” Proceedings 147, no. 3 (2021), see also Gisela Grieger, ”China’s Arctic Policy” European Parliament Briefing (May 2018)

[iii] This quotation is attributed to Stephen Harper. Peter Sheldon and Terry Milewski. “Arctic sovereignty a priority: Harper” CBC News · Posted: Aug 23, 2010 11:15 AM ET https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/arctic-sovereignty-a-priority-harper-1.951536

[iv] Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance: The US Army in the Arctic, Washington: Department of the Army, 19 January 2021, 30.

[v] Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance: The US Army in the Arctic, Washington: Department of the Army, 19 January 2021

[vi] John Andreas Olson and Martin van Creveld, “Introduction” in Olson and van Creveld, eds. The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 1-9

[vii] Lawrence M. Doane, “It’s Just Tactics: Why the Operational Level of War is an Unhelpful Fiction and Impedes the Operational Art” Small Wars Journal, 2015, online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/it%E2%80%99s-just-tactics-why-the-operational-level-of-war-is-an-unhelpful-fiction-and-impedes-the-

[viii] B-GJ-005-300, Canadian Forces Operations, 2005, 1-5 and JP-3, Joint Operations, 2018, I-13.

[ix] B-GJ-005-300, Canadian Forces Operations, 2005, 1-5

[x] JP-3, Joint Operations, 2018, I-13

[xi] B-GJ-005-300, Canadian Forces Operations, 2005, GL-7

[xii] JP-3, Joint Operations, 2018, II-3

[xiii] Lawrence M. Doane, “It’s Just Tactics: Why the Operational Level of War is an Unhelpful Fiction and Impedes the Operational Art” Small Wars Journal, 2015, online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/it%E2%80%99s-just-tactics-why-the-operational-level-of-war-is-an-unhelpful-fiction-and-impedes-the-

[xiv] Lawrence M. Doane, “It’s Just Tactics: Why the Operational Level of War is an Unhelpful Fiction and Impedes the Operational Art” Small Wars Journal, 2015 online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/it%E2%80%99s-just-tactics-why-the-operational-level-of-war-is-an-unhelpful-fiction-and-impedes-the-

[xv] Lawrence M. Doane, “It’s Just Tactics: Why the Operational Level of War is an Unhelpful Fiction and Impedes the Operational Art” Small Wars Journal, 2015 online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/it%E2%80%99s-just-tactics-why-the-operational-level-of-war-is-an-unhelpful-fiction-and-impedes-the-

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