Speakers
Home / Conference / KCIS 2022 / J.P. Clark
Colonel J.P. Clark
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Colonel J.P. Clark is a Professor, Army War College (Functional Area 47W) in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations and the editor-in-chief of War Room, the Army War College’s on-line journal. Prior to joining the faculty, he was the chief of the Strategy Division within the Army G-3/5/7 (DAMO-SSP). In that capacity, he was responsible for the development of the 2021 U.S. Army Arctic Strategy, Regaining Arctic Dominance. He was also the Army’s lead representative to the 2022 National Defense Strategy Core Development Team and the National Military Strategy Working Group.
Colonel Clark was commissioned as an armor officer in 1997. He served in tank battalions at Ft. Stewart, Georgia, and in the Republic of Korea. In 2006, he transferred to what was then known as the Strategic Plans and Policy (FA59) career field. Since then, Colonel Clark has served as an instructor and assistant professor at West Point, the executive officer to the commanding general of United States Division-North in Iraq, the military assistant for strategy to the Secretary of the Army, an exchange officer in the initiatives group of the British Chief of the General Staff, the chief of the Joint Concepts Branch at what was then known as the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). There he served as the lead author for The Army in Multi-Domain Operations, the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum. He then served a year as the director for National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. During that time, he co-led a study that was published by the Army War College Press, Striking the Balance: US Army Force Posture in Europe, 2028.
COL Clark holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in history from Duke University, an M.S.S. from the Army War College, and a B.S. in Russian and German from the U.S. Military Academy. He is the author of Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917 published by Harvard University Press in 2017. He is currently working on a history of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific from 1898 to 1941.
Conference Abstract
Insights from the US Army Arctic Strategy and Wargame
As the chief of the Strategy Division, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Colonel J.P. Clark was responsible for the development of the U.S. Army Arctic Strategy, Regaining Arctic Dominance. He subsequently was the primary sponsor for a service-wide wargame designed to further refine and shape implementation of the Army Arctic Strategy. In this presentation, Colonel Clark highlights the major lessons derived from the strategy development and wargame. At the tactical level, the major finding is the order of magnitude difference in tactical effectiveness between forces who are specifically trained, equipped, and organized for the Arctic as opposed to even high-quality units that lack such optimization. At the operational level, the major finding is that operations in the Arctic have a unique dynamic produced by a combination of low force density, logistics constraints, and the peculiarity of command and control at high latitudes. This unique dynamic places a high premium on investments prior to conflict, though also requires a disproportionately high cost for expeditionary operations. These factors create a unique Arctic dilemma for defense leaders in an era of declining defense budgets and force structure. Effective Arctic forces and operations require investments specific to the region that do not easily carryover, but at the same time it is difficult for an Arctic country to forego the ability to at least operate in a critical and vulnerable part of its sovereign territory.
