While Western military forces have been consumed with counterterrorism and addressing violent extremism since 11 September 2001, global power structures have undergone a significant shift, resulting in challenges to the rules-based international order and the legitimacy of global institutions. During this time, strategic competition has rapidly moved to the forefront of international relations and security affairs.  This level of competition can best be described as “the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, leverage, and advantage necessary to secure their respective interests.”[1]  In addition to the single hegemon becoming a ‘party of three,’ this concept of multipolarity is not limited to these competing powers, but also includes rogue states and non-state entities (such as Al Qaeda, Daesh, or Hezbollah), making the current global situation increasingly complex and uncertain.[2] 

            The current era of strategic competition is largely waged below the threshold of war, as the struggle for access and influence is playing out extensively in the economic, diplomatic, informational, and cyber realms.  These competitive spaces make the realization of national objectives more difficult to achieve, while at the same time, responding to coercive and aggressive activity is more ambiguous than if faced with direct acts of military aggression or engagement. The level of entanglement and compression of the current strategic environment challenges how we define military threats, and more importantly, how we respond to these threats that converge across multiple complex global issues.

            From a military perspective, maintaining strong conventional capabilities is critical for deterrence, and in extremis, to posture for conventional conflict. However, it is generally accepted that very few states desire such a conventional war. Quite simply, the lethality, speed, and technological aspects of the modern battlespace makes an outright war a losing proposition to all sides. 

            Given the complex challenges of the current era of strategic competition, many analysts and strategists recognize the value that Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer and have called for a significant change to SOF’s focus. The proposed shift would see SOF focused less on its traditional tasks (specifically countering terrorism and violent extremism), while moving to better position itself as a military tool to be utilized in the emerging competitive environment. But what is SOF’s role in strategic competition? How does SOF contribute to deterrence? What about the future risk of increasingly capable violent extremist organizations as well as SOF’s enduring crisis response mandates?

As one considers the above questions, it is important to acknowledge that for Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF), the main effort must continue to be national crisis response capability. This requirement is a no fail task and as strategist John Collins stated, “Competent SOF cannot be produced after emergencies occur.”[3] CANSOF maintains very-high readiness, rapidly-deployable SOF that are unique in the realm of military response and offers the Government an essential tool to protect Canadians and Canadian interests at home and abroad. [4]  This mission translates into a finite amount of CANSOF capacity to apply to other emerging national security and national defence challenges.

             It is important to appreciate that terrorism and violent extremism will likely remain a significant global security threat if not managed accordingly. Africa presents a current and relevant example, where violent extremists are waging a savage and ruthless war to impose their ideology, resulting in regional instability with potential global consequences.[5]  Further, the Middle East remains volatile, where in addition to insurgent groups, regional powers often use capable proxies to influence the political landscape. SOF and its expertise in irregular warfare make it ideally suited to deal with many of these situations.[6]  Therefore, SOF forces must maintain counterterrorism (CT) and counter-violent extremism (C-VEO) mandates and capabilities, although arguably the application of SOF in these spaces must evolve beyond recent experiences, to a model of doing more with less (smaller teams with greater authorities). Regardless, core SOF tasks will likely remain extant.[7]

            To effectively compete in the resource constrained, complex environment which exists today, nations will need to employ a whole-of-government, coordinated approach requiring the collaboration of a state’s entire national defence and national security apparatus. Notwithstanding the high demand for SOF forces in its traditional realms, SOF recognize that they will be asked to play a significant role in strategic competition However SOF will likely not be in the lead, but rather in support of larger whole-of-government efforts. SOF’s ability to integrate with military and national security partners will become paramount dependant on its partnerships and operating relationships with Joint Force elements, other governmental departments (OGDs), and allies.  Only by combining capabilities and strengths of the various partnerships can states effectively compete in the current strategic landscape.               

From a Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) perspective, SOF Integration is not a new concept.  In fact, in the Canadian context of operations, there are only three supported commands, namely Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), CANSOFCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).  When CJOC is the designated supported command for an operation, CANSOFCOM provides the necessary ‘supporting’ role.  In essence, CJOC acts as the operational-level lead and provides the Theatre Command function, while CANSOFCOM acts as the Special Operations Component Command (SOCC), which provides SOF expertise for employment, and integrates SOF fully into operational plans by coordinating with, and supporting the operational Commander.  Importantly, CJOC and CANSOFCOM staff meet on a regular basis to ensure both Commands are effectively integrated and provide strategic decision makers with the best possible military advice.

            As another example of SOF integration, CANSOFCOM cannot operate effectively without collaborating with the other Services. [8]  For example, the Navy and Air Force are instrumental in supporting SOF deployment, while the Army can provide capability that is beyond that which exists within CANSOFCOM.  For example, in Iraq, coalition SOF (including CANSOF) forces relied on conventional forces for strategic airlift, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), counter-mortar radar and artillery capabilities to name but a few.   

            CANSOF integration extends beyond our own borders. As a key member of the “Global SOF Network,” an American construct that consists of a globally networked SOF community, CANSOF integrates with interagency actors, allies and partners that are capable of swift response and persistent engagement to address threats to global stability and regional contingencies. Within this construct there are three distinct layers. The first is the “Five-Eyes” framework that consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. This group is a tight, cohesive collective that deals regularly with one another and many of the partners have embeds with the other national SOF entities. Further, members rely on each other for the exchange of information and intelligence to enable operations. Quite simply, Five-Eyes partners have fought and bled together, building the strong relationships that exist today.

            Another layer within the Global SOF Network is North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF. Within this construct, there are 30 partners who work within the NATO structure. For CANSOFCOM this provides access to a myriad of important partnerships and access to their affiliates and capabilities. These partnerships build on a common understanding, interoperability and increased access. Together they demonstrate solidarity and deterrence towards would be aggressors. In sum, NATO SOF provides member nations greater ability to compete in the international forum and work towards stability and security.

            The final layer of the Global SOF Network is the broader relationships developed with partner forces. These are made up of states that require assistance to stave off instability and turmoil. In the Canadian context, this has included countries such as Ukraine or Iraq. Although much of the investment is aimed at developing interoperability and an enduring SOF capability, the fact of the matter is that these partnerships are critical. In essence, military assistance grows partner forces, cultural and regional understanding, access, forward staging hubs and information networks that are enduring in fragile regions. In turn, SOF benefits from the ability to posture for crisis response and influence in regions where strategic competition is underway.

            As CANSOFCOM examines the strategic landscape, it becomes imperative to understand the “competition space” to determine where best CANSOFCOM can fill in the “gaps and seams.” In this vein, although core tasks will remain the same, an evolution of SOF’s role and capabilities is inevitable. Within the new landscape, the ability to “sense” (determine changes within a theatre, confirm events, specifically threats) and “signal” (identify visible and clear demonstration of intent and strength) become critical. As such, the traditional task of special reconnaissance requires careful analysis to ensure it adapts to the new security environment filled with technological and informational hurdles and challenges.

In addition, SOF must also operate within an environment where resources are perpetually limited and constrained. Demand will always exceeds supply.  For this reason, CANSOFCOM continuously analyzes “What is in our national interests?” “What can we offer?” “What do we need to adapt?” and “Where should we deploy to optimize our capabilities to assist achieving national objectives and ensure that we are not redundant?”

            It is undeniable that CANSOFCOM is quickly becoming an important actor in strategic competition due in large part to its agility and its ability to get things done quickly. As a flat organization, its stream-lined command structure allows for swift action and rapid response to all types of national security challenges.[9]  However, in strategic competition, SOF will increasingly rely on its Joint Force, interagency, and global partners, making SOF integration absolutely critical. It is recognized that trust must be built and reinforced over time. As the former commander of the US Special Operations Command, Admiral William McRaven often declared, “You cannot surge trust.” [10] And thus, SOF Integration will increasingly become a vital component of international strategic competition. 

Brigadier General Steven Hunter is the Deputy Commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and former commander of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), BGen Hunter is a recent graduate of the Canadian Forces College National Security Programme and he holds a Master’s in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada.

End Notes

[1] USSOCOM, On Competition: Adapting to the Contemporary Strategic Environment. JSOU Report 21-5 (Tampa: JSOU Press, 2021), xi.

[2] The party of three refers to the long standing United States hegemony being rapidly replaced by a multipolar structure, which includes a revisionist Russia and an emerging China.

[3] https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths. Accessed 30 October 2021.

[4] For more information see https://www.canada.ca/en/special-operations-forces-command.html. Accessed 1 November 2021.

[5] Consequences include (but are not limited to) the establishment of an ideological base for global attacks, large migrations shifts, and challenges to national authority, legitimacy, and governance.

[6] Irregular Warfare (IW) “is characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force.” DoD, Joint Publication 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington D.C.: DoD, 25 March 2013 incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017), x.

[7] Common core NATO SOF tasks are Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance and Military Assistance. Madeleine Moon, NATO Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment (Brussels: Defence and Security Committee, 2018), 2.  In addition, SOF are also responsive to High Value Tasks as requested by government.

 [8] American Colonel (retired) John M. Collins, acting as the under-secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict, wrote the five SOF truths:

1. Humans are more important than hardware;

2. Quality is better than quantity:

3. SOF cannot be mass produced;

4. Competent SOF cannot be rapidly created after emergencies occur; and 

5. Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance. 

[9] A CANSOFCOM team leader (often a junior member) is only two steps removed from Parliament. Specifically, the team leader reports to the Commander CANSOFCOM who reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff who in turn reports to the Minister of National Defence.

[10] Cited in Steven Hoarn, “Admiral William McRaven Praises ‘Fantastic’ Obama, Discusses Afghanistan,” DefenseMediaNetwork, 30 July 2012. Https:// www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/mcraven-praises-fantastic-obama-discusses-afghanistan-and-non-kinetic-sof-operations/, accessed 7 October 2021.

Author:

Brigadier-General Steve Hunter

Deputy Commander, CANSOFCOM

Published: Nov 10, 2021

Listen to the associated podcast