Introduction

The annual Kingston Consortium on International Security (KCIS) Annual Conference returned to Kingston 11-13 October 2022 as an in-person event, bringing together a varied group of practitioners and academics with expertise across the Arctic and wider security fields. International Competition in the High North explored how great power competition at the international level is affecting the regional security of the Arctic, and how these two levels of analysis interacted with one another.[1]

The KCIS, a partnership between the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, and NATO Defense College, is a staple of the security and defence community, each year exploring important defence and security themes. This year’s theme is timely given the renewal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, derailing its chairmanship of the Arctic Council – the region’s premier multilateral forum – with proceedings offering significant insights to security policymakers, practitioners, and academics. Could the international security architecture, being undermined in one part of the world, be preserved elsewhere?

Conference hosts Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Brigadier General (BG) Janeen Birckhead (US Army) challenged participants to imagine a secure and sustainable North during a time of great power competition.[2] The Arctic offered not just the challenge of increasing international tensions, but the opportunity to learn from the past to strike a better balance across the depth and breadth of security for the region.[3] BG Birckhead suggested  participants focus their attention on human and environmental security in particular. She posed the question, “Can we defy the patterns of history” to create an Arctic that would remain a “zone of peace” rather than become one of conflict? [4]

KCIS 2022: Key Insights

• Great power actions elsewhere have created uncertainty surrounding the Arctic’s future. The Arctic is the first place to reengage with Russia in a spirit of functionalism.

• “Arctic Dilemma” – Arctic defence investments cost more than elsewhere and are often specific to the region, disproportionately taking from defence concerns elsewhere.

• The nexus between great power competition and Arctic security is “dual use” activities in the region – the military/civil fusion of scientific research that lacks transparency and thus trust. “Dual use” defence investment is an enabler for both security and Northern prosperity – each reinforcing the other.

• “Track II” diplomacy through Indigenous people and scientific research offers a promising method to enact Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to help stabilize the region in the coming years. Negotiation specialist Diana Chigas defines Track II diplomacies as "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict." The United Nations defines CBM as “planned procedures to prevent hostilities, to avert escalation, to reduce military tension, and to build mutual trust between countries.”[5]

• Increased community resiliency empowers Northerners and fosters trust, security, and prosperity. [6]

Conference Proceedings

Panel 1: International Security Challenges in the North examined how renewed strategic competition is changing the Arctic as a region, and how it fits into the larger global security context. Panelists Dr. Will Greaves (University of Victoria), Dr. Michele Devlin (US Army War College), and Dr. James Morton (University of Alaska – Fairbanks) explored how international drivers such as climate change were reaching down through the levels of analysis to affect the human security of Northerners. Despite these security challenges, Northerners were being presented with new economic development opportunities to seize and a chance to build the infrastructure that has largely eluded their communities.

The panelists agreed that climate change and the invasion of Ukraine were changing the relationship between Northerners and the larger global community. Dr. Greaves argued that the regional security regime had fragmented, with cooperation shifting down to the various sub-regional mechanisms that comprise the Arctic. This is being complicated by climate change moving people towards the poles where they would increasingly interact with indigenous populations – something Dr. Devlin suggested could lead to new civilian/military relationships. Indigenous populations have a lot of political power, Dr. Morton observed, arguing that it should be applied to driving new infrastructure spending in the North. Southerners should work towards reconciling the historic trauma indigenous peoples have suffered going forward., such as respecting their cultural autonomy.[7]

Discussion focused on how indigenous peoples across the North could contribute toward Arctic security through “true partnerships” with the South. This is central to “doing better” in the North and would require savvy governments and corporations with which to partner. Existing Indigenous regional arrangements through the Arctic Council had been hurt by Russian actions in Ukraine. Barring a Russian regime change, discussants argued that Indigenous (Track II) diplomacies established through these partnerships offered a promising vector to help stabilize the region politically over the coming years.

Panel 2: The Great Powers in the High North focused on how these actors were driving relations in and across the Arctic. Dr. Kathryn Friedman and Ms. Lori Leffler (Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies), Camilla Tenna Nørup Sorensen (Forvaret), and Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) looked at how Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine had “paused” the Arctic Council and brought NATO and NORAD to the forefront of discussions surrounding the stability of the region. If the previous panel had highlighted climate change as a driver, this panel noted the effect rapidly advancing technologies are having on the Arctic.[8] Dr. Sorensen discussed China’s approach to the Arctic with its goals of strengthening its research there, and ensuring access to energy, minerals, and shipping lanes. She observed that China is meeting increasing headwinds with these goals as its actions elsewhere clash with Arctic norms and practices but is finding increasing success with a weakened Russia. Friedman and Leffler argued that the US is responding with new strategies rooted in soft power, but backed up with hard power through a modernizing NORAD and an increasingly active NATO in the region. Dr. Piché noted that the nexus of this great power interaction is “dual use” activities in the region – the  military/civil fusion of scientific research that lacked transparency and thus generated distrust. This view of dual use activities illustrates how a positive action may be viewed negatively by adversaries.

The panelists observed that with the exception of Russia, no single country can “go it alone” in the Arctic. They noted that North American defence is behind in the Arctic – there are plenty of pieces but nothing coherently organized – and that there is momentum for a combined American / Canadian strategy. Canada’s attempts to build a joint awareness capability across the Arctic is a major contribution to this bilateral relationship,  but there is an implied requirement for the federal government to share this data and supporting infrastructure with Northern Canadians. Ultimately, discussants argued two things: that China’s focus remains in Asia – not the Arctic – but that the Arctic is the first place to reengage with Russia in a spirit of functionalism.[9]

Brig. Gen. Derek O’Malley (USAF) presented a keynote address on NORAD modernization.[10] He emphasized that a new range of threats to North America demanded the development of a deterrence by denial capability to complement the historic reliance placed on deterrence by punishment provided by American nuclear weapons. A new generation of sensors granting All Domain Awareness would provide “information dominance,” feeding vast amounts of data via new communications infrastructure to Joint Command and Control (C2) systems. New machine learning (AI) would ingest this data, granting more time and options to authorities – creating “decision-making superiority” to policymakers if something afoot is detected. This system would be globally integrated across all the American combatant commands, creating a Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) capability with the aim of deterring, denying, and if necessary defeating threats to North America. All this would need to be supported by new infrastructure across the North to power these sensors and connect them to C2 systems.[11]

Panel 3: Defence Capabilities in North America and the Arctic expanded upon and beyond NORAD modernization. Dr. Andrea Charron (University of Manitoba), Dr. Joseph Corriveau (USACE Cold Regions Research Engineering Lab), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Captain Jacob French of Joint Task Force North (JTFN), and Colonel J.P. Clark (G3 Arctic Game Project/US Army War College) focused their discussions at the intersection of climate change and technological development, noting how melting permafrost is presenting new challenges to defence infrastructure, and how the cold causes significant costs on generating forces that can effectively operate in the region. The panel emphasized that hard decisions had to be made about what is really needed, and how best to address acute threats.[12]

Dr. Charron noted that USNORTHCOM/NORAD is evolving away from relying solely on deterrence by punishment to meet new threats, attempting to generate a deterrence by denial capability. This would require new infrastructure to obtain and transmit data between it and other military commands. Given financial and political concerns, appropriate data and infrastructure sharing between militaries and Northerners is essential to securing support for modernizing NORAD. She concluded that NORAD had to redefine its relationship with other commands and allies.

Dr. Charron explained that NORAD modernization in the Arctic – especially retrofitting and/or replacing its current sensors – went far beyond just upgrading the Northern Warning System (NWS). Russia is forcing cooperation between allies and NORAD needs to work out how it will interact with the other American combatant commands it abuts as well as with NATO across the North Atlantic. Much of this interaction is based around the sharing of data a modernized NORAD will collect and analysis. Despite this bigger NORAD, Charron emphasized that its focus is still on North America’s “10 to 2 o’clock” – the Arctic. And this means tying into Northern communities so that NORAD can benefit from their observations across the region. However panelists made clear that the building of this NORAD infrastructure cannot place too great a stress on communities and the sharing of its information must benefit Northerners as well.

Capt. French argued that JTFN needed to place its efforts where conventional and unconventional threats overlap “below the threshold.” He admitted that JTFN is weak in sharing domain information with allies but that its annual Operation NANOOK is a good start to closing collaborative gaps and seams between it and its partners.[13]

COL Clark presented on building U.S. Army capability in the Arctic and the  “Arctic dilemma” that constrains responses to geopolitical uncertainty in the region. He noted that the region presented an “Arctic Dilemma” where land forces with more than basic capabilities needed to be specialized to the environment and were thus niche in application and expensive to generate. Whilst generating these forces would be hard in a time of austere budgets, they could be necessary for preserving state sovereignty in the region. Clark emphasized that these Arctic defences must be in place before a conflict were to breakout to be useful. Discussions made clear that efforts to generate military presence in the Arctic and build infrastructure there in a timely manner overlap NORAD modernization efforts. COL Clark presented the dilemma specifically in regards to generating an Arctic land force capability beyond simple presence and defence, but the Arctic imposes significant costs compared to other environments. Dr. Sarson agreed, noting that civilian infrastructure is two and a half times more expensive to build in the Arctic than in the South. In the case of either force generation or building infrastructure, there is less margin for error due to significant costs associated each. Moreover, what works in one part of the Arctic might not be appropriate for another. In many cases, the Arctic requires specialized forces and infrastructure with disproportionate costs, making things difficult in a time of austere budgets and growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Dr. Corriveau explored the theme of Arctic specialization and expense who explained that permafrost made things hard for engineers to build supporting infrastructure but that there is a rich background in cold research to draw upon to alleviate this constraint going forward.

Discussion centered on whether the expense of operating in the Arctic would erode the political will to act there. Finances do not favour Arctic defence spending , because it is so expensive to generate offensive ground force capability for the region. Discussants turned to new applications of civilian/military cooperation to better defend the North, agreeing that states had to be mindful of bad strategic messaging surrounding the region that could alienate Northerners. The panel emphasized that investing in “dual use” infrastructure to support both defence platforms and the economic activities of Northerners is an excellent way forward. Despite the financial constraints, the panel noted that the Arctic is a unique security environment due to its low population density that opens up maneuver space for militaries they do not have elsewhere. [14]

The Arctic Dilemma and NORAD Modernization

MGen Roch Pelletier opened the second day of the conference with a keynote that addressed generation of a persistent force in the Arctic. From a Canadian perspective, this meant sending in expeditionary land forces from southern Canada to operate in the North for extended periods of time. He disabused participants of the notion that winter warfare equated to Arctic warfare, with the former being a time and the latter being a place. This required practical experience and training in the Arctic. Forces operating there could expect a wide range of missions, from humanitarian relief and search and rescue (SAR) to providing point security at infrastructure and thus deterrence. Forces currently deployed in the Canadian Arctic are geared toward providing human security rather than traditional national defence. A constraint on current and future forces in the region is that they can only put limited pressure on the strained infrastructure of Northern communities. He forecasted that it will be hard to operate land forces in the Canadian Arctic for the foreseeable future. [15]

Panel 4: Diplomacy and International Cooperation looked at transnational indigenous diplomacy cross the Arctic and the integration of “high politics” of defence and diplomacy with the economic development of Northerners. Dr. Rauna Kuokkanen (University of Lapland), Dr. Leah Sarson (Dalhousie University), Madeleine Redfern (Arctic360), and Dr. Mark Riley (DRDC) examined how new “Track II” diplomacies could lead to better renewable energy and telecommunications across the North. In particular, they discussed how civilian harnessing of new defence infrastructure in support of NORAD modernization to help offset the large costs of building in the region. The panel concluded that enhancing relationships with indigenous communities across the North would lead to greater political certainty that would also attract the capital to the Arctic to help fuel these infrastructure projects.

Dr. Kuokkanen explained that the Sámi were excited to reestablish relations with their Russian brethren in the late 1980s and were central to the creation of the Arctic Council in the 1990s. This forum is unique in that its “Permanent Participants,” (a group of six organizations that represent Indigenous Peoples from throughout the Arctic)  opened a new era in Indigenous diplomacy.[16]

While scientific research by Russia and China is introducing uncertainty into the North, panelists anticipate that indigenous diplomacy will provide a calming force. Kuokkanen explained the history of successful Track II diplomacy by the Sámi, including establishing transnational links with their Russian brethren at the end of the Cold War and also helping to create the unique architecture of the Arctic Council afterwards. Both were stabilizing actions on the regional politics of the Arctic. Participants outlined future opportunities for indigenous diplomacy, such as providing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) for the region to politically stabilize it, and to help attract new business opportunities to develop it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upset Arctic regional partnerships to the detriment of all. While the Arctic Council has recently “paused” all official actions due to the war in Ukraine, Arctic states remain committed to collaboration with Indigenous Peoples and their diplomatic efforts advance larger foreign policy concerns. This “Track II” diplomacy is hindered, however, by the limited resources of indigenous groups. Dr. Sarson argued that with infrastructure costs in the Arctic being significantly more than they are in the South, investment in the North is central to enabling and legitimizing the involvement of Northerners in their national polices. Private investment is required but these monies need regulatory certainty before committing to the North.  

Panels and their discussions pointed out that Russia is the major Arctic state. They argued that Russia did not want conflict in the Arctic with the country seeing the region as central to its future economic development. This is most notably reflected with the “pausing” of the Arctic Council, and its resumption of work not involving Russia. Ultimately, Russian action in Ukraine had directly contradicted international laws and norms – particularly those based around state sovereignty – and thus had undermined the legitimacy of Arctic relations built upon this sovereignty. Arctic regional relations have thus been fragmented from being circumpolar in scope through the Arctic Council to many sub-regional interactions. The Arctic isolation and economic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, noted many conference participants, opened it to exploitation by China.

The notion of “dual use” – building defence infrastructure that helps support civilian communities – was repeatedly referenced throughout the conference as a way to mitigate the costs imposed by the Arctic dilemma. Not only would this provide additional political value to defence dollars spent in the North, but it would help generate the economic growth there advocated by Goldy Hyder in his opening keynote address. The dual use approach to infrastructure, participants hoped, would bring costs down in the North, better connecting it to the larger world, and build needed resiliency at the community level. Empowered communities, discussions revealed, would better resist the sort of hybrid threats facing the North. Sarson pointed out that developing this relationship between Canada and its Northerners would help to mitigate perceptions of economic uncertainty in the Arctic, attracting capital to fund additional development and further alleviating the dilemma.

Discussions of dual use defence infrastructure and indigenous diplomacy establish the notion of a virtuous cycle of security and development for the Arctic, where improving one improves the other. Panelists were adamant that for such a scenario to occur, however, Northerners – especially indigenous Northerners – had to be made meaningful participants in the security and development of the Arctic. Doing so would create a secured and resilient Arctic despite growing international competition there.

Madeleine Redfern tied these previous presentations together, arguing that the political mantra “nothing about us without us” would build better governance between the North and South, leading to greater stability for infrastructure investment in the North and national security for both. Riley reiterated earlier observations that dual use defence investment is an enabler for both national security and Northern prosperity – each reinforcing the other.  Redfern’s presentation outlined the stark reality for participants of the overall lack of infrastructure across the Canadian Arctic. She emphasized the size of the North and its small population, with limited transportation links leading to a scarcity of goods in these communities and thus high prices. This transportation bottleneck and small population has led to very scarce telecommunications infrastructure that is almost completely dependent upon satellites. Energy is a necessary component of this telecommunications infrastructure, but there is limited generation and the diesel fuel that powers these generators compete for space in the transportation bottleneck. Overall this has led to telecommunications with little resiliency, leading to blackouts, and that are increasingly hard pressed to interact with southern networks that are far outpacing it technologically, particularly in bandwidth.

Compared to the importance of the Arctic in Russian thinking, panelists noted that the region is a peripheral concern for China. China is seen as the “pacing threat” at an international level of analysis but not from a regional perspective. Chinese influence on the region has been constrained by its diplomatic tactics elsewhere (the fallout from Huawei and the detainment of the “two Michaels” were provided as examples) leaving it less room to maneuver in the Arctic. However, participants noted that China does want to ensure its access to Arctic resources and shipping lanes and that requires it projecting a presence into the region. In the short-term, it has taken a “wait and see” approach to the Arctic, with some signs it has taken advantage of Russian weakness to develop resources there. However the primary way it is projecting presence into the Arctic, argued panelists, is through scientific research. One half of “Track II” diplomacy – conducting scientific research in the Arctic – not only “normalizes” Chinese (and Russian) activity in the region, but provides opportunity to influence future development. Also, the research undertaken is opaque, raising the concern that it could have military applications.[17]

Panel 5: Joint Security Cooperation, comprised of Dr. Njord Wegge (Forsvaret) and Dr. Leon Strauss (US Marine Corps Command and Staff College); and Maj. Michael Tovo and Maj. Devin Kirkwood (US Naval Postgraduate School);and Col. Cliff Souza, Commander, 109th Operations Group (New York Air National Guard) tackled joint security and civil/military cooperation across the Arctic. This included a return to examining how NATO’s Northern Flank could be defended by US Marine Corps (USMC) expeditionary forces; the technical challenges of training and operating Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the European Arctic; and recognizing how essential airlift is to supporting these and other military and scientific operations across the circumpolar world. The panelists recognized that conducting military training in the North American Arctic put pressure on strained community infrastructure and that establishing and maintaining relationships with these communities were essential to successful operations. [18]

            Wegge and Strauss explained that the USMC had an excellent relationship with Norway and would be used to defend NATO’s Northern Flank there in the event of war. Russia has new maritime doctrine of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) activities surrounding its Bastion concept,[19] but the assumption driving USMC planning is that the Corps could push through this, making it past the Greenland/Iceland/UK (GIUK) Gap to Norway. Discussion returned to the “Arctic Dilemma” and the investment in Arctic-specific capabilities, specifically in relation to SOF. Tovo and Kirkwood argued that a persistent presence is needed to generate real capability in the North – that “Arctic tourism” would only get a military so far. Discussion shifted to the Canadian Rangers as a possible model to offer militaries persistent presence in the High Arctic at an affordable price. While participants posited that the Rangers were under-resourced, they were presented as a force that link Northern communities to their militaries. The panelists noted that contract aircraft gave an alternative option for militaries to help bolster their Arctic logistics when needed. [20]

Tovo and Kirkwood argued that a false dichotomy existed between war and peace for SOF – their concern being training in the Arctic during a time of strategic competition. Here they focused their attention on Indigenous practices for inspiration, arguing “tech[nology] may change but the people remain.” Be it Marine warfighting or SOF competition, Col. Souza made clear that the logistics supporting the Arctic “is air mobility intensive.” Though the region currently lacks the infrastructure to support major air operations, Souza argued this can be quickly setup with pre-staging equipment at airfield hubs. The common message across presentations was that current American exercises were identifying what is needed, and where, to  operate in the High North. [21]

Panel 6: Strategies for the Future had Dr. Thomas Hughes (University of Manitoba), Professor Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv (University of Tromso,  the Arctic University of Norway), and Dr. Stephanie Pezard (RAND) reflected on the policy implications flowing from the previous presentations. These panelists concluded that the Arctic states had to get their signaling right (understanding other’s intentions) given the lack of institutional engagement with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, and that existing divides within Arctic communities are not exploited by geostrategic competition. Both are important given growing uncertainty over Russian and Chinese designs for the Arctic and those countries plans to reshape global governance.

Dr. Hughes observed that every action an Arctic state takes sends a message – states must be cognizant that what message is sent is not always what is received by others in order to create a predictable environment. He raised the provocative point that implementing a dual-use strategy can be seen as aggressive from Russian and Chinese perspectives. Dr. Gjørv noted that Russia’s perceptions of security are dynamic and have shifted over time while Western perceptions have broadened and deepened during this same period. Working to give Arctic populations agency will help them prepare for the possibility of crisis and resiliency to strategic narratives aimed to exploit internal divides.

Dr. Pezard reiterated that the Arctic is not a major priority for China, which is far more likely to use economic rather than military power in the region. She also noted that China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy for internal audiences often makes it is own worst enemy with foreign audiences. China does introduce increasing uncertainty about the future of the Arctic, amplifying the detrimental effects of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. [22] China and Russia see the Arctic as a treasure trove of resources to be exploited and the Arctic is an avenue of approach through which Russian and Chinese weapons could pass on their way to North America and Europe in the event of war. Pezard also argued  the Arctic is a part of both China’s and Russia’s overall “war” on liberal democracy, where changing norms there could affect the larger international system to their benefit.

Discussion acknowledged that Canada will always act on defence issues – including in the Arctic – in concert with its allies. Participants were encouraged to think about what the country can do now to alleviate its worries about an uncertain future for the Arctic. For example, the panel recognized that a “hybrid threat” does not always require a military response – that Northerners should be empowered to stand-up for themselves, and that increasing community resiliency fosters trust with their countries and allies. The panel concluded that continuing to talk about preparedness for an uncertain future will maintain political cohesion across the region.

Final Keynote

Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Wayne Eyre framed the effects  great power competition is having on the Arctic as a political region. He noted that the current rules-based international order is more fragile than ever and projected to become more volatile. Maintaining a stable and secure Arctic, Gen. Eyre argued, acted to buttress this stressed international architecture. However, the region is also under pressure from within by polarizing politics and the pronounced climate change evident across the Arctic “looms over all.” Gen. Eyre noted many of the structure challenges defending the North, such as the cold, large expanse, low population density, and lack of infrastructure that characterize the Canadian Arctic. He is particularly concerned about threats passing “through” the Arctic on their way south, stating that NORAD modernization is needed now, but that it alone does not get Canadians the level of security they will need heading into an uncertain future. Gen. Eyre specifically mentioned the need for new submarines, satellites, and cyber capabilities to not only defend Canada but to strike back if attacked.[23]

The participants saw potential threats in the material constraints imposed by the “Arctic dilemma,” and the unclear intentions of Russia and China, the nebulous intentions behind Northern science conducted by combined with the resulted in by participants. Gen. Eyre concluded that Arctic states need to develop a persistent presence in the North, in Canada’s case via deployment from the South. Meanwhile, Eyre explained, there must be an emphasis on generating greater community resilience in the North to respond to natural disasters and adapt to climate change. Both of these responses were dependent upon building new infrastructure across the North and enabling as much “dual-use” as possible by both militaries and civilians as possible.

Conclusion

The 2022 KCIS examined the topic of International Cooperation in the High North. It did it through panels that looked at international security challenges in the North and the effects of the great powers in the high North. In response to these challenges, panels examined defence capabilities in North America and the Arctic, diplomacy and international cooperation, and joint security cooperation. The final panel of the conference looked at strategies for the future. These panels and the discussions they generated were framed by keynote addresses by Goldy Hyder on the economic development of the Arctic, BGen Derek O’Malley on NORAD modernization, MGen Roch Pelletier on Canada’s ground game in North, and a closing keynote by Gen. Eyre pulling it all together. In her concluding remarks summarizing the panels and keynotes, BG Birckhead noted that while the Arctic had “come so far” in the aspiration of becoming “a zone of peace,” it still had “far to go.”

The conference showed that the “outside in” and “top down” forces of geopolitics and climate change were generating “bottom up” community levels responses from “inside out” of the Arctic. Participants collectively wove together a story of great power competition that would pass through the Arctic in the event of war, but that is already causing greater uncertainty to the region. Prudence demands a response to both threats. The challenges of limited forces and supporting infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic and the great cost of generating both presents a dilemma to defence planners – resources applied to the Arctic meant disproportionately less could be applied elsewhere in the great power game. Solutions to help mitigate this dilemma were found through making military infrastructure available to Northerners, while they would help acclimatize forces to the region and create a second diplomatic track to help stabilize the region and through it, the larger international system. Ultimately, participants argued such an approach would lead to greater prosperity for Northerners and security for all.

Ryan Dean recently received his PhD in Political Science at the University of Calgary. Ryan’s research focuses on Canadian Arctic polices, including issues of sovereignty, defence and governance. His dissertation examines the how societal actors have influenced the formulation of Canadian Arctic security policy since 1985. 

Dr. Michael E. Lynch is a research historian and assistant professor at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. As a research historian, Dr. Lynch conducts and supervises research for senior Army leaders on contemporary issues to provide insight and historical context. He

End Notes:

[1] David J. Singer, “The level-of-analysis problem in international relations,” World Politics 14, no. 1 (1961): 77-92.

[2] Dr. Stefanie von Hlatky was the Director, Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP), Queen’s University. She is now Associate Dean (Research), Faculty of Arts and Science, Queen’s University. BG Janeen Birckhead is Deputy Commandant, United States Army War College (USAWC).

[3] See Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 229-54.

[4] This alludes to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 “Murmansk Initiative” opening the door to establishing multilateral cooperation across the circumpolar North. See Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, “Gorbachev's Murmansk speech: the Soviet initiative and western response,” Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1989.

[5] Chigas, Diana. "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy ; “Military Confidence Building Measures: How to make them work,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/cbms/cbm2/

[6] Northerners is a colloquial term for the residents of the northern Canadian territories: Yukon, Northwest, and Nunavut. The term is inclusive for both indigenous and non-indigenous people.

[7] American participants use the term “Native” in place of “Indigenous.”

[8] The pause lasted only three months. Melody Schreiber, “Arctic Council nations are ‘pausing’ work after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Arctic Today, Mar. 3, 2022, https://www.arctictoday.com/the-7-other-arctic-council-nations-are-pausing-work-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ ; US State Department, “ Joint Statement on Limited Resumption of Arctic Council Cooperation,” June 8, 2022,  https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation/

[9] For more on the concept of functionalism, see Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the nation state: Functionalism and international organization (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2008).

[10] Brig. Gen. Derek O’Malley is Deputy Commander, Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Region and Deputy Joint Force Air Component Commander for 1 Canadian Air Division.

[11] For a classic examination of deterrence theory, see Robert Jervis, “Deterrence theory revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 289-324.

[12] COL JP Clark was the project officer at HQ, Department of the Army, for development of the US Army Arctic Strategy and the Army Arctic Wargame. At the time of the conference, he was assigned to the faculty of the US Army War College.

[13] Operation (Op) NANOOK is the Canadian Armed Force annual northern operation comprised of a series of comprehensive exercises  across Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Labrador designed to exercise the defense of Canada. “Operation NANOOK,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nanook.html

[14] See Jordi Molas-Gallart, “Which way to go? Defence technology and the diversity of ‘dual-use’ technology transfer,” Research policy 26, no. 3 (1997): 367-385 for an early examination of the topic.

[16] See Arctic Council, “Permanent Participants,” Arctic Council Organization at https://www.arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/.

[17]  Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were arrested in China in December 2018 and charged with espionage in retaliation for the arrest Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. Meng had been indicted for bank and wire fraud in the United States and was arrested in Canada on an extradition warrant. The pair were released after the US agreed to deferred prosecution for Meng. See Amanda Coletta, “Canada’s ‘two Michaels’ back home after more than 1,000 days imprisoned in China as Huawei’s Meng cuts deal with U.S.” Washington Post, Sep. 25, 2021.

[18] For Arctic SOF operations, see James R. Morton Jr. and Troy J. Bouffard, “Special Operation Forces and the Arctic: Meeting North America’s 21st Century Security Needs,” Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, August 2022.

[19] Kristian Atland, “The Introduction, Adoption and Implementation of Russia's “Northern Strategic Bastion” Concept, 1992–1999,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 4 (2007): 499-528.

[20] See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, The Canadian Rangers: A Living History (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).

[21] Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds, “The UK and the Arctic: The strategic gap,” The RUSI Journal 156, no. 3 (2011): 72-79 and Rebecca Pincus “Towards a new Arctic: changing strategic geography in the GIUK Gap,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 3 (2020): 50-58.

[22] Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’,” The Diplomat 15 (2020): 648-658 and Peter Martin, China's civilian army: The making of wolf warrior diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[23] P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Threats Through, To, and In the Arctic: A Framework for Analysis,” NAADSN Policy Brief (23 March, 2021) at https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Lackenbauer_Threats-Through-To-and-In-the-Arctic.pdf.