“Standing at an inflection point in history, over the past few years it has become painfully evident that a new era is upon us. From the challenges to the current rules based international system to its potential impacts on partnerships, globalization, and the environment”

Executive Summary

In recent years, it has become painfully evident that a new era is upon us. We stand at an inflection point in history and the challenges to the current rules-based international system and the potential impacts of its downfall on partnerships, globalization, and global operating environments are widespread. From new contests for influence in regions from the Arctic to Europe and across Asia; to the [un]changing character of warfare in major combat operations in Europe to multi-domain operations including land, maritime, air, space, and cyber; across the Indo-Pacific; threats are global. But each focus and friction point offers opportunities for developing new strategies, policies, security measures, and defence capabilities. Considering these challenges, The Kingston Consortium for International Security (KCIS) 2023 Conference was centred on the theme, ‘The [un]Changing Character of War.’ 

The conference identified and analyzed the impacts of recent major shifts in the international security environment and the changing character of war with an emphasis on current flashpoints observed in the Indo-Pacific, Central Europe, as well as the cross-regional impacts on human security posed by a changing threat domain. Panels approached this topic through additional focuses including emerging technology’s impact on hybrid warfare, human security, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) policy considerations. Broad in its scope, this conference brought together scholars and practitioners across the military, government, industry, and academia to spotlight these issues and more that resonates across all domains in this new era.

Challenge to the Conference 

Stéphanie Martel, Director of the Centre for International & Defence Policy (CIDP), challenged the conference to contemplate the underlying causes of conflict and explore ways to mitigate or, preferably, prevent war. Moreover, Martel challenged the conference to contemplate strategies for fostering cooperation among individuals to avert conflicts through the cultivation of relationships and cooperation through institutions. 

Opening Keynote 

Rear-Admiral (Retired) The Hon. Rebecca Patterson, Senator for Ontario, started her keynote remarks with an observation that as long as there have been people, there has been war. The challenge lies in determining how best to include and address human security in an increasingly complex security environment. The United Nations (UN) defines human security as the identification and subsequent response to addressing challenges which threaten the survival, livelihood, and dignity of all people.[1] A means to approach human security as a functional concept is by re imagining both government and military approaches to security discussions wholesale. In thinking about governance rather than government itself in conflict scenarios, a "whole-of-state" approach, inclusive of multiple perspectives and mindful of long-term goals in addition to short term interests is favourable. Long-term governance and sustainable action can often outlast election cycles, making an independent Senate a potential incubator for policy. The character of war and conflict itself, perhaps, is a matter of perception: is the character of war changing, or is the perception of the character of war changing?

Panel 1: Understanding Military Roles and Human (In)Security in War Torn Areas 

This opening panel addressed opportunities and challenges for militaries to formally operationalize a human security framework to increase the efficacy of interventions in the context of complex security environments. The moderator, Sarah-Jane Meharg, Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, identified a particular challenge for this panel of considering how human security can strengthen state security in a complex security operating environment. The panelists discussed how human security considerations are often overlooked in many discussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the need to integrate human security into national security discussions. Political and operational levels of planning must be reconciled to ensure that joint goals are set and achieved. Clare Hutchinson, RedHed Consultancy, highlighted how human security has no commonly recognized or universal definition, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) having one definition and the UN another. There needs to be not only a common definition for human security but also for the term “security” itself.  Regarding human security, Rachel Grimes, NATO ACT, considers it equally important for the military to consider human terrain to develop sufficient policies and implementation processes to ensure human security. David Lambert, Lambert Consulting, focused on how to operationalize human security, identifying the need for a framework to assist militaries with this operationalization and applications for day-to-day operations.  

Panel 2: Evolving Forms of Hybrid Warfare and Below the Threshold Conflict 

This panel examined the nature of international security and conflicts as both changing and unchanging. States continue to be involved in military and economic competitions, armed conflicts still seem inevitable, and strategic competition remains, but now the methods have changed. The means by which these conflicts unfold are no longer uniformly traditional, as they now encompass both conventional and innovative methods, constituting hybrid warfare with adaptative techniques at times occurring below the threshold of conflict. The panel, moderated by Brigadier-General Tod Strickland, Canadian Forces College, approached these implications using both theoretical approaches and real-world applications to discuss hybrid warfare. Marc Ozawa, NATO Defense College, examined Russia’s “total-global” hybrid war. Hybrid warfare has been pervasive in Russian discourse, expanded to a global view and, most recently, to a total, global hybrid war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has not differed from this approach; instead, the intensity and risk associated with it have increased. The NATO and the European Union (EU) response to the Russian hybrid war threat. Dumitru Minzarari, Baltic Defense College, argued that the mechanism to signal a willingness to respond to and resource a response to the threat of Russian hybrid warfare is through policy. This, in turn, creates the challenge of trying to organize an effective response. Marta Kepe, RAND Corporation, highlighted how grey zone and hybrid conflict has evolved in response and the normalization of relations with Russia post-Cold War. Russia continues to conduct some form of Grey Zone and hybrid warfare, and with the current attrition of Russia’s conventional military capability, it will turn increasingly to Grey Zone and hybrid methods moving forward. When considering how we view the world, Howard G. Coombs, CIDP, Royal Military College, argues that conceptual models are necessary tools for shaping understanding of grey zone and conceptual hybrid conflict. One model is the Canadian “Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept,” which considers a competition matrix. This matrix attempts to model the level of coerciveness and persuasiveness of activities in relationship to overt state involvement or varying degrees of a lack of involvement, over time, to increase comprehension of the complex operating environment in which Grey Zone and hybrid activities may occur.

Panel 3: Women, Peace and Security in Conflict Zones 

This panel, moderated by Major-General Denis O’Reily, Canadian Defence Academy, discussed the necessity to integrate gender equity into all levels of conflict planning and management. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) calls for on-the-ground conflict responses to rectify existing gaps in the needs of women and girls in the military planning and operations processes, intervention, and post-conflict situations. This, in turn, promotes a more durable and lasting peace when WPS considerations inform what follows in an operational setting. When considering WPS's NATO institutionalization, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Queen’s University, stated that NATO has sufficient policies, training capabilities, funding, and political engagement of leadership in WPS indicative of broader institutionalization. Lieutenant-Colonel Melanie Lake, Assistant to Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security, highlighted that states each view security through unique lenses and that the universal forum provided by WPS can help with bridging these differences. The four pillars of the UN WPS agenda — participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery —were stressed by Yolande Bouka, Queen’s University. essential in the developing threat posed by the climate crisis and its potential as a threat multiplier in WPS and human security dialogues. Research by Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Royal Military College, and his colleagues, demonstrates how political and cultural polarization of far-right movements which can change analysis and methodology for monitoring far-right extremism in online forums. By further understanding the role of gendered ideology in extremist movements, a more holistic understanding of far-right, militant Islamist, or other dialogues is possible.

Keynote Address (Close of Day 1) 

The end of day keynote was presented by Charlotte McGlade, International Programs, Canadian Red Cross, who called for principled human action focused on preventing and elevating human suffering. She stressed the need for humanitarian agencies and other organizations to be invited by host governments, allies, and partners in conflict zones. Agencies and governments tend to speak past one another or at each other, rather than working cooperatively during and after conflict. Her remarks emphasized the critical significance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent's safeguarded humanitarian zones for their operations, which are anchored in principles of neutrality and impartiality. The defence and security forces and agencies engaging in the safeguarding of this humanitarian space foster collaboration with the Red Cross and Red Crescent. For these interactions to be effective and for the Red Cross and the Red Crescent operations to remain neutral and impartial requires civil-military coordination, an understanding that humanitarian agencies need to be the primary responders, and that potential political bias or favoring cannot influence the equitable dispersal of humanitarian aid. 

Opening Keynote (Opening of Day 2)

The second day started with a keynote by Brigadier-General John W. Errington, Strategic Joint Staff, Canadian Armed Forces, who posited that Western intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti during the 21st century, involving a significant and prolonged presence, resulted in state collapse rather than contributing to state and international security and stability. They proposed two potential paths for the future: either assuming responsibility for a failing state's security or assisting the state in handling its own security challenges. The key idea is that the host nation should retain control over the methods and goals of its own peace and security, with support from friendly states, which may include providing resources while allowing the host nation to determine its own course.

Panel 4: Strategic Insights and Observations from the Ukraine-Russia War

This virtual panel provided real-time insights from the United States Army War College (USAWC) strategic research and highlighted prominent issues related to Russia's attack against Ukraine and insights from ground offensives and the military approach observed over one year into the conflict. The panel conducted an analysis of the apparent failure of NATO's deterrence against Russian aggression. NATO's failure to recognize Russia's grand strategy of expansion in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea region, along with Russia's willingness to tolerate high risks and associated costs of warfare, was a significant oversight. Efforts to deter Russia through economic and political sanctions proved ineffective, given that Russian war objectives seem to be primarily driven by the Kremlin's political ambitions rather than military or industrial capabilities. Russian attempts to undermine Ukrainian morale also met with limited success, as Ukraine effectively mobilized its population and garnered resources. Looking ahead, NATO should consider maintaining a military option in negotiations with potential aggressor states, prioritize the establishment of alliances and diplomatic ties, and address the reluctance of member states to economically mobilize and utilize their industrial and operational capacities. Robert Hamilton, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, started the discussion by looking at the development, planning, and adjustment of both Ukraine’s and Russia’s grand strategy, concluding both have undergone significant changes over the course of the previous year. As Russia realigned its goals, strategies, and resources, Ukraine shifted its objectives from mere survival to the recovery of territory lost since 2014. Antulio Echeverria, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, considered what could be learned about deterrence from the Ukraine-Russia War. He noted that the West tends to default to deterrence by punishment to discourage bad behavior rather than the historically more successful deterrence by denial, which does not punish but reduces the possible benefits that an adversary intends to achieve with their actions. A new way forward could be based on NATO’s experience with Ukraine at integrated deterrence through integrated defense, whereby NATO helps close the gaps with local, in country forces. Lastly, John Deni, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, examined allied support to Ukraine focused on European funding and its impact for U.S. strategy. Since the Cold War, U.S. strategy has consistently emphasized the importance of collaborating with allies, beginning with the Clinton administration, recognizing that such cooperation bolsters both domestic and international credibility for the United States. When examining the strategies of U.S. allies in the context of Ukraine's conflict with Russia, many European partners lack a formal strategy, relying instead on a less structured but nonetheless crucial strategic rationale.

Panel 5: Technology and the New Wars 

In the twenty-first century, technological development has reduced the opportunities for war, but emerging technologies have facilitated new forms of conflict. These developments shift our understanding of war's character and its interaction with the state. The moderator, Rebecca Jensen, Royal Danish Defence College, noted that after the topic of Special Operations Forces, emerging technology was the topic of greatest interest in the areas of defense and security. The panel addressed how rapid changes in aerospace technology are moving towards agile and disposable tools, combined with a cyber capacity to obviate some forms of manoeuvre warfare. With the potential number of small-scale and proxy conflicts on the rise, security is needed against tech and aerospace-based threats. New policy needs to be developed to address both combatting these new threats, and the legality of new tools such as Facial Recognition Technology vis-a-vis human rights and human security. Governments may become increasingly dependent on corporate and private sources of capacity, and the need for interconnected networks will demand either a dramatic update to existing policy and tech frameworks, or completely new schemas.

The panel discussion started with Leah West, Carleton University, considering the responsible use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in war and conflict, recognizing the tension between privacy and precaution. There are two main bodies of law to consider when examining this tension,: International Humanitarian Law, which applies during a conflict, and International Human Rights Law, which always applies. Dave Anderson, Mithraic Solutions Inc., considered the character of war, and started his remarks by observing the next war will not be the type of war that the West would want. In addition, there is a restriction on wars of choice, which are pre-emptive war or war of aggression with fabricated or no justification, because they will be both more expensive and more difficult to win. Our biggest challenge is that the West established the rules-based order for the West. Pushback from countries and other actors outside of the West and its established alliances should not be entirely surprising. With respect to technology and new war, Kristen Csenkey, Balsillie School of International Affairs, argued that there is a need to understand emerging technology if we are to understand it’s import and the role these technologies will occupy in our future operational reality. Cooperation and coordination of efforts is essential to tackle the governance of emerging technology through the implementation of regulation and standardization in the growing industry.

According to Colonel Catherine Marchetti, 7 Wing (Space) - 3 Canadian Space Division, Grey Zone warfare is already occurring in the space domain. Addressing this threat requires space domain awareness and surveillance to understand what potential for threats or miscalculation may be and to avoid them if they manifest themselves. It also requires resilience because the initiation of space conflict will likely be a surprise. The ability to quickly replace lost capability will be critical.

Closing Keynote 

The conference’s closing keynote was presented by General Wayne Eyre, Chief of Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces, who believes the character of war is changing. The threat is real, and the rules- based international order is under threat. The last thirty years of the unipolar world order are now over. Russia and China pose a geopolitical threat, and we are challenged to understand their ultimate motives and intentions. Climate change domestically challenges defense readiness, drives human migration internationally, and will serve as a threat multiplier to all other ongoing tensions and conflicts. This is compounded by technology that is disrupting societal cohesion, while at the same time, technology is evolving rapidly and often with China maintaining a developmental advantage. Although the nature of war remains the same, its character is in a period of change, meaning we cannot hold on to the status quo. We need to adapt, and we need to be less risk -adverse and more creative in the face of unprecedented global shifts.

Conclusion 

Several participants, including General Wayne Eyre, quoted Clausewitz, as a philosopher of conflict at various points during the conference, particularly concerning the nature of war. Clausewitz viewed the nature of war, if left to its own devices, as pure absolute violence; it is the purpose of war, not its nature that makes it an act of policy. In turn, policy influences operations to the degree that war’s violent nature will allow.[2] War, therefore, is not an autonomous act of violence but rather an instrument of policy. The way wars vary,, their character,, changes based on their motives and causes.[3] War evolves, adapting its characteristics to each new conflict.[4] For Clausewitz, the predominating tendencies or nature of war are; violence, hatred, and enmity, concerned with the people engaged in war; followed by probability and chance, which are the concern of armies and commanders. Lastly, the subordination of war to politics and policy, the concern of government.[5] War’s nature is violent, interactive between opposing wills, and driven by politics. Its character is constantly changing. As warfare evolves and becomes increasingly complex, it is essential to critically examine and adapt an understanding of the evolving character of war to ensure that international actions are relevant and timely.

In this context, the Kingston Consortium on International Security Conference, titled "The (Un)Changing Character of War" in September 2023, shed light on how governments and military forces can effectively address human security. This depends on various factors, including the nature of war, the causes and motives behind each new conflict. During the conference panels, it became evident that determining whether an action represents Grey Zone or Hybrid warfare is closely tied to its relationship with the overall concept of war. The prevailing trends in warfare significantly influence the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The Ukraine-Russia War possesses its distinct character, sharing similarities with past conflicts while also exhibiting unique features. In the 21st century, the landscape of war is continuously molded by modern and evolving technologies. Although the fundamental nature of war, marked by violence, hatred, and enmity, remains constant;, its tendencies, disposition, and character are in a constant state of flux, thereby shaping policy and influencing the methods and outcomes of war.

End Notes:

[1] United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, Security Council Resolution 632, 10 September 2012 (New York: United Nations, 2012).

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

[3] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

[4] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 18; and Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11.

[5] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89 and Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 18.